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INTRODUCTION

As the twenty-first century opens, Americans are embracing
monitoring as a matter of private ethics and state policy. Since
the events of September 11, 2001,1 Congress has focused
considerable legislative efforts on the government's duty to
monitor the public space. The USA Patriot Act of 20012 now
provides the government with broad power to monitor people
and organizations in the United States. 3 The government sought
to create a single gateway for all information generated within

the United States, 4 and criticism naturally followed. 5

In

1 When four domestic airplanes were hijacked, close to 3,000 people died after
one plane crashed into the Pentagon, another plane crashed in central
Pennsylvania, and the two remaining planes crashed into the World Trade Center,
destroying both buildings. Some recently published books document the country's
response to the events of 9/11. See generally STEVEN BRILL, AFTER: HOW AMERICA
CONFRONTED THE SEPTEMBER 12TH ERA (2003) (discussing personal reactions and

experiences of Americans on the days after September 11th); BOB WOODWARD,
BUSH AT WAR (2002) (documenting President George Bush's response to September
11th in the 100 days after the attacks).
2 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
3 See id. §§ 201-202, 115 Stat. at 278 (broadening the government's authority
intercept wire, oral or electronic communications relating to terrorism, computer
fraud, and other abuse offenses). Section 207 increases the duration of government
surveillance of non-United States persons serving as agents of foreign powers. See
id. § 207, 115 Stat. at 282.
4 Admiral John Poindexter was initially assigned to head the Information
Awareness Office (IAO) aimed at gathering intelligence to preempt terrorist attacks,
but Admiral Poindexter has since stepped down. See Bradley Graham, Poindexter
Resigns but Defends Programs;Anti-Terrorism, Data Scanning Efforts at Pentagon
Called Victims of Ignorance, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2003, at A2. The IAO was
created after September lth by the Pentagon's Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA). DARPA is the Department of Defense's central research
and development organization that centers on high risks with high payoffs, with the
goal of creating various technologies that may help catch terrorists. The Total
Information Awareness Project, which has since been renamed the Terrorist
Information Awareness Program, is part of DARPA. Additionally, the Department
of Homeland Security earlier in 2003 attempted to get legislation passed that would
enable it to create a major database linking information from credit cards
companies, medical insurers and motor vehicle agencies in hopes of snaring
terrorists. See Report to Congress Regarding the Terrorism Information Awareness
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addition, citizens themselves have been urged to greater
vigilance to report suspicious activity or persons. 6 Once the
province solely of totalitarian regimes, the apparatus of
governmentally enforced and directed monitoring has assumed a
7
substantial prominence within the free world.
Monitoring has also assumed greater prominence in the
regulation of business entities. Much of this focus on monitoring
preceded the events of September 11, 2001, and it reflects years
of governmental efforts to delegate responsibility for monitoring
and reporting obligations to various groups within the private
sector. For example, the war on gang and drug activity produced
anti-money-laundering statutes through which banks and other
financial intermediaries recieved substantial monitoring and
reporting obligations with respect to large cash transactions.6
Program: In Response to Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, Pub. L. No. 108-7,
Div. M, § 111(b) (2003), hhtp://www.darpa.millbody/tia/tia/TIA%20DI.pdf. (last
visited Sept. 30, 2003); Electronic Privacy Information Center, "Terrorism"
Information Awareness (TIA), http://www.epic.org/privacy/profiling/tial (last visited
Sept.
11,
2003);
Defense
Advanced
Research
Projects
Agency,
http://www.darpa.mil/index.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2003).
5 For example, Iowa Senator Chuck Grassley criticized the proposed legislation
to link major databases, saying in a January 22, 2003 statement: "[Tlhis program
could be used to invade the privacy of Americans by snooping around in our bank
accounts, personal Internet computers, phone records and the like." Cutting Edge,
PEORIA J. STAR, Feb. 4, 2003, at C10.
6 See, e.g., Naftali Bendavid et al., U.S. Officials Spread Calls for Vigilance,
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 9, 2001, at A3; Bill Rankin & Tasgola Karla Bruner, Ashcroft Calls
for Greater Vigilance, ATLANTA J. CONST., Nov. 20, 2002, at A8.
7 It is with some irony that one can access on the official website of the MarxistSocialist government of Cuba the suggestion that the American government has
attempted to create its own version of the revolutionary neighborhood committees
for the defense of the revolution-Comitis de Defensa de la Revoluci6n. These
committees were established by the Cuban government after 1959 to enlist citizens
in the monitoring and reporting of their fellow citizens in the cause of the Cuban
revolution, that is, against acts of counterrevolutionary terrorism. See Victor
Joaquin Ortega, Comits de Defensa en USA...? En el Reino del Terrorismo, LA
CALLE, http://www.lacalle.cubaweb.cu/latitudes/cdr-usa.htm (last visited Sept. 30,
2003).
8 See Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-310, 112 Stat. 2941 (1998). The Act began a five year initiative for the
government to combat money laundering and related financial crimes through both
detection and prevention. See id. § 5341, 112 Stat. at 2942. Money laundering
statutes and the obligations of banks and others is beyond the scope of this article.
For more information on this subject see, for example, Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha,
Correspondent Banking after September 11: New Controls Will Combat Money
Laundering and Money Transfers That Aid Illegal Acts, L.A. LAW., Sept. 2002, at
27; Eduardo Aninat et al., Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of
Terrorism, FIN. & DEV., Sept. 2002, at 44; Raymond W. Baker, The Biggest Loophole
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The development of new prosecutorial strategies for charging
corporations for unlawful activity resulted in an increased
emphasis on the monitoring and disclosure obligations of
corporations with respect to their internal operations. 9 These
prosecutorial initiatives have been sharply criticized. 10 Such
emphasis on monitoring and disclosure, however,
was
instrumental in shaping innovations to the nature and scope of
state fiduciary duty of care principles, especially in the state of
Delaware." While academics' 2 and others 13 criticized Caremark
in the Free-MarketSystem, WASH. Q., Autumn 1999, at 29.
9 See Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to
All Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against
Corporations (June 16, 1999), http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Charging
corps.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2003); Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson,
Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Heads of Dep't Components, U.S.
Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20,
2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm
(hereinafter New
Guidelines) (last visited Sept. 30, 2003). The "existence and adequacy of the
corporation's compliance program" is one of the factors prosecutors use to determine
whether to charge a corporation. Id. at Part II.A.5.
10 See American College of Trial Lawyers, The Erosion of the Attorney-Client
Privilege and Work Product Doctrine in Federal Criminal Investigations, 41 DUQ. L.
REV. 307, 321-23 (2003); see also Carl E. Person, Criminal Prosecution Reform
Website: The Worst Federal ProsecutorialAbuses and Misconduct with Suggested
Remedies, at http://www.lawmall. com/abuse/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2003). The web
site is devoted to criminal prosecution reform that lists "The Worst Federal
Prosecutorial Abuses and Misconduct with Suggested Remedies." Id. The web site
aims to give those accused of wrongdoing a chance to respond to the "wrongdoing,
profit-making prosecutorial enterprise." Id. It asserts that those accused are victims
of a biased and corrupt system that needs drastic changes to become more fair. See
id.
11 See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch.
1996); Cheryl L. Wade, Racial Discrimination and the Relationship Between the
DirectorialDuty of Care and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 389, 403-20
(2002).
12 See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, Lessons from Enron, How did Corporateand
Securities Law Fail? The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate
Governance?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189, 1203 (2003); Stephen A. Radin, Year 2000 Bank
Director Liability Issues: State Law Breach of FiduciaryDuty and Mismanagement
Claims,
in
1
YEAR
2000
LIAB.
PREVENTION
& LITIG.
MANUAL,
http://www.weil.com/wgm/Cbyline.nsf/0/bd2a95f10865e4cd8525681700502f7
9?OpenDocument (last visited Sept. 30, 2003). Radin argues that Caremark
guidelines are insufficient because they may only apply when an action is taken,
including a decision not to act, but that the guidelines do not apply when no decision
or action is taken at all. See id. But see Eric A. Chiappinelli, A Tribute to Chancellor
William T. Allen: Bill Allen in Class, 21 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 613, 619-20 (1998).
13 See, e.g., Ronald Berenbeim, How Effective Are Corporate Codes in
Combating Corruption?, International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC) (1999),
http://www.transparency.org/iacc/9th-iacc/papers/day2/ws3/d2ws3_rberenbeim.html
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principles, the principles enunciated in the case are used by
federal prosecutors to expand the importance of corporate
internal monitoring in determining whether charging a
corporation is appropriate. 14 Federal courts appear increasingly
willing to impose personal liability on majority shareholders of
closely-held corporations for the illegal activities of the corporate

entity. 15
Since 1995, corporate monitoring obligations expanded
significantly to embrace non-corporate actors. These actors,
principally auditors and outside counsel, appeared strategically
placed to supplement the inside monitoring by corporate
management and the outside institutional monitoring by
agencies of the federal and state government. 16 In 1995, the
federal government enacted the Private Securities Litigation

(last visited Sept. 30, 2003). "Absent a system that encourages employees to expose
inappropriate conduct, codes will never achieve their full potential to deter
wrongdoing.... Companies need to strengthen code compliance verification
procedures." Id.
14 See New Guidelines, supra note 9, at Part VII.B.
For example, do the corporation's directors exercise independent review
over proposed corporate actions rather than unquestioningly ratifying
officers' recommendations; are the directors provided with information
sufficient to enable the exercise of independent judgment, are internal
audit functions conducted at a level sufficient to ensure their independence
and accuracy and have the directors established an information and
reporting system in the organization reasonable [sic] designed to provide
management and the board of directors with timely and accurate
information sufficient to allow them to reach an informed decision
regarding the organization's compliance with the law.
Id. (citing In re Caremark Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996)).
15 This trend is most obvious in the area of environmental law under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000). Recent cases, however, suggest a willingness of
at least the appellate courts to find a basis for imposing monitoring obligations, and
liability when monitoring fails, on majority shareholders where corporate
discrimination is at issue. See Holley v. Crank, 258 F.3d 1127, 1132-36 (9th Cir.
2001), vacated by Meyer v. Holley, 530 U.S. 280 (2003).
16 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, UnderstandingEnron: "It'sAbout the Gatekeepers,
Stupid," 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1414-20 (2002) (providing an academic articulation of
this position and discussing the necessary role of auditors and lawyers as
gatekeepers and approaches to correcting the problems leading to gatekeeper
failure, like that of the Enron collapse). See generally H. Lowell Brown, The
Dilemma of Corporate Counsel Faced With Client Misconduct: Disclosure of Client
Confidences or Constructive Discharge,44 BUFF. L. REV. 777 (1996) (discussing how
inside counsel face different constraints and the options open to counsel who
discover corporate misconduct and solutions for both the corporate client and the
former counsel who dissociate because of disclosure of illegality).
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Reform Act (PSLRA). 17 While the Act's principal thrust was
against the plaintiffs' bar, section 301 created the new section
10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.18 This section
imposed a duty on a reporting company's outside auditors to
investigate and report to corporate management information
indicating that an illegal act had taken place or might occur.' 9
In 2002, the federal government enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(SOA). 2 ° A number of the provisions of SOA amplify actual and
potential monitoring obligations of auditors. 2'
In addition,
section 307 of SOA 22 seems to have the potential for imposing
new ethical obligations on lawyers who practice before the
SEC. 23 As amplified in the regulations of the SEC and other
17

Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.

18

Id. § 301; 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1.

19 Id. See generally Thomas Riesenberg, Trying to Hear the Whistle Blowing:
The Widely Misunderstood "Illegal Act" Reporting Requirements of Exchange Act
Section 10A, 56 BUS. LAW. 1417 (2001) (providing a fairly partisan discussion of this
provision and describing the statutory scheme, legislative history, and impact of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act).
20 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. The statute is titled: "An Act [t]o protect
investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made
pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes." Id. It was adopted in
response to the increase in restatements of corporate earnings following a spate of
disclosures of possible large scale wrongdoing in some of the largest public
companies in the United States. See 148 CONG. REC. H5462 (daily ed. July 25, 2002)
(statement of Rep. Oxley.) The bill was signed by the President on July 30, 2002.
See 148 CONG. REC. D866 (daily ed. July 31, 2002).
21 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 201-209, 15 U.S.C.A. 78c(a)(58), 78j1(g)-(k), 7231 (West Supp. 2003); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failuresof
the Enron Board and the New Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CONN. L.
REV. 1125, 1136 (2003) ("In this sense Sarbanes-Oxley can be seen as attempting to
calibrate the mandatory disclosure system to a world in which the board of a public
corporation will have insufficient incentives to undertake high-powered monitoring
of corporate finance and, therefore, market monitoring must be strengthened.").
Those acknowledging this focus have also criticized the new monitoring regime. See,
e.g., Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002 Style, 40 HOUS.
L. REV. 1, 50 (2003).

Post-Enron reforms, including Sarbanes-Oxley, rely on increased
monitoring by independent directors, auditors, and regulators who have
both weak incentives and low- level access to information. This monitoring
has not been, and cannot be, an effective way to deal with fraud by highly
motivated insiders. Moreover, the laws are likely to have significant costs,
including perverse incentives of managers, increasing distrust and
bureaucracy in firms, and impeding information flows.
Id.

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245.
Section 307 provides that the Commission shall issue rules, including:
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of

22
23
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agencies, these obligations impose significant new monitoring
and reporting requirements on lawyers with respect to corporate

conduct.

24

By the first years of the twenty-first century, the general
Some of the
trend in federal lawmaking became clear.
obligations of lawyers and auditors were converging despite the
very different natures of their primary societal roles. PSLRA
section 10A and SOA section 307 represent parallel
developments. Both focus on a shift of the primary duty of
lawyers and accountants from their private clients to the
government, the ultimate monitor, and the public at large. The
resistance of the organized bar was broken with the enactment
of SOA. Like auditors, at least to the extent required by statute,
lawyers now have been burdoned with a "public responsibility
''25
transcending any employment relationship with the client.
With SOA for lawyers and section 10A for accountants, federal
law has begun to recognize "the similar economic function that
play as reputational
both transactional lawyers and accountants
26
intermediaries for their corporate clients."
While the government was increasing the monitoring
obligations of corporate insiders and outside corporate
gatekeepers, legislation was enacted to reduce the scope and
power of shareholders to monitor corporate conduct through
derivative litigation. 27 The PSLRA represented a significant
securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the
company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief

executive officer of the company (or the equivalent thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence
(adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with
respect to the violation), requiring the attorney to report the evidence to
the audit committee of the board of directors of the issuer or to another
committee of the board of directors comprised solely of directors not
employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors.
Id., 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245.
24 See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-47276, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
25 United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984) (holding there
is no work product privilege for accountant work). I suggest here, of course, a
potential consequence of the Act in terms of its power to conflate lawyers' and
accountants' roles with respect to corporate clients.
26 Peter C. Kostant, Paradigm Regained: How Competition From Accounting
Firms May Help Corporate Attorneys to Recapture the Ethical High Ground, 20
PACE L. REV. 43, 60 (1999).
27 The value of shareholder litigation as a monitoring device has been
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effort to reduce the scope of shareholder power exercised through
derivative litigation. 28 In addition, the 1990s saw significant
strengthening of the power of a board of directors to effect
dismissal of derivative actions without breaching the obligations
of the board under state fiduciary duty principles. 29 The rise in
power and prominence of theoretically independent members of
boards of directors is well-known. 30 The independent-director
model of corporate governance, at least for publicly traded
companies, had a significant effect outside the borders of the
United States. The recent Higgs Commission report in the
United Kingdom concluded that there was a need to move to an
31
independent director model of corporate governance.

questioned. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as
Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 7 (1985)
(discussing how the shift toward independent directors has decreased value of
shareholder litigation as a monitoring device).
28 See Joel Seligman, The Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, 38 ARIZ. L.
REV. 717, 719-20 (1996).
29 Cases involving judicial review of board decisions provide guidance. See
Scattered Corp. v. Chi. Stock Exch., Inc., 701 A.2d 70, 75-77 (Del. 1997) (reviewing
a board decision not to bring suit after demand; Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981) (reviewing a board action when a special independent
committee recommends termination). Special litigation committees, composed of a
majority of disinterested directors may, after a good faith investigation, recommend
termination of a derivative suit if the termination is in the best interests of the
company. Commentary on internal corporate investigations in also helpful. See, e.g.,
Arthur F. Mathews, Internal Corporate Investigations,45 OHIO ST. L.J. 655, 675-76
(1984); Thomas R. Mulroy & Eric J. Mufioz, The Internal CorporateInvestigation, 1
DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 49, 49-50 (2002); James L. Rudolph & Gustoavo A. del
Puerto, The Special Litigation Committee: Origin, Development, and Adoption
Under Massachusetts Law, 83 MASS. L. REV. 47, 47-48 (1998).
30 An independent member of the board of directors is generally understood to
mean a person with no financial, personal, or other connection with the company or
officers of the company she serves. See NYSE Approves Measures to Strengthen
Corporate Accountability: New Standards Aim to Restore Investor Confidence,
EXCHANGE, Aug. 2002, at 1-2, http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/xnlv9n08.pdf (last visited
Sept. 30, 2003) (stating a director must have no material relationship with the
company to be deemed "independent"); see also Donald E. Pease, Outside Directors:
Their Importance to the Corporationand Protectionfrom Liability, 12 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 25, 29-30 (1987).
31 In April, 2002, "Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Patricia Hewitt
and the Chancellor, Gordon Brown ....
appointed Derek Higgs to lead an
independent Review into the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors."
Press Release, U.K. Dep'tof Trade and Industry, Derek Higgs Appointed to Lead
Review
of
Non-Executive
Directors
(April
15,
2002),
http://www.nds.coi.gov.uk/coi/coipress.nsf/2b45ele3ffe090ac802567350059d840/1256
a817e7cec2e280256b9c004bb3e3?OpenDocument (last visited Sept 30, 2003). The
report of Derek Higgs on the role of non-executive directors in English companies
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While a tremendous amount of time and effort has been
spent on the need to create and enforce monitoring duties among
corporate insiders and outsiders, relatively little time has been
spent thinking through the nature of the duty created or the
scope of activities to be monitored. The conventional, fairly
thoughtless answer focuses on corporate misconduct based on
violations of federal securities laws and state fiduciary duty
law-that is, for violations of disclosure obligations and
obligations of corporate fiduciaries to act with appropriate care
and solely in the best interests of the corporation or its
shareholders.
This conventional approach reflects a focus on the abuses of
derivative litigation process and its deleterious
shareholder
the
It also represents a more
effects on corporate governance.
forceful reaction to the corporate scandals of the late twentieth
and early twenty-first centuries. These scandals profoundly
influenced the relationship between law and American business.
a
In 2000, at a time when the nation appeared to be heading into 32
election,
presidential
contested
mild recession after a hotly
allegations surfaced of large-scale fraudulent transactions and
accounting practices at Enron, one of the principal energy
intermediary companies in the nation. 33 The company was
eventually forced to seek bankruptcy protection, 34 and its top
executives, many with access to the highest levels of the
was recently published. See Derek Higgs, Review of the Role and Effectiveness of
Non-Executive Directors (Jan. 2003), http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/non-execreview/
pdfslhiggsreport.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2003). Many of the proposals would go
into effect at the end of July, 2003. The Report recommended that at least one half
of the directors, excluding the chairman, be independent. See id. at 9.5. The report
also proposed that the roles of chairman and chief executive should be separated.
See id. at 5.3. Higgs was well aware of developments in the U.S. The Report
expressed concern regarding the American practice of concentrating authority in a
single individual serving as both chairman of the board of directors and chief
executive officer. See id. 2.8-.10.
32 See Peter G. Gosselin, PoliticalMess Raises Fears of Recession Economy, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2000, at C1.
33 See Daniel Fisher, Shell Game: How Enron Concealed Losses, Inflated
Earnings-andHid Secret Deals from the Authorities: Are Criminal Charges Next?,
FORBES, Jan. 7, 2002, at 52 (describing Enron's use of a network of external
partnerships to hide the declining value of its assets.); see also Allan Sloan et al.,
Who Killed Enron, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 21, 2002, at 18 ("[A] handful of executives and
outsiders made millions by investing in off-balance-sheet deals with Enron that
played a large role in destroying the company.").
34 See, e.g., Lanny J. Davis, Enron? We're Missing the Point, WASH. POST, Jan.
6, 2002, at Bl(providing an account from the popular press).
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35
American government, were either prosecuted or ruined.
WorldCom, a worldwide telecommunications company, collapsed
soon thereafter, following allegations of more simple-minded yet
large-scale accounting fraud. 36 The founding family of Adelphia,
a large cable broadcast company in the Northeast United States,
ushered in a renewed media focus on the anti-celebrity of the
white collar "perp-walk 37 after the commencement of

35 See Carrie Johnson & Peter Behr, Charges Near in Probe of Enron Officer;

Former CFO Fastow is Task Force's Focus, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2002, at El
(discussing how investigators from the Justice Department's Enron task force and
the Securities and Exchange Commission attempt to prove that former executives
knew, or should have known, that Enron was dependent on sham asset sales and
inflated financial deals.); see also Alexei Barrionuevo et al., Enron's Fastow Charged
With Fraud, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2002, at A3 (describing charges against former
Enron chief financial officer, Andrew Fastow).
Kenneth Lay, the CEO who was the friend of the current President and VicePresident, was forced to resign and seek the protection of obscurity but has to date
managed to avoid indictment. See Jonathan Weil & Alexei Barrionuevo, Justice
Department Finds Building Criminal Case Against Lay Tough, WALL ST. J., Aug.
26, 2002, at A3.
A significant aspect of the Enron meltdown is that officers, such as
Kenneth Lay, and, more generally, the other members of the Enron board
of directors, likely did not steal directly from the cash register. Instead,
they relied upon assurances of technical compliance to insulate them from
the consequences of improper behavior as they inflated the price of Enron
stock for their own gain.
William H. Widen, Enron at the Margin, 58 BUS. LAW. 961, 967 (2003).
36 See, e.g., Shawn Young et al., WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J.,
July 22, 2002, at A3 (revealing WorldCom filed for bankruptcy protection after
accumulating $41 billion of debt due to, in part, misstating $3.8 billion in expenses
for five quarters); see also The Lessons of WorldCom, WASH. POST, July 23, 2002, at
A16 ("WorldCom's accounts were spectacularly misleading: Nearly $4 billion in
expenses were misreported, creating a huge overrepresentation of the firm's
profits."); Jon Van, Ex-WorldCom Execs Charged with Fraud; 3 Others Likely to
Plead Guilty, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 29, 2002, at 1 (noting that accounting irregularities
at Worldcom were reported as high as $7.1 billion, nearly twice the amount
originally disclosed).
37 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Auditors and the Fourth Amendment: Data
with the Power to Inspire Political Action, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221 (2003)
(providing a more nuanced insight on the perp-walk in the broader context of
"racialized" criminality). In particular, he notes that
[l]urthermore, entertainment value means that juicy, atypical crime
stories that either meet audiences' pre-existing expectations or are novel
only in their severity crowd out coverage of more typical crimes. Several
structural factors skew the media's presentation of the role of race in the
criminal justice system. Television coverage, for example, reflects an
inadvertent class bias: Middle-and-upper-income persons, a group that is
disproportionately white, have the skills and resources to afford bail, get
good legal representation, and get advice on handling the press. In short,
they look good on television. Police are also more likely to protect their
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investigations related to allegations of large-scale misuse of
corporate funds for unsuccessful family ventures. 38 Tyco, a large
conglomerate, suffered severe losses after revelations of the use
of corporate funds to support the lavish life styles of select
corporate executives and allegations of questionable financial
reporting. 39
Many other companies quietly reviewed and
restated their financial reports to avoid scandal and potential
prosecution.
The focus on one set of scandals affecting corporations at the
end of the twentieth century should not blind us to other
scandals that plagued corporations during that time. Enrontype financial and securities laws violations were not the only
significant corporate scandals of the early twenty-first century.
For example, while Enron was collapsing, Texaco faced a
massive racial discrimination lawsuit. 40 The evidence in that
litigation demonstrated significant passive evasion and cover up
at all levels of the corporation. 41 Texaco was not the only large
privacy. But poor, low-status offenders, a group that is disproportionately
comprised of racial or ethnic minorities, often do not make bail, and are
more likely to appear disheveled, poorly dressed, and threatening on the
news, when reporters cover their "perp-walks" to the station, frequently
having been alerted by the police.
Id. at 261.
38 See Christopher Stern, Members of Rigas Family Indicted; 3 Ex-Adelphia
Officials Accused of Conspiracy, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2002, at El ("[T]he
Rigases... allegedly] used Adelphia funds to cover more than $250 million in
personal stock losses."); see also Bill Bergstrom, Adelphia Boss Took in $67 Million;
Agents Document Hefty Advances From Cable Firm, CHI. TRIB., July 29, 2002, at 6
(stating that bills from family owned companies, including the Buffalo Sabres
professional hockey team, a furniture and interior design company, a car dealership,
and a number of partnerships, were allegedly paid out of Adelphia bank accounts);
Geraldine Fabrikant, Indictments for Founder of Adelphia and Two Sons, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2002, at C1 (revealing the charges of conspiracy, securities fraud,
wire fraud, and bank fraud against the three in connection with their economic
activities involving Adelphia).
39 See, e.g., Kevin McCoy, Authorities Widen Tyco Case, Look at Other Officials'
Actions, USA TODAY, Aug. 13, 2002, at 1A; Floyd Norris, Now Will Come the Sorting
Out of the Chief Executive's Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2002, at C1.
40 See Roberts v. Texaco, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). In settling the
case, Texaco agreed to increase the salaries of all members of the complaining class
by 11.34%, implement programs to eradicate prejudice throughout their company,
and establish diversity and equal opportunity for all employees. Id. at 191-92.
41 See id. at 190. The named plaintiff in the case, Bari-Ellen Roberts, a Finance
Department employee, alleged that she was denied a promotion for which she
claimed she was qualified after she requested and the company rejected her request
that Texaco implement an equal opportunity program. Id. at 202-03. Evidence
showed that Texaco directors rejected Robert's suggestion and one director said,
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corporation subject to charges of large-scale discrimination.
Coca-Cola, 42 Xerox, 43 and others 44 also faced such charges.
Discrimination actions against large public companies do not
45
appear to be a temporary phenomenon.
"before you know it, we will have Black Panthers in the Texaco parking lot." Id. at
202 n.27. Roberts also complained that Texaco directors rejected her formal
complaints and retaliated against her because of her complaints. See id. at 202.
After Roberts filed suit, she said that Texaco's EEO officer told her and another
plaintiff "not to show [their] faces at Texaco for a while" and another Texaco
supervisor threatened her with physical violence. Id. at 203. Another plaintiff, Sil
Chambers, challenged the Performance Management Process, a Texaco
management monitoring system, as discriminatory against women and minorities.
A Texaco director offered Chambers an increase in salary if Chambers withdrew his
complaint. Chambers refused, and Texaco managers embarked on a campaign to
embarrass Chambers in front of directors. Id. at 204.
42 See Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2001). In this
suit, plaintiffs' alleged that Coca-Cola's employment policies, including promotions,
compensation, and performance evaluations, discriminated against African
Americans. Id. at 1366. Coca-Cola reached a settlement agreement with the class
action representatives and the Court confirmed the settlement agreement. Id. at
1364-65. Coca-Cola agreed to make substantial programmatic changes, including
the establishment of a task force to oversee the changes, throughout the entire
company. Id. at 1368.
43 See Reed Abelson, Black Sales Agents File Discrimination Suit Against
Xerox, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at C4. In this case, African-American employees
filed a class action suit against Xerox corporation on May 9, 2001, alleging that
Xerox's sales organization was a "boys club" and a "buddy-buddy system." Id. White
managers excluded black employees from sales opportunities that offered higher
commissions and greater chance at promotion. Alicia Dean-Hall alleged the
promotion was given to a white male who was less qualified and less experienced
than her. Id. Kenneth Jimmerson alleged that following a reorganization, managers
allocated his lucrative sales opportunities to white employees with less experience
than him. Id. Dora Miller alleged that managers gave attractive sales territories to
white employees over her and had asked if another black sales representative was
"too black" to handle major accounts. Id. Another racial discrimination suit against
Xerox was filed in 2002. See Duncan Campbell, Workers Take Xerox to Court for
'Blacks in a Noose' Discrimination,GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 9, 2002, at 11.
44 See, e.g., Bloomberg News, Avis to Pay $3.3M in DiscriminationCase, SUNSENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Dec. 23, 1997, at 2D (discussing settlement
payment by Avis over discriminatory denial of rental cars to customers); Dave
L'Heureux, Eight Sue SCE&G for Discrimination, STATE (Columbia, S.C.), at B6
(listing a number of charges of discrimination against large public companies); Lisa
Miller, Justice Department Probes Allegations That Avis Practiced Discrimination,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 1997, at B6; Year-End Review of Markets & Finance 2001Review of What Was News-One Year, Two Worlds: What Was News in 2001, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 2, 2002, at 12 ("Morgan Stanley is sued by the EEOC, which charges
sexual discrimination against a former saleswoman who earned $1 million a year.
The government says its class-action suit on behalf of up to 100 women in the firm's
institutional-stock department is the first major case charging sexual bias against a
large brokerage house.").
45 See Alison Grant, Complaints to EEOC IncreasingNationally, PLAIN DEALER
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This Article focuses specifically on the scope of activities
covered by and the nature of the duties imposed by the new
monitoring statutes on outside gatekeepers, outside counsel, and
auditors in publicly-held corporations. The Article makes three
points. In Part I, I argue that the recent amendments to the
federal securities laws impose a duty on outside auditors and
counsel to seek out and report on an issuer's violation of any law,
rule or obligation which might have material effect on the issuer.
Part I reviews the nature of the monitoring burdens imposed by
recent legislation and case law on these actors under
professional accounting standards. The duty to report is not
limited to violations of federal securities laws, failures to
disclose, or acts of financial misconduct. Instead, the statutes
are written broadly, extending the duty to report to a wide range
of corporate misconduct, including violations of the antidiscrimination, environmental, and other laws. For purposes of
this Article, I focus on the effect of the new monitoring
compliance
with antiobligations on a corporation's
discrimination laws.
I argue in Part II of this Article that the duty to monitor and
report is active rather than passive; it imposes an active duty to
develop and implement monitoring systems that can detect
materially significant violations. I demonstrate how the relevant
statutes can be reasonably interpreted to impose positive
responsibilities on corporate counsel and auditors to uncover
corporate wrongdoing over a very broad range of activity. Both
auditors and outside counsel have affirmative duties to inquire.
Both have affirmative duties to be suspicious. Both have the
duty to implement systems of gathering information designed to
collect the sort of data that could trigger suspicion.
Consequently, neither lawyers nor accountants can narrowly
tailor their review to minimize the likelihood of detecting
evidence of wrongdoing. These active obligations may be limited
only by the scope of the gatekeeper's engagement with the
corporate client.

(Cleveland, Ohio), May 16, 2003, at C3 (providing a sample of the description of this
trend from the popular press). But see Mark Diana, Beginning of the End of Money
Damage Class Actions? The Future of Big Money Employment DiscriminationClass
Actions, on the Rise Since the 1991 Civil Rights Act Was Passed, Is Unsettled, 167
N.J. L.J.1270 (Mar. 25, 2002) (suggesting that limitations on class actions lawsuits
seeking money damages may slow the proliferation of such actions).
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Finally, in Part III of this Article, I assert that though
governmentally imposed monitoring obligations also protect
outside auditors and counsel against private actions for a failure
to comply with the duty to monitor and report, both auditors and
counsel risk liability as principals. I conclude by proposing that
while these new obligations present tremendous risk for outside
counsel and auditors, they may well present a significant
opportunity for litigants looking for deep pockets. In particular,
I demonstrate how the new monitoring obligations of corporate
counsel and auditors possibly gave rise to an obligation on their
parts to discover and report racial, ethnic, religious, gender, and
other forms of discrimination in the workplace. In addition, I
demonstrate how the failure to discover and to take appropriate
measures in the face of evidence of potential discrimination
within a corporation might leave corporations open to liability in
discrimination actions.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE DUTY TO MONITOR
Congress has imposed obligations to report violations of law
to their clients on both lawyers and auditors. The main objective
of these reporting requirements was to provide information to
corporate management, primarily the board of directors, about
potential legal violations. 46 By making information available to
the board of directors, Congress intended to reduce the
occurrence and severity of corporate misconduct.4 7 But the
46

148 CONG. REC. S6552 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards)

("This amendment is about making sure those lawyers, in addition to the
accountants and executives in the company, don't violate the law and, in fact, more
importantly, ensure that the law is being followed."). This is reflected in the
understanding of some SEC Commissioners. See, e.g.,

Cynthia A. Glassman,

Sarbanes-Oxley and the Idea of "Good" Governance, Address Before the American
(Sept. 27,
2002), at http://www.
Society
of Corporate Secretaries
sec.gov/news/speech/spch586.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2003) ("Recognizing that
awareness must precede action, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Commission's rules require
the CEO and Board to make certain that procedures are in place to ensure that they
hear bad news.").
47 See, for example, Harvey Pitt, then-SEC Chairman, commenting on
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, and stating that "[iut's difficult, and often impossible,
for government to discover frauds perpetrated with management collusion in the
early stages. This makes the need even stronger for people of integrity in
accounting, law and business who detect fraud early, or avert it." Harvey L. Pitt,
Remarks Before the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association's Business
Law Section (August 12, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch579.htm (last
visited Sept. 30, 2003); see also Implementation of Standards of Professional
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provisions were also meant to provide governmental regulators,
primarily the Securities and Exchange Commission, with
information about violations of law. 48
Armed with this
information, the government could enforce applicable laws more

effectively.

49

The focus of the reporting requirements for lawyers was on
corporate financial improprieties of the type that caused the
collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and the other corporations caught
Conduct for Attorneys, Exchange Act Release No. 34-46868, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670,
71,671-73 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205) (describing
earlier efforts to discipline lawyers leading up to enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
Section 307). In the proposed rule, the SEC also referred to evidence from the floor
debate regarding section 307 between Senators Edwards, Enzi, and Corzine
indicating "that they believed that an issuer's directors, once notified of the evidence
of a material violation could be counted on to remedy it." Id. at 71,687 n.55. This
result would parallel the results after enactment of Section 10A. Id. (citing in part
Riesenberg, supra note 19, at 1444-45).
48 In this regard there was something of a contrast between section PSLRA
10A
and SOA section 307. The SEC, however, in proposing that lawyers, under certain
circumstances, report to the SEC, attempted to finesse the difference in language
between section 10A and SOA section 307. As the SEC explained in its commentary
to the regulations proposed under SOA section 307:
Senator Enzi stated in the floor debate over Section 307 of the Act that
"[t]he amendment [he] support[ed] would not require the attorneys to
report violations to the SEC, only to corporate legal counsel or the CEO,
and ultimately, to the board of directors." 148 Cong. Rec. S6555 (July 10,
2002). He was, however, contrasting the reporting requirement in what
would be Section 205.3(b) of the proposed rule with the reporting
requirement in Section 1OA(3) of the Exchange Act. As Senator Enzi
explained, requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation
first to senior officers of an issuer, and then, if they do not rectify the
violation, to the board of directors, as Section 205.3(b) would, is "less
onerous" than Section 10A's requirement that an accountant must, as the
Senator put it, "report, both to the client's directors and simultaneously to
the SEC, an[] illegal act if management fails to take remedial action." Id.
(emphasis added). Senator Enzi nowhere suggested that an attorney
representing an issuer should not be required (1) to withdraw in the
unlikely and extreme event that the issuer's board of directors failed to
prevent an ongoing material violation and (2) to notify the Commission
that he had withdrawn for "professional considerations.
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. at
71,689 n.57; see also Financial Fraud Detection: Hearings on H.R. 574 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Fin. of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
103d Cong. 84 (1993) (statement of Rep. Markey) ("[T]here needs to be direct
reporting by the auditor to the SEC, within 1 day after notifying the board of
directors of the client firm, of the fraud which has been identified .... That's a big
change. That gives an earlier warning. The flag is going up.").
49 This notion was especially important in the passage of section 10A. See
Thomas L. Riesenberg, supra note 19, at 1426-27 (providing helpful citations to
legislative history).
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up in the scandals of 2000 through 2002.50
However, the
statutes were broadly written and broadly construed in the
regulations implementing them. A close reading of the new
gatekeeper provisions suggests that any form of corporate illegal
conduct, including conduct constituting violations of state and
federal anti-discrimination laws, is subject to the reporting
requirements imposed on accountants under section 10A of the
Exchange Act of 1934 and on lawyers under section 307 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and
the regulations
promulgated
thereunder. While the provisions can be read narrowly, 51 a
broad reading more likely accords with the sentiments of
Congress in enacting this requirement.
A.

The Scope of MonitoringBurdens:Auditors

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 5 2 added a new
section 10A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 53 Under this
provision, accountants performing audits for registered
companies are required to build procedures into their audits that
are designed to provide reasonable assurance of detecting illegal
acts that would have a direct material effect on the issuer's
financial statements, identify related party transactions, and
5 4 If
evaluate the issuer's ability to continue as a going concern.
50 Some of the relevant legislative history is quoted in John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1293-94
n.1 (2003).
51 Indeed, this has been suggested by some academic commentators. See, e.g.,
Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light
Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 966-68 (2003); Larry E.
Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 32 (2002); Riesenberg, supra note 19,
at 1433-34.
52 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
53 See id. § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2000).
54 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(a) (2000). Section 10A(a)(1) creates the requirement
that all auditors of 1934 Act reporting companies include "procedures designed to
provide reasonable assurance of detecting illegal acts that would have a direct and
material effect on the determination of financial statement amounts." Id. at § 78j1(a)(1). Should an auditor "detectf or otherwise becomef aware of information," id.
at § 78j-1(b)(1), during the course of an audit, the auditor is required to determine
"whether it is likely that an illegal act has occurred []and if so, determine and
consider the possible effect of the illegal act on the financial statements of the
insurer." Id. at § 78j-1(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
In addition, the auditor is required to "inform the appropriate level of
management.., and assure that the [board's] audit committee ... or the board of
directors ... is adequately informed with respect to illegal acts that have been
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there is a determination that an illegal act has or may have
occurred, the auditor is required under section 10A to make an
additional determination as to the effect of the illegal act on the
financial statements of the issuer. 55 This reporting requirement
applies to all "illegal act[s] (whether or not perceived to have a
material effect on the financial statements of the issuer)"5 6 if the
auditor determines that "it is likely that an illegal act has
57
occurred."
If the effect is determined to be other than inconsequential,
section 1OA(b) imposes on auditors the duty to report detected
illegal acts to management and to the audit committee. 58 If the
reported breach of law is not corrected in a timely manner and
the failure to take remedial action will warrant a departure from
the standard report of the auditor, the auditor is required
formally to report to the board of directors. 59 If the company
fails to inform the SEC of the receipt of this report, the auditor is
required to resign or to furnish the SEC with a copy of the
60
report.
The term "illegal act" in section 10A(f) is defined in the
statute as "an act or omission that violates any law, or any rule
or regulation having the force of law." 61 The actual meaning of
the term, however, has been the subject of some debate. The
black letter of the statute suggests that Congress intended a
detected." Id. at § 78j-l(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). The auditor is required to
"directly report its conclusions to the board of directors." Id. at § 78j-l(b)(2)(C). In
the event the auditor concludes that the illegal act has a material effect on the
issuer's financial statements, management has not taken or has not been caused to
take "timely and appropriate remedial actions," and the failure to take such
measures will prevent the auditor from issuing a standard audit report. Id. at § 78j1(b)(2)(A)-(C).
The auditor is also required to resign from its engagement or furnish the SEC
with a description of its report to the board, should the board, itself, fail to furnish
such a report to the SEC with a copy to the auditor. Id. at § 78j-1(b)(3)(A)-(B).
Should the auditor resign, it must furnish a copy of its report to the SEC. See id. at
§ 78j-1(b)(4). Should the SEC determine that the auditor "willfully violated" its
obligations, the SEC can impose civil penalties. Id. at § 78j-1(d). However, auditors
are protected against civil liability "in a private action for any finding, conclusion, or
statement expressed in a report made" pursuant to Section 10A.Id. at § 78j-1(c).
55 Id. § 78j-1(b)(1).
56 Id.

Id. § 78j-l(b)(1)(A)(i).
11 Id. § 78j-l(b)(1).
57
59
60
61

Id. § 78j-(b)(2).
Id. § 78j-1(b)(3).
Id. § 78j-1(f).
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broad meaning of "illegal act." Under this view, auditors would
have to report all acts or omissions "that violate[] any law, or any
rule or regulation having the force of law," 62 unless the likely
"illegal
act" discovered by
the
auditor
is "clearly
inconsequential." 63 This view is the position echoed by the SEC
in promulgating regulations under section 10A. 64 This broad
reading is also consistent with the language of the Statement on
Auditing Standards No. 54, which defines illegal acts as
"violations of laws or governmental regulations." 65 Moreover, the
SEC staff has taken a position with respect to materiality under
section 10A that also suggests a very broad interpretation of
66
illegal acts for purposes of section 10A.

62

Id.

Id. § 78j-1(b)(1)(B).
See Implementation of Section 10A of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-38387, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,743, 12,744 n.2 (Mar. 18,
1997) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 71) (implementing Section 10A of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934).
65 CODIFICATION OF STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS AU § 317.02 (Am.
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1989) (citing Statement on Auditing Standards
No. 54) [hereinafter SAS 54]. SAS 54 includes within its definition of illegal acts,
both illegal acts that have a "direct and material effect on the determination of
financial statement amounts" and those which have "material but indirect effects."
Id. §§ 317.05, 317.07. With respect to the latter, AU Section 317.06 explains that
"Entities may be affected by many other laws or regulations, including those related
to securities trading, occupational safety and health, food and drug administration,
environmental protection, equal employment and price-fixing or other antitrust
violations." Id. § 317.06. Illegal acts with material but indirect effects "are normally
the result of the need to disclose a contingent liability because of the allegation or
determination of illegality." Id.
Of course, what might make this broad reading plausible within the auditing
standards is the related understanding that an auditor's obligations with respect to
uncovering illegal acts with indirect effects is significantly lower than with respect
to the discovery of illegal acts with direct effects on the financial statements. With
respect to material indirect illegal acts, an auditor may not be expected to learn
facts leading to their discovery "unless he is informed by the client, or there is
evidence of a governmental agency investigation or enforcement proceeding in the
records, documents, or other information normally inspected in an audit of financial
statements." Id. § 317.06. But this understanding does not, as a consequence,
narrow the meaning of illegal acts for purposes of SAS 54. See discussion infra Part
II (discussing the nature of the detection and reporting requirements).
66 See Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,154-55 (Aug.
19, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211) [hereinafter SAB 99]. An SAB does not
have the same force or effect as a regulation. It represents the views of the SEC
staff, and not necessarily those of the Commission itself. Id. at 45,150. The staff
rejected the idea that an issuer could either net the financial effects of
misstatements to determine the scope of its reporting obligation or rely on
quantitative thresholds to trigger disclosure. See id. They also took the position that
63
64
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Indeed, the structure of section 1OA(b) lends itself most
plausibly to a broad reading of the term illegal acts as defined in
section 1OA(f). Section 1OA(a) imposes an obligation on auditors
to develop procedures for detecting illegal acts "that would have
a direct and material effect on the determination of financial
statement amounts," 67 identify related party transactions "that
are material to the financial statements,"68 and conduct "an
evaluation of whether there is substantial doubt about the
ability of the issuer to continue as a going concern. '69 This
obligation would seem to limit the reach of the procedures to acts
with a direct connection to the financial statements. However,
the auditor's obligation to report to management, set forth in
section 1OA(b), makes it clear that there was no intent to create
such a limitation.
The auditor's obligation to report to
management extends to any circumstance in which the auditor
"detects or otherwise becomes aware of information indicating
that an illegal act (whether or not perceived to have a material
effect on the financial statements of the issuer) has or may have
occurred." 70 The only exception provided by section 10A is for
illegal acts which have clearly inconsequential effects "on the
financial statements of the issuer, including any contingent
monetary effects, such as fines, penalties and damages." 71 As a
result, illegal acts, including acts which might result in damages
that are not clearly inconsequential, are included within the
auditor's duty to report, whether or not those illegal acts are
directly related to financial disclosure. These illegal acts could
include race, sex, or other forms of prohibited employment
discrimination, systematic sexual harassment, violations of
health and safety regulations, and acts contrary to law which
could result in either public or private actions against the issuer.
Put another way, the procedures required to be implemented
under section 1OA(a) are intended to detect illegal acts, including

illegal acts "include personal misconduct by the entity's personnel unrelated to their
business activities." Id. at 45,154 n.41.
67 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(a)(1) (2000).
68

Id. §78j-1(a)(2).

Id. § 78j-1(a)(3).
Id. § 78j-1(b)(1). Reporting ismandatory only after the auditor issatisfied
that the illegal act has occurred, and has determined the possible effect of the illegal
act on the financial statements. See id. § 78j-l(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
71 Id. § 78j-l(b)(1)(A)(ii).
69

70
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those that might produce "contingent monetary effects" as
72
understood pursuant to section 1OA(b).
On the other hand, auditors and their counsel have argued
for a narrow definition of illegal acts, centering on financial
fraud. 73 They assert that a narrow reading of the term is
consistent with what is viewed as the most plausible reading of
the legislative history of the provision and other indicia of
74
Congressional intent at the time of the provision's enactment.
Even those taking this narrow view, however, concede that
"there might also be unusual cases in which other types of
misconduct are discovered, such as significant violations of the
tax, environmental, antitrust, or other laws which could
materially impact the financial statements and, if not properly
disclosed, could also constitute fraud." 75 Thus, even some
proponents of a narrow reading concede the broad scope of the
obligation to discover and report. Their arguments, however,
72 Id.; see also SAB 99, supra note 66, 64 Fed. Reg. at 45,154 ("The statute
specifies that these [reporting] obligations are triggered 'whether or not [the illegal
acts are] perceived to have a material effect on financial statements of the issuer...
[sic]'"). Moreover, the auditing standards in effect since 1976 have provided
auditors with substantial guidance on procedures to be used for obtaining evidence
and otherwise testing management's representations regarding litigation or claim

contingencies. See CODIFICATION OF STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS AU §§

337.01-.05 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2000) (citing Statement on
Auditing Standards No. 12).
73 See Riesenberg, supra note 19, at 1434-36. Mr. Riesenberg was associate
general counsel of Ernst & Young LLP at the time he wrote the article. See id. at
1417. Cf. Richard W. Painter, Lawyers'Rules, Auditors'Rules and the Psychology of
Concealment, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1399, 1411 (2000) ("Section 10A... specifies
procedures that auditors must follow to detect and disclose fraud and other illegal
acts (including violations of the securities laws) by a registered company.").
74 See Riesenberg, supra note 19, at 1436 ("Here, the title of the law, the
numbering of the statute, and most importantly the legislative history all point to
the law's reach as being limited to fraud.") (citation omitted). Mr. Riesenberg argues
that the legislative history of section 10A never suggested a broad understanding of
the meaning of the term illegal acts. See id. at 1434-35. The Congressional hearings
on the bills centered only on issues of financial fraud. See id. at 1435. Moreover, he
suggests, a legislative intent to limit the meaning of the term could be discerned
from the title of the bills which set forth the various versions of what became section
10A because each of these bills was contained the word "fraud" in its title. See id. at
1436, 1436 n.106. Section 10A(f) defines an "illegal acts" as "an act or omission that
violates any law, or any rule or regulation having the force of law." 15 U.S.C. § 78j1(f)(2000). Riesenberg, however, suggests that the "striking inconsistency between
the statutory intent and the statutory language" creates an ambiguity which in
analogous contexts has been resolved by the courts in light of legislative history.
Riesenberg, supra note 19, at 1435-36.
75 Riesenberg, supra note 19, at 1438.
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tend to center on the issue of the nature rather than on the scope
of the obligation, that is, on the scope of measures that an
auditor must take to discover and report, 76 rather than on the
nature of the misconduct itself. This argument is taken up in the
section that follows. 77
B.

The Scope of the MonitoringBurdens: Lawyers.

In addition to widely publicized criminal enforcement
actions, the federal government responded to the corporate fraud
scandals after 2000 by enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in
2002.78 SOA amended federal securities law in many respects.
Among the most important changes was the addition of
certification requirements for chief executive and chief financial
officers in connection with the company's periodic reports that
must be filed under the Exchange Act. 79 Additionally, SOA now
requires that the annual report contain a report and evaluation
of management's internal controls80 and requires "[r]eal [t]ime"
disclosure of material changes in the financial condition of the
reporting company or results of operation.8 ' It changes the
reporting rules for purposes of section 16 of the Exchange Act 8 2
and amends section 10A of the Exchange Act to require
exchanges to adopt listing standards requiring every member of
a company's audit committee to be independent and carry out
See id. at 1418.
See discussion infra Part II.A.
78 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. The statute, titled "An Act [t]o protect
investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made
pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes."Id. The statute was adopted
in response to the increase in restatements of corporate earnings following a spate
of disclosures of possible large scale wrongdoing in some of the largest public
companies in the United States. See 148 CONG. REC. H5462 (daily. ed. July 25,
2002) (statement of Rep. Oxley). The bill was signed by the President on July 30,
2002. See 148 CONG. REC. D866 (daily ed. July 31, 2002).
79 Section 302 requires the company's principal officers to certify each annual
and quarterly report with respect to their review of the report and certain internal
controls now mandated by the Act. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15
U.S.C.A. § 7241 (West Supp. 2003). Section 906(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
requires CEO and CFO certification of each periodic report that contains financial
statements, with criminal penalties for failure to comply. See id. § 906(a), 18
U.S.C.A. § 1350 (a).
80 Id. § 404, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262.
81 Id. § 409. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(1).
82 See id. § 403, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p (requiring reports of changes in beneficial
ownership within two days, rather than monthly as previously permitted through
the use of Form 4 and Form 5).
76
77
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specific responsibilities.8 3 SOA also requires every reporting
company to disclose whether its audit committee has at least one
financial expert and, if not, the reasons why it does not.8 4 The
law also requires public companies to disclose whether they have
adopted a code of financial ethics or the reasons they have not,85
prohibits public companies from extending or arranging loans to
their directors and officers,8 6 and imposes certain blackout
periods for trading shares acquired in connection with
87
employment as an officer or director.
SOA focused on areas of traditional concern in the
regulation of securities disclosure,
accountability,
and
information equality-the so-called level-playing field.
It
broadened federal governmental involvement in the regulation of
corporate agents, primarily with respect to accountants, 88 but
also with respect to lawyers.8 9 Most importantly for purposes of
this Article, it also significantly increased the role of the federal
government in the monitoring of activity within the corporation.
In addition to the certification requirements imposed on
corporate principal officers, 90 SOA imposed significant
83 Id. § 301, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(m). These duties include the appointment and
oversight of outside auditors, the determination of the compensation of outside
auditors, and the resolution of conflicts between management and the auditors. See
id. In addition, section 202 of the Act requires the SEC to adopt rules requiring the
audit committee to pre-approve all auditing and non-auditing services. Id. § 202, 15
U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(i)).
84 Id. § 407, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7265.
85 Id. § 406, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7264.
86 Id. § 402, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(k).
87 Id. § 306, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7244. These provisions will operate in a manner
analogous to the short swing trading rules of Exchange Act section 16.
88 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act establishes a regulatory agency to oversee the work
of accountants performing auditing services for companies subject to registration
under the Securities Acts, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB). See id. § 101, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211. The PCAOB is empowered: (1) to
register firms that perform auditing services for public companies; (2) to adopt
auditing, quality control, ethics, independence, and other standards relating to the
preparation of audit reports; (3) to inspect registered auditing firms; and (4) to
conduct investigations and disciplinary hearings involving registered auditing
firms. Id. § 101(c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(c)). Only auditing firms registered with the
PCAOB can perform or participate in audits of companies subject to registration
under the Securities Acts. Id. § 102(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7212(a).
89 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposes new ethical obligations on lawyers who
practice before the SEC. See id. § 307, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245.
90 See id. § 906, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (requiring CEO and CFO certification of
each periodic report that contains financial statements); id. § 302, 15 U.S.C.A. §
7241) (mandating that principal officers to certify each annual and quarterly report
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monitoring responsibilities on corporate audit committees, 91 as
92
well as on management in general.
SOA's focus on monitoring was not revolutionary. For at
least a decade before its enactment, the government had been
increasing its focus on corporate monitoring as a means of
curbing illegal or unethical behavior. Especially in the decade
before passage of SOA, federal prosecutors had started to use
evidence of corporate monitoring as a factor for determining the
extent and character of corporate prosecution. 93 The Delaware
courts arguably incorporated a duty to monitor under some
94
circumstances as part of the general fiduciary duty of care.

with respect to their review of the report and certain internal controls now required
by the SOA).
91 The Audit Committee is defined in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as "a committee
(or equivalent body) established by and amongst the board of directors of an issuer
for the purpose of overseeing the accounting and financial reporting processes of the
issuer and audits of the financial statements of the issuer." Id. § 2(a)(3)(A), 15
U.S.C.A. § 7201(a)(3)(A)). A company is not required to appoint an audit committee.
In the event none is appointed, however, then the entire board of directors is treated
as the audit committee for purposes of the Act. See id. § 2(a)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. §
7201(a)(3)(B). SOA creates disclosure incentives for appointing a financial expert, as
defined by the Securities Exchange Commission in accordance with framework of
the Act, to the audit committee. See id. § 407(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7265(a). The Act
imposes responsibility on the audit committee
for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of any
registered public accounting firm employed by that issuer (including
resolution of disagreements between management and the auditor
regarding financial reporting) for the purpose of preparing or issuing an
audit report or related work, and each such registered public accounting
firm shall report directly to the audit committee.
Id. § 301, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(m)(2).
The audit committee is also responsible for creating and maintaining systems
for "(A) the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints received by the issuer
regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters; and (B) the
confidential, anonymous submission by employees of the issuer of concerns
regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters." Id. § 301, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j1(m)(4).
92 SOA section 404 will require management to prepare an "internal control
report" in their Form 10-K reports. Id. § 404(a) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
7262(a)). The report must "state the responsibility of management for establishing
and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial
reporting." Id. § 404(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262(a)(1). The report must also "contain
an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal year of the issuer, of the
effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the issuer for
financial reporting." Id. § 404(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262(a)(2).
93 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
94 See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968-69 (Del.
Ch. 1996); see also infra notes 219-25 and accompanying text.
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Thus, at least in this respect, SOA represents evidence of a broad
and growing embrace by the government of monitoring as an
important weapon in its regulation of corporate conduct.
Section 307 of SOA introduced a very controversial provision
affecting lawyers. 95 That section directed the SEC to adopt new
rules of professional conduct applicable to attorneys practicing
before it who represent issuers. 96 The purpose of section 307 was
to impose on lawyers a gatekeeper obligation similar to that
imposed on accountants in 1995 under section 10A. 97

This

imposition was meant to provide a partial remedy to the
institutional failures raised by academics, who had suggested
that the Enron collapse could have been averted, or at least
made less spectacular, had the company's natural gatekeepers,
98
lawyers and accountants, fulfilled their duties.
The SEC regulations 99 took an expansive view of the
regulatory objective of section 307. The regulations require an
attorney subject to its provisions 00 who "becomes aware of
95 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245.
96 Section 307 requires the promulgation of rules
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of
securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the
company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief
executive officer of the company (or the equivalent thereof); and (2) if the
counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence (adopting,
as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with respect to
the violation), requiring the attorney to report the evidence to the audit
committee of the board of directors of the issuer or to another committee of
the board of directors comprised solely of directors not employed directly or
indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors.
Id.
97 The need to align lawyers' and accountants' duties was emphasized by
Senator Edwards before the enactment of the Act. See 148 CONG. REC. S6552 (daily
ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards).
98 See Coffee, supra note 16, at 1403-05. See generally Painter, supra note 73
(discussing lawyers' and auditors' rules and the psychology of fraud concealment in
the representation of clients).
99 Standard of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing
Before the Commission in the Representation of the Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003).
100 Id. § 205.1-2. This portion of the regulations remains both controversial and
unsettled. While the SEC initially proposed a very broad definition, it substantially
narrowed its definition of attorneys appearing and practicing before the
Commission. According to the final regulations, appearing and practicing before the
commission means
(i) [t]ransacting any business with the Commission, including
communications in any form; (ii) Representing an issuer in a Commission
administrative proceeding or in connection with any Commission
investigation, inquiry, information request, or subpoena; (iii) Providing
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evidence of a material violation by the issuer or by any officer,
director, employee, or agent of the issuer, [to] report such
evidence to the issuer's chief legal officer ... or to both the
issuer's chief legal officer and its chief executive officer...
forthwith." 10 1 If the attorney does not believe that the initial
response is appropriate, 10 2 or if the attorney reasonably believes
that reporting to the chief legal officer would be futile, 10 3 then
the attorney is obligated to report the evidence of material
violation to the audit committee of the board, another board
committee designated to receive such disclosure, or the board as
04
a whole.1
The regulations define a "material violation" as a "violation
of an applicable United States federal or state securities law, a
material breach of fiduciary duty arising under United States
federal or state law, or a similar material violation of any United
States federal or state law." 10 5 It is also evident from the sweep
of this provision that both Congress and the SEC meant to paint
with a broad brush. The securities laws are defined to include
the provisions of SOA itself. 10 6 As such, among those activities
that lawyers must bring to the attention of the company are
failures by company lawyers and others to comply with their
reporting obligations under section 307.107 Lawyers now have a
duty to report, if they fall within the ambit of section 307, and
they must report "evidence" of a "material violation" of the
advice in respect of the United States securities laws or the Commission's
rules or regulations thereunder regarding any document that the attorney
has notice will be filed with or submitted to, or incorporated into any
document that will be filed with or submitted to, the Commission,
including the provision of such advice in the context of preparing, or
participating in the preparation of, any such document; or (iv) Advising an
issuer as to whether information or a statement, opinion, or other writing
is required under the United States securities laws or the Commission's
rules or regulations thereunder to be filed with or submitted to, or
incorporated into any document that will be filed with or submitted to, the
Commission.
Id. § 205.2(a)(1); see also Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47276, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6297-98 (Feb. 6,
2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205) (discussing of the SEC's rationale).
1o 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1).
102 Id. § 205.3(b)(3).
103 Id. § 205.3(b)(4).
104 Id. § 205.3(b)(3).
1o Id. § 205.2(i).
106 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(c)(47) (West Supp. 2003).
107 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §307, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (West Supp. 2003).
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reporting obligations of other lawyers under section 307.108 The
regulations define "breach of fiduciary duty" as "any breach of
fiduciary or similar duty to the issuer recognized under an
applicable Federal or State statute or at common law, including
but not limited to misfeasance, nonfeasance, abdication of duty,
abuse of trust, and approval of unlawful transactions."'10 9 On the
other hand, the phrase "a similar violation" is not further
defined.1 10 However, it appears from the context in which it is
used in section 307 that the term is intended to extend beyond a
breach of fiduciary duty or a violation of the securities laws."'
The literal language of the regulation thus suggests a broad
scope of reportable activity. The primary focus of the reporting
required by the regulation is on material violations by corporate
agents of their obligations under the federal securities laws and
state fiduciary duty laws, including SOA itself. 1 2 But lawyers'
obligations extend beyond violations of those sorts of provisions
to cover similar material violations of any United States or state
law. 113 These similar material violations must include illegal
acts that have a direct effect on the corporation and its financial
condition. 114 They may, however, include violations of any law
5
with a direct, indirect, or contingent effect on the company."
Among these
could be
violations
of discrimination,
environmental, and other laws. 116
108 See id.
109 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(d).

110 Id. § 205.2(i).
111 Implementation

of Standards of Professional

Conduct

for Attorneys,

Exchange Act Release No. 34-46868, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670, 71,679 (proposed Dec. 2,
2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
112 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1).
113 See id. § 205.2(i).
114 See Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Results of Operations (Item 303), 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (2002).
115 See Susan P. Koniak, CorporateFraud: See, Lawyers, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 195, 201-10 (2003).
116 As lawyers for public companies are well aware, significant legal
contingencies of actual or threatened lawsuits, or other legal action, can have a
significant effect on financial statement amounts. To the extent that legal action is
unresolved, or not filed, auditors may be required under GAAP to disclose loss
contingencies. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 5: ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES 6-7

(1975). As the Coca Cola, Texaco, and other recent discrimination suits
demonstrate, discrimination suits can have a significant effect not only on financial
statement amounts but also on the corporation itself. See supra notes 40-45. In that
respect, management may be under a separate obligation to disclose contingent
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This approach would be consistent with the broad range of
company activities that usually involve review by lawyers. The
SEC's treatment of disclosure of contingent liabilities 17 and the
development of the required disclosures under Management's
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition (MD&A)118
provide two examples of the breadth of issues requiring lawyer
involvement; such issues are likely to expose the lawyer to
potential evidence of material violations far more extensive than
mere direct violation of the securities laws. Regulation S-K,
section 103, requires disclosure of any material pending legal
proceedings.1 19 Environmental litigation is subject to special
instructions designed to induce disclosure.1 20 Lawyers involved
in the preparation of disclosure under Item 103 would
necessarily be exposed to information that might reasonably be
believed to constitute evidence of a material violation. Even
where disclosure is not required under Item 103, the sweep of
disclosure required by MD&A and Item 303 may expose the
prudent lawyer to information requiring disclosure under the
SOA section 307 regulations. 121 The Instructions to Item 303
specify that MD&A disclosure "shall focus specifically on
material events and uncertainties known to management that
would cause reported financial information not to be necessarily
indicative of future operating results or of future financial
condition."1 22 To the extent that lawyers are involved in the due
diligence necessary for appropriate disclosure, evidence of a

liability arising out of actual or threatened legal action. See, e.g., Standard
Instructions for Filing Forms under the Securities Act of 1933, Reg. S-K, (Item 103)

Legal Proceedings, 17 C.F.R. § 229.103.
117 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.103.

118 Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results

of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Exchange Act Release No.
34-26831, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427 (May 24, 1989) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211,
231, 241, 271).
119See 17 C.F.R. § 229.103.
120 See id. n.5. Administrative or judicial proceedings involving violation of the
environmental laws are subject to disclosure if the proceedings or litigation are
either material to the business or financial condition of the company, involve claims
exceeding 10 percent of the current assets of the company, or the government is a

party to the proceedings and the claim will result sanctions of less than $100,000.
Id.
121See Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Results of Operations (Item 303),17 C.F.R. § 229.303; Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 §
307, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (West Supp. 2003).
122 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a), Instructions to Paragraph 303(a) no.3.
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material violation of a contingent nature would likely come to
the attention of counsel.' 23 The evidence might well be of wrongs
potentially far a field of mere technical securities laws
compliance issues; that is, it might relate to underlying wrongs
that might have a material effect on the financial statements
and thus on the company's disclosure obligations. Because "[a]
disclosure duty exists where a trend, demand, commitment,
event or uncertainty is both presently known to management
and reasonably likely to have material effects on the registrant's
financial condition or results of operation," 124 it seems that the
scope of the lawyer's obligation under section 307 would extend
to the preparation of those disclosures as well as to the
underlying events or uncertainties comprising the subjects of
that disclosure.
Read together with company disclosure
obligations under the securities laws, the scope of material
violations subject to reporting under the regulations to SOA
section 307 would logically have to include disclosures of
violations of any law that might have a material effect on the
company.
Proper disclosure, however, would do more. SOA section 307
affects the auditor's parallel obligations under section 10A and
management's parallel obligations under SOA section 404. In
particular, the new lawyer detect-and-report provisions will
substantially affect the reporting of legal contingencies, both to
management and to the company's auditors. 125 It is possible to
take the position that SOA section 307 and section 10A, either
separately or taken together, have upset the carefully-crafted
compromise between auditors and lawyers with respect to
lawyers' responses to auditors' inquiry letters, 126 which is
123 As Professor Koniak reminds us, in reviewing the web of transactions
leading to the Enron disaster, lawyers were heavily involved in all of the
transactions on behalf of all of the parties and their accountants. See Koniak, supra
note 115, at 201-10.
124 Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Exchange Act Release No.
34-26831, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,429 (interpretive release May 24, 1989) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 241, 271).
125 I thank Lance Cole, Pennsylvania State University, for this insight.
126 Matthew Barrett recently well described the pre-SOA conflict between
auditors and lawyers with respect to disclosure:
The enterprise's auditors generally want to encourage as much disclosure
as possible, or even adequate accruals, to ensure that the financial
statements do not understate or overlook material liabilities. In the
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Handbook"
"Auditor's Letter
in
the ABA's
reflected
27 In particular, the agreement with respect to loss
monograph.
contingencies involving "unasserted possible claims" 128 that a
lawyer currently must reveal to an auditor only when the client
has authorized/requested in writing that the lawyer do so
violates both the letter and spirit of both provisions in a postEnron/WorldCom world. The policy behind the ABA's Auditor's
Letter Handbook rested on the now discredited view of an
expansive duty of counsel to keep a client's secrets. 129 That
broad interpretation of confidentiality was substantially
narrowed by the requirements of SOA section 307 on outside
counsel, the requirements of SOA section 404 on management,
and the requirements of SOA section 404 and section 10A on
auditors. Material unasserted claims may well constitute
evidence of a "material violation" which must be reported to
management 130 and on which management must act.13 1 Such
claims may also be subject to the internal controls procedures
required by SOA section 404,132 to an auditor's obligation to
detect and report illegal acts, and to ensure that such illegal acts
1 33
do not have a material effect on financial statement amounts.
absence of an accrual, the auditor wants the financial statements to
disclose as much information as possible about a material contingent
liability to communicate all relevant information to the users of financial
statements. In addition, the auditor wants to gather as much information
as possible to support the enterprise's treatment of contingent liabilities.
Disclosure and documentation help to protect the auditor from liability if
the client experiences future financial problems. Lawyers, on the other
hand, strive to protect the attorney-client privilege. These goals conflict,
because a lawyer's disclosure of information to auditors can waive the
attorney-client privilege.
Matthew J. Barrett, Opportunitiesfor Obtainingand Using LitigationReserves and
Disclosures,63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1017, 1051 (2002).
127 See A.B.A., AUDITOR'S LETTER HANDBOOK 11 (1990).
128 Id. at 12.
129 Official commentary on lawyer-client confidentiality in relations to auditors
See, e.g., A.B.A., Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to
available.
is
Auditors' Requests for Information, 31 BUS. LAW. 1709, 1709-10 (1976); Subcomm.
on Audit Inquiry Responses, A.B.A., Inquiry of a Client's Lawyer Concerning
Litigation, Claims, and Assessments: Auditing Interpretation AU Section 337, 45
Bus. LAW. 2245, 2245-46 (1990); James J. Fuld, Lawyers' Responses to AuditorsSome PracticalAspects, 44 Bus. LAW. 159, 164-65 (1988).
130 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (West Supp.
2003).
131 See id., 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245.
132 See id. § 404, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262.
133 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-
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Lawyers will likely no longer be able to hide behind the ABA
Auditor's Letter Handbook to avoid disclosure of material
unasserted contingencies or to avoid liability either under SOA
section 307134 or the securities laws. 135 SOA section 307, in
particular, will therefore substantially affect the scope and
nature of the reporting of assertions of violation, especially of
violations of laws that do not directly affect the financial
statements, like discrimination, environmental, and health and
safety laws, both up the ladder and to the auditors. A secondary
but significant effect might well be that some of these disclosures
will more readily and rapidly find their way into at least the
footnotes of a company's financial statements. To the extent that
such disclosure in the financial statements affects share price, it
may increase management's motivation to investigate and
resolve rather than resist the object of the complaint or
allegation. Also, to the extent the old compromise between
auditors and lawyers was undermined by the requirements of
recent securities legislation, the likelihood grows for greater
discovery opportunities, at the expense of traditional and now
displaced rules of attorney-client confidentiality.
The comments to the language of the proposed regulation
under SOA section 307 demonstrate the legal community's broad
136
understanding of the scope of the term "material violation"'
and its primary focus. Interestingly, the most telling comments
about the scope of material violations were received in reaction
to 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2).1 37 As originally proposed, disclosure
1(b)(1) (2000).

134 This is an obligation owed to and policed by the government, but with the
potential for spilling over into private litigation. See infra Part III.
135 To some extent the ABA manual, like GAAP and GAAS for auditors, will not
provide much of a shield against liability where it can be shown that a gatekeeper
became aware of misconduct and failed to act on it in some reasonable way. See
infra Part III.B.2.
136 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245.
137 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(i) (2003) (permitting lawyers to disclose, without the
consent of the client, otherwise privileged information of a material violation where
injury to property or to the financial interests of investors are at stake).
Substantially similar rules were added to the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct by vote of the ABA House of Delegates at its August, 2003 meeting. See
Client Confidentiality, CHRISTIAN SCI.MONITOR, Aug. 13, 2003, at 8.
The ABA, at its annual meeting in San Francisco, voted to modify its rules
regarding the fiercely protected attorney-client privilege. When actions by
a client harm the financial interests of others, the ABA says, a lawyer has
an obligation to the public good to report the wrongdoing.... The ABA
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was required with respect to "illegal acts," the term similar to
the one used in section 10A. 138 Some argued that it should not be
a lawyer's duty to correct or report illegal activities, "or even to
prevent wrong- doing." 139 Others suggested that the obligation be
"limited to illegal acts that are likely to have a material impact
on the market for the issuer's securities."1 40 Still others argued
that the duty to disclose should be limited to those instances
where there existed a risk of bodily harm but not where mere
monetary interests were at stake.14 1 In response, the SEC chose
to substitute the term "material violation" for "illegal act," in
order to "conform to the statutory language in section 307."142
However, the SEC did not suggest that the change of language
meant to change the intent or scope of the provision as finally
adopted. It would seem then, that this action is strong evidence
of intent by the SEC to conflate the scope of "illegal acts" under
section 10A1 43 and "material violations" under SOA section
307.144
A reasonable construction of the scope of the reporting
obligation under the regulations to SOA section 307 is
necessarily broad. The regulation is written that way. The
scope of lawyers' involvement in the disclosure and due diligence
obligations of companies under the Securities Acts makes it
acted in the face of a Securities and Exchange Commission threat to force
the issue of attorneys cooperating with its investigations of corporate

malfeasance. The SEC already had enacted new rules that require lawyers
for public companies to tip regulators to clients when they believe clients
are committing fraud.
Id. It remains to be seen, however, whether and to what extent state regulators will
adopt the rule. My suspicion is that eventually a majority of them will, as states
have increasingly as a matter of course, follow the federal lead.
138 See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-47276, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6310 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
139Id. (quoting Comments of the Law Society of England and Wales, at 12).
140 Id. (citing Comments of the Los Angeles County Bar Association, at 2;
Comments of Edward C. Brewer III at 8; Comments of the Association of the Bar of

the City of New York, at 5).
141 See id. at 6310-11 (citing Comments of the American College of Trial
Lawyers, at 6).
142Id. at 6311 (commenting on 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)). Subparagraph (iii) was
also modified to clarify that the "material violation must be one that has 'caused, or

may cause, substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or
investors.' Id. (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)((2)(iii)).
143 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(f) (2000).

144 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (West Supp. 2003).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.77:919

almost impossible to conceive of a definition of a scope of
reporting smaller than the scope of a lawyer's activities for its
client. In its own way, it provides a sweep analogous to section
10A(f) as applied to the reporting obligations of auditors.
II.

THE POSITIVE NATURE OF THE DUTY TO MONITOR.

It is one thing to impose a reporting requirement on lawyers
and accountants. It is quite another to determine the nature and
extent of the duties of these new gatekeepers. The imposition of
an obligation to report does not necessarily include an obligation
to investigate, or at least to put oneself in a position that
increases the likelihood that relevant information will be
encountered. On the one hand, it is possible to argue that the
gatekeeper provisions do not impose any positive duty to act on
lawyers and accountants.
Information that comes to the
attention of such gatekeepers in the normal course of their
representation is the only sort of information with respect to
which these gatekeepers have a duty to act. On the other hand,
the statutes could be interpreted to impose a positive obligation
on accountants and lawyers to implement information-gathering
systems designed to discover facts relating to their respective
reporting obligations.
Neither section 10A of the 1934 Act nor section 307 of SOA
clearly describes the approach to monitoring which is required
under either provision. It is not difficult to suggest that, with
the possible exception of misconduct directly related to the
federal securities laws, the detection obligation is passive. I
suggest, however, that this reading neither accords with the
general intent of Congress in creating the gatekeeper roles for
auditors and lawyers, nor with a fair reading of the provisions in
context. Reasonably read, both provisions appear to create
positive obligations to discover and report corporate illegal
conduct of every sort. With respect to auditors, the positive
obligation suggests a rejection of a division between the way
auditors approach illegal acts that have an indirect rather than a
direct and material effect on the financial statements. 145 With
respect to lawyers, that positive obligation accords with
developments in Delaware duty of care law146 and changes the
145 See SAS 54, supra note 65, at AU § 317.06.
146 See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch.
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way in which federal prosecutors approach the determination of
corporate culpability for purposes of charging corporations with
crimes. 147
A.

The Auditor's Positive Monitoring Obligations.

It is generally undisputed that auditors have some sort of
obligation to detect and report unlawful activities. The scope of
that obligation might be quite broad. 148 The nature of the
obligation may also be quite broad, especially after the
enactments of sections 10A and SOA. The auditing profession's
obligations to detect and report unlawful conduct have three
primary sources: accounting standards developed by the
profession itself, case law, and statutory enactments. These
sources, when read together, evidence an intention to broadly
define the nature and scope of the detection obligation.
The most relevant accounting standards are the Statement
on Auditing Standards (SAS) 54149 and 99.150
SAS 54 is
particularly ambiguous about the nature of the obligation to
detect illegal activities, given the distinction made in that
standard between acts that cause direct and material effects and
those that have a material but indirect effects on the financial
statements. 15 1 It is fairly clear that under the standard, auditors
have a positive obligation to detect illegal acts that have a direct
and material effect on the financial statements. 152 These acts

1996) (listing the elements of the Delaware duty of care as it is applied to directors).
147

See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, U.S.

Dept. of Justice, to Heads of Dept. Components, U.S. Attorneys, Principles of
Federal
Prosecution
of
Business
Organizations
(Jan.
20,
2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines. htm.
148 See supra Part I.A.
149 See SAS 54, supra note 65, at AU § 317.
150Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a
Financial Statement Audit (American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2002)
[hereinafter SAS 99]. SAS 99, effective December 15, 2002, supercedes SAS 82. Id.

at para. 84. SAS 82, effective starting December 17, 1997, is the successor to SAS
No. 53. See Statement on Auditing Standards No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a
Financial Statement Audit, para. 41 (American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants
1997)

[hereinafter

SAS

82];

CODIFICATION

OF

STATEMENTS

ON

AUDITING

STANDARDS AU § 316 (American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2000) (citing
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 82); Steven Burkholder, New Fraud
Reporting Rules are Not Mere Clarifications,ASB Chairman Warns, 28 SEC. REG. &
L. REP. 1528, 1529 (1996).
151
152

See SAS 54, supra note 65, at AU § 317.05-07.
See id. § 317.05.
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are understood to primarily encompass acts of fraud. 153 "The
auditor's responsibility to detect and report misstatements
resulting from illegal acts having a direct and material effect on
the determination of financial statement amounts is the same as
"154
that for misstatements caused by error or fraud ....
The obligation to detect and report financial statement fraud
is treated specifically in SAS 99.155 Under this standard, the
"auditor has a responsibility to plan and perform the audit to
obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial
statements are free of material misstatement, whether caused by
error or fraud." 156 SAS 99 focuses only on a subset of illegal acts

governed by SAS

54157,

such as internal falsification of financial

statement amounts and theft.1 58 With respect to these acts, SAS
99 provides rules relating to the construction of appropriate
audit procedures for detecting fraud. 159 Included among the risk
factors for financial statement fraud is an assessment of
management's actions with respect to internal controls. 160 When
a draft of SAS 82, the predecessor of SAS 99, was circulating, an
official of the AICPA was quoted as saying that the aim of the
new standard was to induce "'auditors to focus more on
suspicious situations and carry a healthy skepticism with them
when they do their job.' "161
With respect to illegal acts that may have an indirect but
material effect, however, SAS 99 is silent and SAS 54 suggests
that the auditor may not become aware of these acts "unless he
is informed by the client, or there is evidence of a governmental
agency investigation or enforcement proceeding in the records,
documents, or other information normally inspected in an audit
of financial statements."' 16 2 Echoing this notion, commentators
have expressed the view that because "[United States]
153See generally SAS 99, supra note 150 (entitled "Consideration of Fraud in a
Financial Statement Audit").
154SAS 54, supra note 63, at AU § 317.05.
155See SAS 99, supra note 150, at para. 1.
156 Id. (citing in part prior section 110, Responsibilities and Functions of the
Independent Auditor).
157 See SAS 54, supra note 65, at AU § 317.02.
158 Compare id., with SAS 99, supra note 151, at para. 5-12.
159 See SAS 99, supra note 150, at para.19-27.
160 See id.
16, Lee Berton, Auditors Face Stiffer Rules for Finding, Reporting Fraud at
Client Companies, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1996, at A2.
162 SAS 54, supra note 65, at AU § 317.06.
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businesses are subject to so many laws and regulations that, if
violated, could lead to material consequences, it is questionable
whether an audit can be designed to provide reasonable
assurance of detecting all illegal acts that may have a material
effect on financial statements."' 16 3
However, the SAS 54
description is not meant to serve as a shield to justify a passive
approach to illegal acts. SAS 54 provides that:
Normally, an audit in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards does not include audit procedures
specifically designed to detect illegal acts. However, procedures
applied for the purpose of forming an opinion on the financial
statements may bring possible illegal acts to the auditor's
attention. For example, such procedures include reading
minutes; inquiring of the client's management and legal
counsel concerning litigation, claims, and assessments;
performing substantive tests of details of transactions or
balances. The auditor should make inquiries of management
concerning the client's compliance with laws and regulations. 164
Thus, while there appears to be no obligation under the
standard to include procedures that directly detect illegal acts
with indirect material effects on the financial statements, the
standard appears to raise an expectation that illegal acts will be
detected. The accounting profession has long established
standards and procedures for verifying management's assertions
with respect to certain contingencies, litigation, claims, and
assessments. 165 Indeed, AU section 337.07 reminds auditors that
an "audit normally includes certain other procedures undertaken
for different purposes that might also disclose litigation, claims,
and assessments." 16 6
These include reviews of corporate
minutes, contracts, loan agreements, leases, correspondence
163 Jeanne Calderon & Rachel Kowal, Auditors Whistle an Unhappy Thne, 75
DENV. U. L. REV. 419, 438 (1998) (relying, in part, on Jane Mancino, The Auditor
and Fraud,J. ACCT., April 1997, at 32, 36).
164 SAS 54, supra note 65, at AU § 317.08.
165 Auditors are instructed first to obtain information from management and

counsel regarding litigation. See CODIFICATION OF STATEMENTS ON AUDITING

STANDARDS, Inquiry of a Client's Lawyer Concerning Litig., Claims, and
Assessments, AU § 337.05 (American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1976)
(citing Statement on Auditing Standards No. 12) In addition, the auditor is to
"[e]xamine documents in the client's possession concerning litigation, claims, and
assessments, including correspondence and invoices from lawyers." Id. at AU §
337.05(c).
166 Id. at AU § 337.07.
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from governmental agencies, and similar documents. 167 With
such a broad sweep, it is more likely than not that these
procedures will also potentially uncover illegal acts other than
those referenced by management and the focus of the audit
inquiry. With respect to those acts; auditing standards and
section 10A now require auditors to take action.
On the other hand, the expectation appears to be greater in
the context of fraud, and this is especially true of fraud with a
direct material effect on financial statement amounts. In those
cases, the auditor has a positive obligation to plan and perform
the audit in order to obtain reasonable assurance that the
financial statements are free of material misstatements caused
by fraud or error. 168 But this expectation appears to run to other
illegal acts defined in SAS 54 as well: "For those illegal acts that
are defined in [section 317] as having a direct and material effect
on the determination of financial statement amounts, the
auditor's responsibility to detect misstatements resulting from
such illegal acts is the same as that for errors or fraud." 169 Thus,
"when fraud is detected, the auditor should consider the
implications for the integrity of management or employees and
the possible effect on other aspects of the audit."'170 Auditing
standards thus appear to cut more heavily in favor of a
contextually limited, but nonetheless positive, duty to detect
illegal acts.
This positive obligation has been amplified in judicial
opinions. Courts have recognized that auditors serve not only
the management of the company being audited but investors as
well. In an often-quoted passage, the Supreme Court described
the duty of an accountant, independent of additional statutory
requirements, as "a public responsibility transcending any
The independent
employment relationship with the client.
public accountant performing this special function owes ultimate
allegiance to the corporation's creditors and stockholders .... "171
Thus, it is almost a truism that "[aiccountants do have a duty to
take reasonable steps to correct misstatements they have
167
168

See id. at AU § 337.07(b).
See SAS 99, supra note 150, at para. 3.

169 CODIFICATION OF STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS, Audit Risk and
Materiality in Conducting an Audit, AU § 312.04 n.5 (American Inst. of Certified
Pub. Accountants 1984).
170 Id. at AU § 312.08.
171 United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984).
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discovered in previous financial statements on which they know
172
the public is relying."
Absent a specific obligation, however, accountants do not
have a positive duty to seek out and disclose illegal activity on
the part of the company or its agents. Thus, for example, in
Ahmed v. Trupin, 173 the court held that accountants have no
positive "obligation to seek out fraud. If they do not know the
data they audit is fraudulent, and the fraudulent nature of the
data given them is not apparent, accountants are not liable if
they audit it in accordance with GAAP."'1 74 Other courts have
reasoned that "while an accountant's role may create a duty to
disclose errors in financial statements, an accountant has no
duty to disclose improper loans and investments since these
wrongs are 'not dependent on or tied to' the role of an
accountant."

175

The issue of the nature of an auditor's duty was particularly
important prior to the Supreme Court's decision in CentralBank
of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver.176 Before Central
Bank, an accountant's liability for aiding and abetting securities
fraud under Rule 10b-5177 could depend on a determination that
78
the auditor had a duty to detect and report issuer misconduct.
While the judicial gloss on auditor disclosure duties was not
consistent, the cases suggested a judicial willingness to impose
on auditors whether narrowly or broadly drawn a duty to
disclose under certain circumstances.179 While aider and abettor
172 Int'l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld,
173 809 F. Supp. 1100 (S.D.N.Y.

619 F.2d 909, 927 (2d Cir. 1980).
1993).

Id. at 1111.
Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 722 n.3 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Cornfeld,
619 F.2d at 925).
176 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (holding that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not
provide a basis for private actions against aiders and abettors).
177 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003). In connection with the purchase or sale of
any security, Rule 10b-5 forbids the use of "any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud.... [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made. . not misleading, or
[t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates.. as a fraud
upon any person." Id.
178 See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, Locating That "Indistinct" and "Virtually
Nonexistent" Line Between Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section I 0(b), 75
N.C. L. REV. 691, 761-69 (1997) (discussing aider and abettor liability before 1994);
Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of
1934, 69 CAL. L. REV. 80, 83-86 (1981) (same).
179 See Painter, supra note 73, at 1411-13 (discussing auditors' duty to
disclose). "The three most commonly used standards for defining an auditor's duty
174
175
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liability for auditors has disappeared, auditors now face the
possibility of primary liability under Rule 10b-5.18 0
Judicial development of standards for determining
accountant liability was sometimes tied to auditing standards.
Thus, adherence to the standards of SAS 54 or former SAS 53
and 82 (superseded now by SAS 99) was said to provide a
touchstone for determining whether auditor conduct was
reckless enough to support a finding of scienter necessary for
primary liability under section 10b-5.181 The courts, however,
did not adopt a uniform approach. 182 What clearly emerged from
the cases was a sense that while professional standards were
important in determining the scope and nature of legal
obligations under statutory and case law, such standards were
not always or necessarily dispositive of such legal liability. The
professional standards increasingly a greater obligation imposed
on auditors to be sensitive to corporate illegal conduct.
The primary statutory enactments focusing on auditor
duties to detect and report are found in section 10A of the
Exchange Act and in SOA. Under section 10A, auditors are
required to include in their audits "procedures designed to
provide reasonable assurance of detecting illegal acts that would
have a direct and material effect on the determination of
financial statement amounts."'8 3 The procedures need not be
designed to detect all illegal acts.
The positive obligation
imposed on auditors requires only the design of procedures

to disclose a client's securities fraud include: duties narrowly prescribed by the
accounting profession under GAAP and GAAS; duties broadly defined without
regard to GAAP and GAAS; and duties narrowly defined without regard to GAAP
and GAAS." Francine A. Ritter, Note, Accountability of the Independent Accountant
as Auditor in the Wake of Central Bank: Does the Implied Private Right of Action
Survive Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 873, 881-82
(1998).
180 See, e.g., In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 976 (C.D. Cal. 1994)
(holding that there was a duty to withdraw or disclose in light of public reliance on
prior audit reports).
181See, e.g., In re SCB Computer Tech., Inc., 149 F. Supp. 334, 364 n.12 (W.D.
Tenn. 2001) (stating that compliance with SAS No. 82 "would at most allow for a
finding of negligence").
182 See, e.g., In re Software Toolworks, Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 627-28 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that gross departures from auditing standards are not enough to
demonstrate recklessness); Ades v. Deloitte & Touche, 799 F. Supp. 1493, 1501-02
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that gross deviation from auditing standard may be
sufficient to prove scienter).
183 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(a)(1) (2000).
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targeted toward the detection of illegal acts that have a "direct
and material effect" on the calculation of amounts in the
financial statements. 8 4 Even that targeted obligation with
respect to the design of procedures is further limited. The
procedures need not detect all illegal acts with a direct and
material effect; they only need to provide "reasonable assurance"
that they will detect such illegal acts.18 5 Thus, the focus of the
procedures is on illegal acts with a direct and material effect on
financial statement amounts, and the effectiveness of the
procedures in detecting such illegal acts is to be determined by a
"reasonable assurances" standard. The result is that auditors
are not subject to an absolute liability standard for failing to
detect every illegal act or even for failing to detect illegal acts
with a direct and material effect on financial statement amounts.
Nevertheless, the intended obligations of auditor's with respect
to the design and implementation of audit procedures were to be
8 6
greater than those previously provided under GAAS.
This understanding of the focus of the monitoring obligation
of auditors under section 10A, however, does not necessarily
mean that auditors can implement procedures narrowly
designed to detect only illegal acts with direct and material effect
on financial statement amounts. The reporting and response
provisions of section 10A contemplate the creation of a system
capable of detecting the full range of illegal acts defined in
section 10A(f). Section 1OA(b) describes the obligations of an
auditor who, in the course of conducting an audit, "detects or
otherwise becomes aware of information indicating that an
illegal act (whether or not perceived to have a material effect on
the financial statements of the issuer) has or may have
occurred."' 18 7
This provision makes no sense unless it is
understood to assume that the procedures created under the
mandate of section 1OA(a), while focusing on illegal acts with
direct and material effect on financial statement amounts, will
also result in the detection of, or make it more likely, that
184

Id.

Id.
The views of Harvey Pitt, SEC chairman at the time of the enactment of
SOA, on the character of auditors' new obligations under section 10A were well
known. See Harvey L. Pitt & David B. Hardison, For Outside Accountants, The New
Obligations Imposed by the Securities Litigation Reform Act Go Way Beyond
Classical GAAS, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 25, 1996, at B4.
187 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b)(1) (emphasis added).
185
186
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information will be produced indicating that an illegal act has
occurred. The expectation built into this provision clearly
contemplates that the auditing procedures will detect or make it
more likely that the auditor will become aware of the range of
illegal acts defined in section 1OA(f). Therefore, procedures
designed to reduce the likelihood of detecting or becoming aware
of information, which indicates that an illegal act has or may
have occurred, appear contrary to the letter and spirit of section
1OA(b).
This result is made clearer by the procedures which auditors
must follow once they detect information about illegal acts
described in section 1OA(b)(1). Auditors are required to report
illegal acts to the appropriate level of management once they
"determine whether it is likely that an illegal act has occurred"18 8
and "consider the possible effect of the illegal act on the financial
statements of the issuer, including any contingent monetary
effects, such as fines, penalties, and damages."18 9 Thus, while the
procedures which auditors are required to design may be focused
on a reasonable assurance of the detection of direct and material
effect on financial statement amounts, the nature and scope of
the auditor's reporting duty to management is far broader. The
focus of the reporting obligation is on illegal acts as defined in
section 1OA(f), other than those which are "clearly
inconsequential."' 190
Consequential illegal acts include those
with "direct and material effect on the determination of financial
statement amounts" 191 and those with "contingent monetary
effects, such as fines, penalties, and damages. ' 192
The
effectiveness of the reporting obligation must necessarily be
measured by the procedures used by the auditor, including (but
not limited to) the procedures required under section 1OA(a), yet
it exists independent of the obligation to design the procedures
described in section 1OA(a).
Clearly, section 10A creates a
positive obligation to detect and report illegal acts. Such acts
need not be narrowly connected with violations of the securities
laws; they should necessarily include violations of the

188
189

190
191
192

Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §

78j-1(b)(1)(A)(i).
78j-l(b)(1)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).
78j-1(b)(1)(B).
78j-l(a)(1).
78j-l(b)(1)(A)(ii).
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discrimination, labor, environmental, consumer, and health and
safety laws.
This positive obligation to detect and report, and especially
to report illegal acts with indirect or contingent effects on
financial statements, was reinforced by certain provisions
applicable to auditors in SOA. As a part of their auditing
procedures, SOA requires auditors to review the report
submitted by management as part of its expanded MD&A
analysis under SOA section 404.193 The act provides that each
"registered public accounting firm that prepares [or issues] the
company's audit report [for the issuer shall] attest to, and report
on, management's assessment of the effectiveness of the
company's internal controls." 194 Read in a vacuum, the provision
193 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404 (b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262(b) (West Supp.
2003). A few days after the adoption of final rules under SOA section 404, Scott A.

Taub, the SEC's Deputy Chief Accountant, in prepared remarks stated:
The potential impact of the requirements for both management and
auditors to issue reports related to issuers' internal controls cannot be
understated. We believe that the increased attention to internal controls
on the part of the management will reduce the potential for errors in the
financial statements, including those due to fraud. The attestation by the
auditor will provide additional assurance in this regard, and, not trivially,
should also increase the quality of audits. In fact, Congress made it clear
that it considers the internal control attestation by the auditor to be
important to the financial statement audit by prohibiting the attestation
from being a separate engagement.
Scott A. Taub, The SEC's Internal Control Report Rules and Thoughts on the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Address at University of Southern California Leventhal School
of Accounting SEC and Financial Reporting Conference, Pasadena, California (May
29, 2003) [hereinafter Taub Speech], http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch052903
sat.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2003). However, the SEC chose to limit the focus of
the expanded reporting by management to the financial statements disclosed to
investors by narrowly defining the term "internal control over financial reporting"
as a process to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of the
financial statements for external purposes which must include procedures
pertaining to recordkeeping, recording of transactions (with an emphasis on
authorizations for receipts and expenditures), and prevention of unauthorized
action with respect to assets. See Management's Report on Internal Control Over
Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic
Reports, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47986, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636, 36,640 (June 18,
2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270, 274).
194 Taub Speech, supra note 193. The SEC's final rule provides:
Attestation report on management's assessment of internal control over
financial reporting. The term attestation report on management's
assessment of internal control over financial reporting means a report in
which a registered public accounting firm expresses an opinion, or states
that an opinion cannot be expressed, concerning management's assessment
of the effectiveness of the registrant's internal control over financial

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.77:919

could be interpreted as adding little to the obligations of
auditors. In this light, the provision merely builds on audit
requirements refined recently in SAS 82, now modified as SAS
99.195

Thus, drafting its final regulations to SOA section 404, the

SEC resisted proposals "to adopt a considerably broader
definition of internal control that would focus not only on
internal control over financial reporting, but also on internal
control objectives associated with enterprise risk management
196
and corporate governance."
It is, however, also possible to interpret the provision as
effectively increasing the nature and character of the auditor's
assessment, more directly imposing on management substantial
additional responsibility for the development and maintenance of
internal control systems under section 404. Read together with
reporting (as defined in § 240.13a-15(f) or 240.15d-15(f) of this chapter) in
accordance with standards on attestation engagements. When an overall
opinion cannot be expressed, the registered public accounting firm must
state why it is unable to express such an opinion.
Definitions of Terms Used in Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(a)(2) (2003).
It should be noted that attestation standards, once the sole province of
accountant self-regulation, are now to be modified, at least with respect to public
companies, through action by and under the guidance of, the Public Company
Accountant Oversight Board (PCAOB), an entity created by SOA. The PCAOB has
adopted the AICPA standards as interim measures and is now considering changes
to attestation standards based, in part, on an exposure draft circulated by the
AICPA. See Taub Speech, supra note 193.
195 Indeed, section 404's obligation's are consistent with the auditor's duty
under SAS No. 99 to review management's internal controls for purposes of
detecting fraud in the financial statements. See SAS 99, supra note 150, at para.
19-27.
A public company's ability to withstand pressures to provide false or
misleading information to the public depends a great deal on the
effectiveness of internal controls. Effective internal controls are the best
defense against fraudulent reporting. That is why the AICPA has for years
strongly advocated internal control reporting by management, and we
applaud the SEC for taking this step today.
James O'Malley, AICPA Senior Vice President for Public Affairs, AICPA Applauds
SEC Action on Internal Controls (May 27, 2003), at http://www.aicpa.org/news/
2003/030527.asp (last visited Sept. 30, 2003).
196 Management's Reports on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and
Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. at 36,639.
The SEC maintained that: "While we agree that these are important objectives, the
definition that we are adopting retains a focus on financial reporting, consistent
with our position articulated in the Proposing Release." Id. Indeed, the SEC made
clear its reluctance to expand the responsibility of auditors beyond their traditional
scope. "[I]ndependent accountants traditionally have not been responsible for
reviewing and testing, or attesting to an assessment by management of, internal
controls that are outside the boundary of financial reporting." Id. at 36,639-40.
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section 10A, the auditor's SOA section 404 report and attestation
add more than an additional review responsibility. Rather, the
obligation to oversee management's review procedures under
SOA section 404 necessarily requires the auditor to include
procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance of detecting
illegal acts with direct and material effect on the financial
statements. Section 10A obligates the auditor in a SOA section
404 review to report to management-and possibly the SECevery illegal act that is discovered and not inconsequential.1 97
The result is not merely the amalgamation of a random of
section numbers. The addition of SOA section 404 extends the
positive character of an auditor's obligation to investigate to
include the form and substance of management's own internal
systems of control. In this sense, SOA section 404 to some extent
undercuts the distinction made in SAS 54 between illegal acts
with direct and indirect effects on the financial statements. 198
197 Scott Taub described the SEC's sense of the nature of an auditor's obligation
under SOA section 404:
While external auditors cannot make the initial evaluation and
determination as to the effectiveness of internal controls, they are required
to attest to management's assertion about the effectiveness of those
controls. To do so, the auditing firm must perform enough work on internal
controls to assure itself that 1) management has designed sufficient
controls and put such controls in place, 2) management has performed
sufficient testing to evaluate the effectiveness of those controls and 3)
management's conclusion about the effectiveness of those controls is
appropriate. The auditor will certainly need documentation of
management's work in order to be able to complete its task, and may also
need to reperform some of that work. The final rules do not specify the
level of work that the auditor must do. Rather, the firm must determine
the level of work to perform based on the attestation standards, the firm's
knowledge of the company, and its experience and judgment. Much as with
an opinion on financial statements, an auditor cannot be compelled to issue
a report on internal controls if it is not satisfied with the procedures it has
been able to perform.
Taub Speech, supra note 193.
198 See SAS 54, supra note 65, at AU §§ 317.05-.07. But the undercutting is by
no means complete. In releasing the final regulations issued pursuant to SOA
section 404, the SEC explained that
[w]e recognize that our definition of the term "internal control over
financial reporting" reflected in the final rules encompasses the subset of
internal controls addressed in the COSO Report that pertains to financial
reporting objectives. Our definition does not encompass the elements of the
COSO Report definition that relate to effectiveness and efficiency of a
company's operations and a company's compliance with applicable laws
and regulations, with the exception of compliance with the applicable laws
and regulations directly related to the preparation of financial statements,

ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW

[Vol.77:919

This is particularly apparent in the SEC's "explicit reference to
assurances regarding use or disposition of the company's assets"
in the final regulations. 199 Though the financial reporting focus
of the regulations would ordinarily make issues relating to
assets unnecessary to a determination of the condition of the
financial statements, procedures targeting operations may be
necessary when management relies on systems that cannot
provide reasonable assurance to the auditors of the value or
20 0
condition of the assets represented in the financial statements.
This approach is amplified by SOA section 103(a)(2)(A)(iii),
which requires the Public Company Accountant Oversight Board
(PCAOB) to establish standards with respect to the testing of
management's internal control procedures described in SOA

section

404.201

such as the Commission's financial reporting requirements.
Management's Reports on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and
Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. at 36,640.
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO)
report advocated a framework of controls in three categories-"effectiveness and
efficiency of operations; reliability of financial reporting; [and] compliance with
applicable laws and regulations." COSO, Executive Summary of Integrated
Framework,http://www.coso.org/publications/executive summary-integrated-frame
work. htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2003). COSO objectives, however, can vary for
purposes of auditing, and might include operations, financial reporting, or
compliance. The COSO definition, as least with respect to financial reporting, was
incorporated into generally accepted auditing standards in 1997. See Statement on
Auditing Standards No. 78, Consideration of Internal Control in a Financial
Statement Audit: An Amendment to SAS No. 55, at 3 (American Inst. of Certified
Pub. Accountants 1995); CODIFICATION OF STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS,
Consideration of an Internal Control in a Financial Statement Audit, AU § 319.06
(American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1990). The result is a partial
incorporation of the COSO standard, focusing on financial reporting but touching on
matters which might have a contingent effect on the financial statements.
199 Management's Reports on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and
Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. at 36,640.
The SEC explained that "[t]his provision is specifically included to make clear that,
for purposes of our definition, the safeguarding of assets is one of the elements of
internal control over financial reporting." Id.
200 Id. at 36,641 n.57 (referencing the COSO Report). Indeed, even as the SEC
explained its determination to limit the focus of the analysis and attestation of
internal control in SOA section 404, it reminded auditors that this limitation did not
act to otherwise limit their obligations under GAAP and GAAS. "Codification of
Statements on Auditing Standards section 317 requires auditors to consider a
company's compliance with laws and regulations that have a direct and material
effect on the financial statements." Id. at 36,640 n.52.
201 Specifically, SOA section 103 provides that the PCAOB
(A) [s]hall include in the auditing standards that it adopts, requirements
that each registered public accounting firm shall-(iii) describe in each
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Putting all of this together, it seems clear that, at a
minimum, auditing standards, evolving judicial rules, and recent
legislation impose a positive duty on auditors with respect to the
detection and reporting of illegal acts. At its narrowest, this
positive obligation is centered on illegal acts directly connected
with the auditor's review of financial statement amounts. Even
in this context, however, it seems clear that the auditor may not
devise procedures indifferent to indirect affects on the financial
statements, particularly illegal activities that may have a
However, the trend of selfsignificant contingent effect.
regulation, judicial decisions, and the federal securities laws
An
appears to be directed toward a broader construction.
auditor's duty to monitor, even when centered on the financial
accounting objective, requires some, and sometimes significant,
attention to issuer operations. As Harvey Pitt, former SEC
Chairman, suggested, auditors must "structure the audit
process ... to detect illegal acts by clients, to determine whether
it is likely that an illegal act took place, to assess the potential
20 2
financial consequences of any illegal acts that are uncovered."
This focus may, under the circumstances of the engagement,
require the auditor to develop procedures that can lead to the
detection of illegal acts. 20 These illegal acts can include actions
that may result in liabilities with a contingent effect on the
financial statements, including violations of discrimination,
environmental and health and safety laws.

audit report the scope of the auditor's testing of the internal control
structure and procedures of the issuer, required by section 404(b), and
present (in such report or in a separate report)-(I)the findings of the
auditor from such testing; (II)an evaluation of whether such internal
control structure and procedures ....
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 103(a)(2)(A)(iii), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7213(a)(2)(A)(iii) (West
Supp. 2003). See Establishment of Interim Professional Auditing Standards No.
2003-006, § 7, Rule 3000T (Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 2003). These rules
were approved by the Commission on April 25, 2003. Id.
202 Harvey L. Pitt et al., More than "Classical GAAS": Audits and Illegality
Under the LitigationReform Act, 943 CORP. L. & PRAc. CouRsE HANDBOOK SERIES.
445, 455 (Practicing Law Inst. 1996); see also Harvey L. Pitt & David B. Hardison,
supra note 186, at B6.
203 See Pitt et al., supra note 202, at 455 ("[A]uditors should consider whether
additional [fraud detection] procedures are required, or whether procedures
previously employed will suffice in the performance of their new statutory
obligations.").
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B.

The Lawyer's Positive Monitoring Obligations
Lawyers have experienced the greatest substantive change
in the nature of their obligation to their clients and to public
regulators. Prior to the passage of SOA, a lawyer's obligation
was strictly centered on the client, and the paramount value of
that relationship was confidentiality. 20 4 For years before 2002,
academics and others criticized the legal profession for the
ambiguity of its rules with respect to lawyer conduct in the face
of client wrongdoing. 20 5 While ethical rules permitted a lawyer
to refer misconduct to persons of higher authority in the
organizational client, they mandate such disclosure. 20 6 SOA
section 307 imposed on lawyers practicing before the SEC an
obligation to report material violations to an appropriate level of
management. 20 7 I have already argued that the scope of this
duty to report is broad, and it may include an obligation to report
violations of any law that might have a material impact on the
corporation. 20 8 In this section, I argue that the nature of this
obligation is broadly positive. Lawyers are not required merely
to report evidence that might happen to come to their attention,
but instead they have an additional, affirmative obligation to
develop systems of gathering information that are reasonably
likely to lead to the detection of evidence subject to reporting
under SOA section 307.
204

See Nicole M. Healy, The Impact of September 11th on Anti-Money

Laundering Efforts, and the European Union and Commonwealth Gatekeeper
Initiatives, 36 INT'L LAW. 733, 744 n.73-74 (discussing the importance of protecting
client confidences and describing SOA's lack of provision for the preservation of the
attorney-client privilege in connection with the required disclosures).
205 Fairly representative of this criticism was the following:
While the ABA's Model Rules prohibit lawyer participation in client crime
or fraud, they set forth vague standards on what a lawyer should do
affirmatively when confronted with crime or fraud, particularly within an
organizational client. The lawyer must act in the "best interests of the
organizational client," but the ABA has consistently refused to affirm that
a lawyer for an organization must report illegal acts by the organization's
agents to the board of directors or other highest authority in the
organization.
Painter, supra note 73, at 1406. Professor Painter, of course, worked actively to
change the ABA's position; his attempts, however, were unsuccessfully. See
Memorandum from Richard W. Painter to ABA Ethics 2000 Commission in Support

of

Proposal

to

Amend

Model

Rule

1.13

(May

http://www.abanet.org/cpr/painter/html. (last visited Sept. 19, 2003).
206 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003).
207 See supranote 22-23.
208 See supra Part I.B.

13,

1998),

2003]

THE DUTY TO MONITOR

The core of the reporting obligation in the final regulation is
written in the passive voice:
If an attorney, appearing and practicing before the Commission
in the representation of an issuer, becomes aware of evidence of
a material violation by the issuer or by any officer, director,
employee, or agent of the issuer, the attorney shall report such
evidence to the issuer's chief legal officer (or the equivalent
thereof) or to both the issuer's chief legal officer and20its
chief
9
executive officer (or the equivalents thereof) forthwith.
The concern of the SEC appeared to be with the "triggering
standard" rather than with the procedures that attorneys would
have to adopt in order to comply with the reporting
requirement. 2 10 The SEC was not concerned so much with how
an attorney obtained information, or whether the attorney
appeared to have an obligation to seek out information subject to
reporting under section 205.3(b), but with the nature of the
information sufficient to trigger the reporting. 211 This lack of
concern was echoed by the organized bar and legal academics
interested in the question of lawyer obligations under SOA
In this respect, the regulations under SOA
section 307.212
209 Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing
Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1)
(2003).
210 See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
Exchange Act Release No., 34-46868, 67 Fed. Reg. 1 71,670, 71,681 (proposed Dec.
2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205). The SEC explained that in utilizing the
"becomes aware" standard:
[T]he rule seeks to balance the likelihood of increased compliance with the
law as a result of having an appropriate triggering standard that prompts
the bringing of potentially illegal conduct to the attention of the issuer's
management against the likelihood of decreased compliance resulting from
reduced consultation with an issuer's attorneys through adoption of too
high a standard.
Id.
211 Thus, in the proposed regulations, the SEC explained:
The report required in Section 205.3(b) to prevent or minimize the harm to
an issuer resulting from a material violation is internal. It involves no
disclosure of confidential information outside the issuer. The report,
moreover, is intended to prevent, if possible, misconduct that would injure
the issuer and its shareholders, or at least to limit the injury. Accordingly,
awareness of information leading an attorney reasonably to believe that a
material violation has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur appears
to be the appropriate trigger for the obligation to make an internal report
of the evidence of a material violation.
Id. at 71,681-82.
212 See Koniak, supra note 116, at 227-30 (providing a good, if partisan,
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section 307 stand in marked contrast to the focus and
construction of the detection and reporting requirements
imposed on auditors under the black letter of section 10A. 21 3 The
effect of the difference, however, may be less stark than the
differences in wording.
There are several sources providing some indication of the
sort of investigation, or due diligence, required of outside counsel
in connection with their reporting obligations under the
regulations to SOA section 307. These consist of the SEC's
response to comments about the "becomes aware" standard, the
development of the SEC's position prior to the enactment of
SOA, and most importantly, the development within state
fiduciary duty of care jurisprudence of a standard of reasonable
diligence for corporate fiduciaries. The SEC explained that only
one commentator objected to the "becomes aware" language, but
that the nature of the objection was cured with changes to the
definition of "evidence of material violation." 21 4 Indeed, it might
appear that the nature of the attorney's duty to detect is tied to
the triggering of the reporting requirement. The lower the
standard, the more extensive and positive the lawyer's obligation
to report is.
Despite a slew of negative comments, 2 15 the
threshold of evidence sufficient to invoke the disclosure
obligation is relatively low. To be subject to reporting up the
ladder, the lawyer must conclude that the information revealed
description of the focus of many of these people and organizations).
213 See supra Part I.A.
214 "The Comment of Federal Bar Counsel for example, objected to 'becomes
aware' in (b)(1) but appears to have done so in connection with the proposed
definition of 'evidence of a material violation.'" Implementation of Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47276, 68 Fed.
Reg. 6296, 6306 n.71 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205) (quoting
Comment of Federal Bar Counsel, at 12-13). The revisions made to that definition

appear to address those objections.
215 See id. at 6301-02. The SEC noted a number of comments suggesting a
higher evidentiary threshold for the invocation of the detect and report rules. In the
comments to the final regulations, the SEC noted that:
Nearly all practicing lawyers who commented found the reporting trigger
in the rule too low and called instead for a subjective standard, requiring
"actual belief' that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing,
or is
about to occur before the attorney would be obligated to make an initial
report within the client issuer. The revised definition incorporates
suggested changes into an objective standard that is designed to facilitate
the effective operation of the rule and to encourage the reporting of

evidence of material violations.
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constitutes "credible evidence, based upon which it would be
unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent and
competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely
that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to
occur." 21 6 The SEC went to some lengths to suggest that the
standard would be objective. 217 However, it made some changes
to the originally proposed standard to ensure that the trigger for
2 18
reporting not be too low.
Moreover, the SEC has indicated that it would treat the
reporting obligations as consistent with the position it took in an
The SEC noted that even lawyers were
earlier case. 219
"'obligated to take affirmative steps to ensure that appropriate
action is taken to address the misconduct,' including 'disclosure
of the matter to the entity's board of directors, resignation from
In
the firm, or disclosure to regulatory authorities.' "220
particular, the "the Commission has argued that attorneys
should be held responsible for materials which they have
drafted, or participated in drafting, that they knew would be
included in a document to be filed with the Commission but
which have been submitted without attribution or under another
individual's signature." 221 This is consistent with the SEC's
216 Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing
Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F. R. § 205.2(e)
(2003). In reporting the final regulations, the SEC noted that "This formulation,
while intended to adopt an objective standard, also recognizes that there is a range
of conduct in which an attorney may engage without being unreasonable.... Under
the revised definition, an attorney is not required (or expected) to report 'gossip,
hearsay, [or] innuendo.'" Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at 6302.
217 See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68
Fed. Reg. at 6301-02.
218 See id. at 6302.
219 See In re of John H. Gutfreund, 51 S.E.C. 93, 108-14 (Dec. 3, 1992)
(reporting on investigation by a chief legal officer who learned of criminal
misconduct by a corporate officer). In the release of the proposed regulations under
SOA section 307, the SEC explained that "[s]ection 307 of the Act requires the
Commission to promulgate minimum ethical standards for attorneys representing
issuers, including an 'up the ladder' reporting requirement on attorneys as
originally proposed by the Commission in Carter and Johnson." Implementation of
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 34-46868, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670, 71,673 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 205) (citations omitted).
220 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed.
Reg. at 71,672 (quoting In re John H. Gutfreund, 51 S.E.C. at 113-14).
221 Id. at 71,676 (citing the SEC's previous positions to this effect in Newby v.
Enron Corp., No. 02-20486, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 15059,(5th Cir. July 30, 2003), a
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increased willingness to apply to lawyers those developing
standards of monitoring conduct applicable to corporate
222
fiduciaries.
The SEC's use of developing standards of affirmative duty
originally applicable to corporate fiduciaries accords with
parallel developments in state corporate law with respect to the
nature and extent of the monitoring duties of corporate
fiduciaries. Prosecutors in connection with SEC enforcement
actions incorporated these positive obligations at the federal
level, 223 and they are likely to be influential in fleshing out the
"become aware" standard under the SOA section 307 regulations.
The state case that appears to have caught the eye of federal
officials with respect to the development of a law regarding the
obligation to monitor, is In re Caremark Intermational.224
Caremark, in a sense, represents the parallel efforts of the state
courts to develop, and perhaps extend, the law of monitoring
obligations, even as the federal government sought to develop its
own law of monitoring through the federal securities laws.
Indeed, the Caremark court was quite conscious of this
parallelism and sought, to some extent, to harmonize its view of
private class action suit in which the SEC filed amicus curiae briefs, and Klein v.
Boyd, Nos. 97-143, 97-1261, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 2004 (3rd Cir. Feb. 12, 1998),
vacated by, reh'g granted, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 4121 (3rd Cir. Mar. 9, 1998)).
222 For example, the SEC cited the information and disclosure standards
applicable to corporate officers as relevant to the construction of lawyer reporting
standards under SOA section 307. The SEC noted:
In 1997, the Commission issued another report of investigation in a matter
involving officers and directors of W.R. Grace Co. The Commission
concluded that these individuals failed to take action to ensure full and
prompt disclosure of substantial retirement benefits the company had
agreed to pay to its former CEO in the company's annual report, a 10K
filing, and a proxy statement. The Commission issued the report in order
"to emphasize the affirmative responsibilities of corporate officers and
directors to ensure that the shareholders whom they serve receive accurate
and complete disclosure of information required by the proxy solicitation
and periodic reporting provisions of the federal securities laws." Although
none of the officers and directors named in the matter were attorneys, the
report emphasizes the affirmative duty of an issuer's management to
correct misconduct and make full disclosure of relevant matters to
investors.
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. at
71,672-73 n.22 (quoting In the Matter of W.R. Grace & Co., Exchange Act Release
No. 34-39157, 53 S.E.C. 235, 236 (Sept. 30, 1997) (citations omitted).
223 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text; infra notes 234-239 and
accompanying text.
224 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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managerial monitoring obligations with the standards being
developed at the federal level. 225 Chancellor Allen read from
prior Delaware case law a positive duty to monitor. At its
narrowest, the rule stands "for the proposition that, absent
grounds to suspect deception, neither corporate boards nor senior
officers can be charged with wrongdoing simply for assuming the
integrity of employees." 226 Chancellor Allen rejected the notion
that a "corporate board has no responsibility to assure that
appropriate information and reporting systems are established
by management." 227 The "essential predicate" 228 for reasonable
compliance with a duty to detect and report is "relevant and
timely information.2 29 In addition, Chancellor Allen observed:
Obviously the level of detail that is appropriate for such an
information system is a question of business judgment....
Thus I am of the view that a director's obligation includes a
duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate
information and reporting system, which the board concludes is
adequate, exists, and that failure to do so under some
circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable
230
for losses caused by non-compliance.

Chancellor Allen noted that the question of the scope of the duty to monitor:
[H]as been given special importance by an increasing tendency, especially
under federal law, to employ the criminal law to assure corporate
compliance with external legal requirements, including environmental,
financial, employee and product safety as well as assorted other health and
safety regulations.
Id. at 969. He further explained that the increased penalties for corporate
misconduct under the federal sentencing guidelines "offer powerful incentives for
corporations today to have in place compliance programs to detect violations of law,
promptly to report violations to appropriate public officials when discovered, and to
take prompt, voluntary remedial efforts." Id.
225

226

Id.

Id. at 969-70. Such a proposition "would not, in any event, be accepted by
the Delaware Supreme Court in 1996." Id. at 970.
228 Id. at 970.
229 Id.
230 Id. Referring to Caremark, the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court
suggested that
[s]uch compliance systems could reasonably be expected to identify
wrongdoing when a compliance program could benefit the corporation
under federal sentencing guidelines. Although Caremark is dictum in a
Court of Chancery case approving a settlement of a derivative action, and
is not Supreme Court precedent, my personal view is that the expectations
of directors, therefore, progressed in the thirty-plus years from AllisChalmers to Caremark.... It was not a sudden leap of thirty years,
however. In a 1980 law review article in The Business Lawyer that I co227
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Some commentators have argued that failure to monitor a
corporation's practices, leading to a successful discrimination
suit, could constitute a breach of the duty of care under this
standard. 231 Caremark provides the principal template for
understanding the scope of any corporate monitor's obligations.
It is a template some have argued has already been widely, if
informally adopted, by public companies. 232
Its conscious
resonances with developing federal policy, as applied to criminal
actions, suggests that there is merit in carrying over its
principles to lawyers' and other gatekeepers' emerging
obligations to detect and report. Lawyer's good faith under the
SOA section 307 regulation suggests the need to develop and
implement at least some sort of rudimentary information
gathering system appropriate to the nature of the corporation
2 33
and the scope of the risk of "material violation."

authored with William Manning, Esquire, of the Delaware Bar, we noted
that such expectations may already have evolved in the then-seventeen
years following Graham.
E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the
Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 446 (2003) (citing E.
Norman Veasey & William E. Manning, Codified Standard-Safe Harbor or
Uncharted Reef? An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care Compared with
Delaware Law, 35 BUS. LAW. 919, 929-30 (1980)).
231 See Leonard M. Baynes, Racial Stereotypes, Broadcast Corporations,and the
Business Judgment Rule, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 819, 872-73 (2003) (noting that
broadcast executives could be liable for breach of the duty of care).
232 Professor Lawrence Cunningham suggested that
[t]he SEC must promulgate rules requiring annual reports to contain an
internal control report expressing management's responsibility for
establishing and maintaining adequate internal controls for financial
reporting and assessing their effectiveness. This mandate is a disclosure
counterpart to substantial extant legal requirements broadly imposed by
Congress in the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the milestone
legislation mandating internal financial reporting controls in response to
that period's equivalent of the Big Four Frauds. The disclosure's
substantive reference also duplicates the practice followed by most
companies pursuant to perceived mandates emanating from such
influential state law cases as In re CaremarkInternational.
Lawrence A. Cunningham, supra note 51, at 957.
233 Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (West Supp. 2003). In
another sense, this construction of the obligation accords with the auditor's
obligations under SAS 54 and 99. See supra notes 149-67 and accompanying
discussion. It makes sense from a logistical and policy standpoint, especially for
lawyers and accountants, to draw parallel connections between state and federal
laws. This type of approach was used by the judge in Caremark.
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Caremark extends beyond its state law confines. In its
2 34
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations,
the Department of Justice described the principles that
prosecutors are to use in determining whether to seek charges
against a corporation. 235 The principles suggest a number of
factors prosecutors ought to consider in making this
determination. 23 6 Among them is "the existence and adequacy of
the corporation's compliance program." 237 The document, citing
Caremark, states that: "In evaluating compliance programs,
prosecutors may consider whether the corporation has
established corporate governance mechanisms that can
238
effectively detect and prevent misconduct."
In a sense, the SOA section 307 regulations institutionalize
one facet of the sort of corporate governance mechanism for the
detection and prevention of misconduct contemplated in the
Department of Justice Guidelines. Institutionalization itself,
however, must be effective if it is to carry any weight, that is, if
it is to avoid being "merely a 'paper program'[rather than one]
239
designed and implemented in an effective manner."
A passive approach would tend to protect lawyers who hide
or management that conceals. Such actions clearly were not
intended by the provision. Legislative history suggests that
lawyers would take an approach similar to that required of
auditors. 240 Just as in the rules issued pursuant to SOA section
307, the emphasis was on an affirmative obligation to report
rather than on the nature of the obligation to seek out reportable
information. 24 1
Law firms seem to understand these
242
implications.
234 Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to Heads of Dep't Components, U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003),
(establishing guidelines for the prosecution of corporations as well as all other types
of business organizations), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm
(last visited Sept. 11, 2003).
235 See id. Part I (finding that corporations "should not be treated leniently
because of their artificial nature").
236 See id. Part II (listing nine factors that should be considered in reaching a
decision on how to properly treat a corporate client).
237 Id.
238 Id. at Part VII.
239

Id.

See 148 CONG. REC. S6551-52 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Edwards) (describing the provision as "about making sure... lawyers ...ensure
that the law is being followed").
241 The SEC, in its release of the proposed section 307 regulations, summarized
240
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Additional evidence suggesting that the obligations imposed
under section 307 are active can be found in the ways in which
the reporting requirements of sections 307 and 404 might work
together. SOA does not explain the relationship between the
reporting system created under section 307 and the
requirements of section 404 for the preparation, testing, and
disclosure of management's internal control report. 243 Under
rules to be created by the SEC, section 404 will impose on
companies the obligation to create and report on their internal
the legislative history to this effect:
This appears to have been the expectation of the Senators who drafted
[s]ection 307 of the Act. See 148 Cong. Rec. S6552 (July 10, 2002)
(statement of Sen. Edwards) ("the SEC shall make one rule in particular,
and it is a simple rule with two parts. No. 1, a lawyer with evidence of a
material violation has to report that evidence either to the chief legal
counsel or the chief executive officer of the company. No. 2, if the person to
whom that lawyer reports doesn't respond appropriately by remedying the
violation, by doing something that makes sure it is cured, that lawyer has
an obligation to go to the audit committee or to the board. It is that
simple.... If the CEO can do a short investigation, for example, and figure
out that no violation occurred, then the obligation stops there. But if there
is a serious violation of the law, the appropriate response is clear: The
CEO has to act promptly to remedy the violation. If he doesn't, the lawyer
has to go to the board. It is that simple."). Accord id. at S6555 (statement
of Sen. Enzi) ("This amendment instructs the Commission to establish
rules that require an attorney, with evidence of material legal violation by
the corporation or its agent, to notify the chief legal counsel or the chief
executive officer of such evidence and the appropriate response to correct
it. If these officers do not promptly take action in response, the
Commission is instructed to establish a rule that the attorney then has a
duty to take further appropriate action, including notifying the audit
committee of the board of directors or the board of directors themselves, of
such evidence and the actions of the attorney and others regarding this
evidence."), S6556 (statement of Sen. Corzine) ("when lawyers are aware of
a potential violation, they do have a duty to investigate. And if they
determine there is a material violation of law-not some small violation,
some insignificant rule-that violation should be remedied by the
corporation. If it is not remedied, it is the duty of the lawyer, under our
language, to report it to the board.").
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-46868, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670, 71,681 n.38 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
242 In an article published in the ABA Journal,the author noted with approval
that, after the passage of SOA, "[iln some cases, law firms are examining their own
internal management and operational structures in efforts to minimize their levels
of risk under Sarbanes [Oxley]." Jenny B. Davis, Sorting Out Sarbanes-Oxley, 89
A.B.A. J. 44, 49 (2003).
243 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 307, 404, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7245, 7562 (West
Supp. 2003).
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244
control structure as well as procedures for financial reporting.
Further, reporting companies will have to assess the
effectiveness of the internal control structure, and accounting
firms providing services to the company will have to attest to
and report on management's assessment of the internal controls.
245 The company's outside counsel, rather than its auditors, will
likely have a hand in creating and implementing these internal
246
control systems.
The quality and sufficiency of lawyer disclosure is subject to
review by company management as well as the company's
outside auditors. 247 In effect, it might be possible for both
management and auditors, in the course of preparing, reviewing,
and certifying a section 404 report, to review and pass on the
quality and sufficiency of a lawyer's reporting obligations under
section 307. In this context, the company and its auditors might
be obliged, in order to meet their obligations, to provide the
necessary evidence to establish liability on the part of lawyers to
third parties affected by section 307 disclosures. Thus, lawyers
and general counsel will have a clear incentive to create systems
of review designed to detect material violations. The prudent
lawyer, in the course of advising management on its disclosure,
as well as of its design and implementation of internal control
systems, will carefully review customer and employee

244

See id § 404, 15 U.S.C.A. §7262.

245

See id.

246

Section 201(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act added new Section 10A(g) to the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which prohibits auditors from performing nonaudit services for their audit clients. Among the non-audit services affected are
financial system design and implementation. See id. § 201, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(g). In
that connection, the SEC adopted "rules, consistent with our previous rules, that
prohibited the accounting firm from providing any service related to the audit
client's information system, unless it is reasonable to conclude that the results of
these services will not be subject to audit procedures during an audit of the audit
client's financial statements." Strengthening the Commission's Requirements
Regarding Auditor Independence, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47265, 68 Fed. Reg.
6006, 6011 (Feb. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240, 249, 274).
Specifically citing the auditor's obligations under SOA section 404, the SEC
explained that "[d]esigning, implementing, or operating systems affecting the
financial statements may place the accountant in a management role, or result in
the accountant auditing his or her own work or attesting to the effectiveness of
internal control systems designed or implemented by that accountant." Id. at 6012.
247 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262; Strengthening
the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, 68 Fed. Reg. at
6014 (citing AU §319) (noting that auditors must gain an understanding of a client's
system of internal controls when conducting an audit under GAAS).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.77:919

complaints, governmental inquiries, anonymous reports,
litigation threatened or instituted, and company-generated
analyses of industry-related problems. The prudent lawyer will
also have to present evidence to document his or her compliance
with detection and reporting requirements. Furthermore, a
reasonably prudent lawyer will institute a rudimentary system
that will create a reasonable likelihood that information that
lawyers are expected to review will indeed come to the attention
of, and be reviewed by, the lawyer burdened with a SOA section
307 obligation.

III. LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES FOR FAILURE TO MONITOR
I have suggested a set of possible interpretations of the
obligations imposed on auditors under section 10A of the 1934
Act and on lawyers pursuant to section 307 of SOA, which
extend the nature and scope of obligations and potentially
extend liability for acts or the failure to act against which
lawyers and accountants had been previously protected. Under
section 10A, auditors have a positive obligation to develop
procedures to detect the commission of illegal acts by the
corporation. 248
Likewise, SOA requires lawyers to report
evidence of a material violation "of fiduciary or similar duty to
the issuer recognized under an applicable Federal or State
statute or at common law." 249 In both cases, the reporting
requirement extends well beyond a narrowly tailored set of
corporate non-compliance. It is likely that both lawyers and
accountants have a duty to report evidence of discrimination by
250
the corporation or its employees and agents.
In this section I explore, at least preliminarily, the extent to
which the application of the detection and disclosure rules, as I
have suggested they might be applied, create additional bases of
liability for lawyers and auditors representing corporate clients.
First, I examine the extent to which the regulations themselves
protect lawyers and accountants from liability in connection with
their detection and reporting obligations. Next, I suggest that
248

(2000).

See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1

249 Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing
Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(d)
(2003).
250 See discussion supra Part I.A-B.
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protection is limited in connection with assertions of liability as
principals under the securities laws or for violations of other
laws. In addition, I will suggest the ways in which such
reporting information might serve as a useful source of discovery
for litigants seeking to prove corporate misconduct, especially in
connection with violations of labor, employment, and
environmental laws. Lastly, I will focus on corporate violations
of discrimination laws as an example of the possible operation of
the statutes.
The extension of liability for lawyers and accountants might
come as something of a surprise. In both cases, the regulations
promulgated by the SEC attempt to insulate auditors and
lawyers from liability to third parties for compliance (or noncompliance) with their reporting obligations. 251 With respect to
auditor liability related to reporting illegal acts, section 10A
provides independent public accountants with protection from
liability "in a private action for any finding, conclusion, or
statement expressed in a report made" to the SEC under section
10A. 25 2 Moreover, the SEC has taken the position that such
disclosure to the issuer is non-public and not the basis for
liability to third parties. In promulgating the regulations under
section 10A applicable to auditors, the SEC stated its view that:
Rule 1OA-1 is based on the premise that the notices and
reports under section 10A are to assist the Commission in
performing its enforcement responsibilities and, therefore, will
be non-public. Disclosure to the public of issuers' illegal acts will
continue to be made in modified audit reports or, when the
auditor has resigned, been dismissed, or elected not to stand for
253
re-election, on Form 8-K.
The regulations to SOA section 307 provide similar
protection for lawyers with an obligation to disclose evidence of
wrongdoing. "Nothing in this part is intended to, or does, create
a private right of action against any attorney, law firm, or issuer
254
based upon compliance or noncompliance with its provisions."
251 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.7 (stating that there is no private right of action against
attorney for compliance or non-compliance and that the authority to enforce
compliance vested exclusively in the SEC).
252 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(c) (2000).
253 Implementation of Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-38387, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,743, 12,745 (March 18, 1997)
(to be codified at 17 C.F. R. pts. 210, 240).
254 17 C.F.R. § 205.7(a).
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The protection afforded under this provision is meant to extend
broadly.
The Commission is of the view that the protection of this
provision should extend to any entity that might be compelled
to take action under this part; thus it extends to law firms and
issuers. The Commission is also of the opinion that ...it must
extend to both compliance and non-compliance under this
255
part.
The regulation also includes a statement of the SEC's
exclusive jurisdiction to enforce compliance with a lawyer's
obligation to report evidence of a material violation of law. 256
"The provision is intended to preclude, among other things,
private injunctive actions seeking to compel persons to take
actions under this part and private damages actions against
257
such persons."
These limitations may have little effect on the ability of
litigants to reach the information generated in compliance with
gatekeeper duties by accountants and auditors. More
importantly, the safe harbor provisions of section 10A and the
section 307 regulations may not limit the liability of lawyers and
accountants with respect to issuer discrimination reported to
management in all circumstances.
Knowledge of possible
discriminatory conduct, of a magnitude sufficient to justify
communication with management, may create a duty on the part
of the reporting lawyer or accountant, independent of the
statutory duty to report.
A.

Discovery.
The availability of either information gathered or reports
prepared by outside monitors can be very useful to plaintiffs in
suits against a corporation. They can also be very useful to
committees of independent directors evaluating shareholder
derivative actions. Discovery related to information produced by
gatekeepers is particularly important in two respects. First,
such information can provide evidence that the board's own
255 Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-47276, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6315 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
256 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.7 (b).
257 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 6315.
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monitoring system, as designed, was ineffective or otherwise
failed. Information in this event might support claims that the
directors breached their duty of care for failure to develop
adequate and reasonable monitoring systems. 258
Second,
assuming that the monitoring system itself worked well, such
information can provide evidence that the board ignored or failed
to utilize information provided by the monitoring system.
Information, in this case, would tend to show that the directors
breached their duty of care for failure to act on information of
259
corporate wrongdoing.
1.

Auditors
There may be circumstances under which reports prepared
or information gathered by auditors may be subject to
discovery. 260 Though auditors are not required to design an
audit to provide reasonable assurance of detection of illegal acts
with indirect effects on the financial statements, principles of
good practice by auditors suggest that an auditor ought to

document compliance with SAS

54.261

The SEC has suggested

that such disclosure may be anticipated in connection with an
auditor's compliance with the detect-and-report requirements of
section 10A, 262 even though section 10A reports would not be
258 See Wade, supra note 11, at 406-10 (providing an application of an
argument to this effect in the context of discrimination suits). Wade argues that had
the Texaco board implemented efforts to satisfy the duty of care through monitoring
and responding immediately to discrimination claims, the company would not have
faced such adverse economic consequences. Id.
259 For an application of an argument to this effect in the context of
discrimination suits, see, for example, Leonard M. Baynes, supra note 231, at 86263. Baynes argues that board members of the broadcasting corporations could lose
the benefits of the business judgment rule if their decisions were irrational, not fully
informed, or if they failed to properly monitor the diversity within the corporation
by not placing enough emphasis on creating minority-based television shows. Id. He
also argues that an executive's breach of duty of care will mainly focus on the type
and quality of the decision-making processes. Id. at 874-81.
260 See, e.g., United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 813-15 (1984);
see also Michael J. Sharp & Abraham M. Stanger, Audit-Inquiry Responses in the
Arena of Discovery: Protected by the Work-Product Doctrine, 56 BUS. LAW. 183, 205
(2000) (providing a discussion of traditional understanding in this regard).
261 See, e.g., Linda B. Specht, The Auditor, SAS 54 and Environmental
Violations, J. ACCT., Dec. 1992, at 67, 68 ("The auditor should document compliance
with Statement on Auditing Standards no. 54, Illegal Acts by Clients, and assess the
adequacy of the client's treatment and disclosure of ...contingencies.").
262 Thus, the SEC has explained that though an auditor's section 10A reports to
management and the SEC might remain confidential, the "[dlisclosure to the public
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subject to disclosure, at least at the time made. 263 Auditor work
papers are usually subject to discovery. 264 Discovery should
include any auditor documentation of compliance with SAS 54.
The information in the auditor documentation might provide
evidence of client knowledge or intent of a kind especially useful
in discrimination cases.
Moreover, work papers prepared in connection with an
auditor's section 10A compliance might also be subject to
discovery. It can be argued that the safe-harbor rules, which
provide protection only against private lawsuits grounded on an
auditor's section 10A compliance, and disclosure with respect to
the section 10A reports, do not extend to work papers. 265 The
case may be clearer for discovery where the work papers, or the
information contained therein, are used in the course of the
audit and are necessary for an attestation review of
management's internal control report under SOA section 404, or
otherwise in connection with the conduct of the audit. Any such
documentation may also provide evidence of any auditor
misconduct. For example, complicity by accountants, directly or
indirectly, to hide or alter evidence of client misconduct may be
discovered through a review of auditor SAS 54 documentation.

of issuers' illegal acts will continue.., in modified audit reports." Implementation of
Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 3438387, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,743, 12,745 (March 18, 1997) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
210, 240). The SEC referred to the auditor's obligations with respect to its audit
report under SAS No. 54. See id. at 12,744-45.
263 See id. at 12,745.
264 See, e.g., Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. at 817-18 (holding that workproduct immunity for attorney papers is not applicable to independent auditor's
work papers and endowing the work papers of an independent auditor with a workproduct immunity from discovery would destroy the appearance of auditor's
independence by creating the impression that the auditor is an advocate for the
client); see also PepsiCo, Inc. v. Baird, Kurtz & Dobson LLP, 305 F.3d 813, 815-16
(8th Cir. 2002) (holding that quality control assessments prepared by auditor were
not protected by accountant-client privilege under Illinois law); Inspiration Consol.
Copper Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 60 F.R.D. 205, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(holding that for purposes of discovery, an independent accountant may be a general
auditor subject to normal discovery).
265 Thus, it could be argued that the safe-harbor confidentiality rules covers
only the reports made to management, but not the information on which the report
is based. This would correspond to the difference between protection of work product
and lack of protection of information which might find its way into a work product
protected writing. Otherwise, auditors might be tempted to hide information within
reports.
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More importantly, the documents might contain information
leading to evidence of corporate misconduct.
Discovery of audit papers need not rest solely or primarily
on an assertion of auditor liability. There are good reasons for
seeking discovery of this material, especially where the
corporation is alleged to have engaged in no financial statement
misconduct. The sort of information that might be available in
this way may lead to evidence critical to the presentation of an
effective suit against the corporation for its illegal acts,
especially with respect to discrimination, environmental, and
health or safety issues. Commentators have suggested:
[A]uditors presumably will want to have some information
about.., illegal or improper acts that have been found by
management or the audit committee during the preceding fiscal
Customer complaints, governmental inquiries,
year.
anonymous reports, litigations instituted and threatened, and
any internal analyses of industry-specific problems ... Are all
subjects into which auditors may deem [of interest] .266
Even though some of this information may be contained in a
form protected from discovery, as work product and privileged
auditor
at
aimed
attempts
discovery
information,
communications relating to corporate internal controls may lead
to the production of significant information in actions other than
Management representations to
securities fraud cases. 267
auditors may provide circumstantial evidence of motive or bad
Both section 10A and the auditor's increased
intent.
involvement in management's MD&A now provide additional,
and perhaps important, sources of information for plaintiffs in
cases alleging corporate misconduct.
2.

Outside Counsel

Likewise, there may be circumstances under which the
reports prepared by lawyers may be subject to discovery. Like
much of the communication between a corporation and its
counsel, lawyer up-the-ladder reports required under the
regulations to section 307 are likely protected as privileged. The
See Pitt et al., supra note 2033, at 455-56.
See Management's Reports on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting
and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-47986, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636, 36,645-47 (June 18, 2003) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270, 274).
266
267
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SEC has been sympathetic to the bar's concern about the effect
of participation in the corporate monitoring process on the scope
and availability of attorney-client privilege. Indeed, lawyers
might have thought they dodged the disclosure bullet when the
SEC withdrew proposed rule 205.3(b)(3) which provided that
"[t]he attorney reporting evidence of a material violation shall
take steps reasonable under the circumstances to document the
report and the response thereto and shall retain such
documentation for a reasonable time. ' 268 Documentation would
have extended to the Chief Legal Officer, who would have been
required to document the inquiry in response to the report. 269 In
addition, the reporting attorney would have been required to
document the response to her report.27 0 Fear of discovery among
the practicing bar appears to have provided at least some
motivation for the SEC's change of heart.
[C]ommentators opined that the documentation requirement
might increase the issuer's vulnerability in litigation. They
noted that a report will be a "treasure trove of selectively
damning evidence" and, while the Commission may be of the
view that such documentation should be protected by the
attorney-client privilege, the applicability of the privilege will
be decided by the courts.
Thus, there is considerable
uncertainty as to whether it will be protected. At a minimum,
it was contended, assertions of privilege will be met with
27 1
significant and prolonged legal challenges.
268 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-46868, 67 Fed. Reg.
71,670, 71,684
(proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205); Implementation of
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Exchange Act Release No. 3447276, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6306 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
205).The SEC suggested that the reporting requirements were imposed to create
incentives to handle reports more thoughtfully "if those involved memorialized their
decisions." Id. at 6306.
269 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 6306.
270 See Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and
Practicing Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. §
205.3(b)(8) (2003) (stating what an attorney shall do with an adequate document
response); id. at § 205.3(b)(9) (stating what an attorney should do with an
inadequate document inadequate response).
271 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 6307 (citing, in part, to Comments of the American Corporate Counsel
Association, at 5, and referencing Comments of Corporations Committee, Business
Law Section, the State Bar of California, at 10). This fear is not unfounded. See, e.g.,
In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices. Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 305-
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However, the SEC cautioned that "in the absence of an
affirmative documentation requirement, prudent counsel will
consider whether to advise a client in writing that it may be
violating the law."272 The SEC also suggested "responsible
corporate officials may direct that such matters be
273
documented."
In these circumstances, the withdrawal of the regulations
appears to be as little more than a paper victory. It is true
enough that reporting lawyers need not report material
violations in writing, nor do corporate clients need to
memorialize their investigations. It is, however, likely that both
outside counsel and the corporate client will produce writings
relating to their obligations under the SOA section 307
regulations. Moreover, the internal controls report requirements
of SOA section 404, along with its enhanced reporting
obligations, suggest that it is more likely than not that both
lawyers and the corporate client will document of material
violation. 274 First, both the corporate client and outside counsel
will want evidence of compliance with their obligations under the
securities laws. At a minimum, preparation of some sort of
documentation may be necessary or prudent as support for the
discussion of the internal controls now required as part of
management's MD&A disclosure. More importantly, perhaps,
the corporate client's auditors may demand documents in
connection with their certification obligations under SOA section
404.275
Documentation of some sort, whether oral comments
07 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that privilege is waived when privileged records turned
over to federal prosecutors).
272 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 6307.
273 Id.
274 SOA section 404 requires management to produce an internal control report.
That report must contain a statement describing the responsibility of management
for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and
procedures for financial reporting and containing an assessment of the effectiveness
of the structures and procedures used for internal control of the issuer's financial
reporting. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262 (West. Supp.
2003).
275 SOA section 404 provides in part:
With respect to the internal control assessment required by subsection (a),
each registered public accounting firm that prepares or issues the audit
report for the issuer shall attest to, and report on, the assessment made by
the management of the issuer. An attestation made under this subsection
shall be made in accordance with standards for attestation engagements
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reduced to written (if summary) form by auditors as part of any
necessary testing of the efficacy of the statements, assertions in
the internal controls report, or written comments provided by
management or counsel, may be required by auditors as support
for their statutory attestation under SOA section 404(b). In this
context, both lawyers and auditors ought to remember the
observation of one commentator:
Even the most competent auditor faces a losing battle in court
if nothing in the workpapers supports an exercise of judgment
in these matters.
Although GAAS does not require
documentation of compliance with SAS no. 54, juries are not
necessarily convinced, nor monetary judgments necessarily
limited, by the argument that the auditor complied with
GAAS.

276

Prudentail concerns create substantial incentives for
lawyers to produce documentation.
First, SOA requires
277
detection and reporting by lawyers,
though it is arguably
protected in some instances by the attorney-client privilege.
More importantly, issues of both privilege and work product
protection have become increasingly complex, especially where
the company faces investigation by the federal government as
well as private actions which might bear a direct relationship to
those investigations. 278 Waivers of the attorney-client privilege
issued or adopted by the Board.
Id. § 404(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7562(b).
276 Specht, supra note 261, at 72.
277 See supra Part I.B.
278 See generally Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law
Enforcement's Multi-Front Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege (And Why it is
Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV. 469 (2003) (examining how federal law enforcement is
encroaching on the attorney-client privilege). On the problems of defendants facing
multiple federal government investigations, see, for example, Mark D. Hunter,
SEC/DOJ Parallel Proceedings: Contemplating the Propriety of Recent Judicial
Trends, 68 MO. L. REV. 149, 162-67 (2003). For a discussion on the impact of
secrecy agreements in this context, see, for example, Susan P. Koniak, Are
Agreements to Keep Secret Information Learned in Discovery Legal, Illegal, or
Something in Between?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 783, 783-788 (2002). The practicing
bar has become very sensitive to the issues raised by this increasingly popular
practice. See, e.g., Thomas Brom, Full Disclosure, CAL. LAW., June 2003, at 33.
Moreover, the SEC is itself proposing changes that would make it easier for it to
obtain otherwise confidential client material. See SEC, REPORT PURSUANT TO
SECTION 704 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 45-47 (Jan. 24, 2003)

[hereinafter SEC 704 Report], http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/SOA704report.pdf.
The Commission proposes amendment of the Exchange Act to permit parties to
produce privileged or protected materials to the SEC without being deemed to waive
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and work product protection are now a common demand by
federal prosecutors 279 that compound the problem for outside
counsel to the benefit, potentially, of counsel for plaintiffs'
lawyers in discrimination, environmental, and similar actions
against the corporation. Steve Freccero, a partner in the San
Francisco offices of Morrison & Feorster, noted that
[b]y the same token, waiver of privilege can have enormous
consequences. It's rare that all you're faced with is a DOJ
investigation.
You are more likely to have multiple
investigative bodies and parallel civil litigation. You may reach
an agreement with government investigators regarding

the privilege or other protection with respect to others. Id. at 45.
279 See David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New
World: The Death of Privilege in CorporateCriminalInvestigations,37 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 147, 155-56 (2000). The authors note:
Corporations now fear that a less-than-complete disclosure will not count
as "thorough" cooperation and may increase the chance of an indictment
and the severity of any penalty. Exploiting this fear, federal prosecutors
are now licensed to take a short cut around "cooperation or immunity
agreements" by requesting privilege waivers "if necessary" to the
investigation.... The federal government thus effectively encourages the
solicitation of privilege waivers for the sake of obtaining evidence that it
formerly sought through the traditional means of grand jury subpoenas
and the conferral of immunity.
Id. The authors have a point. The SEC recently announced a thirteen factor policy
to be used to aid the SEC in determining whether to reward cooperation by an
issuer under certain circumstances. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section
21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the
Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-44969 (Oct. 23, 2001) (parent company not subject to SEC action
where its financial statements were misstated as a result of the actions of the
comptroller of a subsidiary of the parent company), http://www.sec.govflitigation/
investreport/34-44969.htm. In addition to swift investigation, disciplinary action
and public disclosure, the parent company cooperated with the SEC in many
significant respects.
The company pledged and gave complete cooperation to our staff. It
provided the staff with all information relevant to the underlying
violations. Among other things, the company produced the details of its
internal investigation, including notes and transcripts of interviews of
Meredith and others; and it did not invoke the attorney-client privilege,
work product protection or other privileges or protections with respect to
any facts uncovered in the investigation.
Id. The SEC, however, would not institutionalize the thirteen factors as either rule
or regulation. The SEC stated that "we are not adopting any rule or making any
commitment or promise about any specific case; nor are we in any way limiting our
broad discretion to evaluate every case individually, on its own particular facts and
circumstances." Id.
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confidentiality, but plaintiffs' counsel may demand 280
that they
too should have access to all your internal interviews.
At the same time, the federal corporate sentencing
guidelines also create incentives for waiver. "[C]omplying with
the guidelines may require waiving privileges, which has
significant potential adverse consequences for both employees
and the corporation in subsequent criminal and civil proceedings
involving the same conduct." 28 l Waiver may also work to the
benefit of third-party plaintiffs seeking information to support
their actions.
SOA also requires assertions by management to the
investing public, which relies in part on those communications or
the failure to make the necessary communications under SOA
section 307.282 In the hands of management, in the form of the
MD&A discussion of management under SOA section 404, as
well as in connection with auditor's needs pursuant to their
attestation function, it may be possible for documentation of
"material violations" to be produced in discoverable form. 28 3
Plaintiffs counsel in large scale discrimination, environmental,
health and safety and other lawsuits will likely take advantage
of this possibility by attempting aggressive discovery targeted on
those documents.
B.

Liability as a Principal Under SecuritiesActs

Since the decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver28 4 liability for securities laws
violations as an aider and abettor has been eliminated for
lawyers and accountants. 28 5 However, the reporting obligations
280 Update: White-Collar Legal Defense, CAL. LAW., Aug. 2003, at 43-44. The
SEC itself is aware that "[u]nder current law, however, a party who produces
privileged or protected material to the Commission runs a risk that a third party,
such as an adversary in private litigation, could obtain that information by

successfully arguing that production to the Commission waived the privilege or
protection." SEC 704 Report, supra note 278, at 45.
281 Cole, supra note 278, at 539.
282 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262 (West Supp. 2003).
283 To some extent, corporate counsel will resist production not only on the
grounds of privilege, but more likely in the SOA section 404 context, on the work
product privilege. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5) ("Claims of Privilege or
Protection of Trial Preparation Materials").
284 511 U.S. 164 (1994). For commentary on the case see Joel Seligman, The
Implicationsof Central Bank, 49 BUS. LAW. 1429, 1429-41 (1994).
285 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191. The government, however, may still seek
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imposed under section 10A and under the regulations to SOA
section 307 may permit the assertion of securities fraud actions
against lawyers and auditors as principals. Indeed, the trends in
federal law toward convergence of the conceptualization of the
duties and roles of the auditor and outside counsel are well
evidenced within the context of auditor/outside counsel primary
2 6
liability under Rule 10b-5. 8
1.

Auditors

Section 1OA(c) eliminates an auditor's liability in private
rights of action for "any finding, conclusion, or statement
expressed in a report made pursuant to the [auditor detect-andreport provisions of section 1OA(b)] including any rule
promulgated pursuant thereto."28 7 Liability arising from the
violation of the securities laws themselves, however, may not be
covered under the safe harbor. Commentators have suggested
that section 10A "may expose auditors to increased litigation for
failure to discover and disclose illegal acts other than
management fraud. These situations could expose auditors to
securities fraud lawsuits based upon direct primary liability
under Rule lOb-5."28 8 These obligations arise independently of
GAAP. Though some courts have suggested that an auditor's
duties are co-extensive with GAAP, 28 9 other courts have
suggested that GAAP may be a factor, but not necessarily the
290
determinative factor, in determining auditor liability.

criminal sanctions against lawyers and accountants for aiding and abetting
securities fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (providing general authority to charge

under federal criminal statutes).
286 See infra notes 306-17 and accompanying text (discussing the extension of
primary liability to outside counsel under Rule 10b-5).
287 Implementation of Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,

Exchange Act Release No. 34-38387, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,743, 12,746 n.34 (Mar. 18,
1997) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 210, 240).
288 Calderon & Kowal, supra note 163, at 430-31. The authors contend that
section 10A's disclosure obligations run directly to investors, and as such, breach of

the whistle-blowing obligation should give rise to Rule 10b-5 liability. Id.
289 See Chill v. Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 270 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Allegations of a
violation of GAAP provisions or SEC regulations, without corresponding fraudulent
intent, are not sufficient to state a securities fraud claim."); Monroe v. Hughes, 31
F.3d 772, 775-76 (9th Cir. 1994).

290 See, e.g., Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1113-15 (7th Cir.
1974) (finding that other factors include the possible misleading of defendant
accounting firm by plaintiff, the extent other agencies investigated the existence of
fraud, and the existence of causal connection between the breach of duty of inquiry
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Currently, the appellate courts have split on the question of
the nature of the conduct sufficient to bring accountants within
the primary liability provisions of section 10b-5. At least one
court has held that accountants may be primarily liable for
statements made by others where the accountants reviewed the
statements and played a significant role in the drafting and
editing of the statements. 291 Another court has found primary
liability possible "when [a secondary actor], acting alone or with
others,
creates
a
misrepresentation
even
if
the

misrepresentation is not publicly attributed to

it."292

On the

other hand, the Tenth Circuit declined to adopt a "rule allowing
liability to attach to an accountant or other outside professional
who provided 'significant' or 'substantial assistance' to the
representations of others." 293
The Tenth Circuit, instead,
adopted a narrower rule which requires that outside counsel or
auditors "must themselves make a false or misleading statement
(or omission) that they know or should know will reach potential
investors" for primary liability to attach. 294 The Second Circuit
295
has adopted a similar standard.
The corporate scandals that gave rise to SOA may well have
an impact on the willingness of courts to find primary liability.
In In re Enron Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation,296 the
federal district court, in a broadly worded opinion, denied the
motions to dismiss claims of primary liability under the
securities laws against Vinson & Elkins, Enron's primary
outside counsel, and Arthur Anderson, Enron's primary outside
accountants. 297 The district court provided a laundry list of

and disclosure and the facilitation of the underlying fraud so that adequate inquiry
and subsequent disclosure would have led to the discovery of the underlying fraud
or its prevention).
291 See In re Software Toolworks, Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994); see
also In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (finding that
primary liability attaches to accounting firm that was "intricately involved" in the
creation of false documents).
292 Carley Capital Group v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1324,
1334 (N.D. Ga. 1998).
293 Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1227 (10th Cir. 1996).
294 Id. at 1226.
295 See Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[A]
secondary actor cannot incur primary liability under [10b-5] for a statement not
attributed to that actor at the time of its dissemination.").
296 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
297 See id. at 708.
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conduct constituting primary violation of the securities laws. 298
The district court applied the principle that allegations of
violations of GAAP, standing alone, are not sufficient to make
out a claim for primary liability against auditors. 299 However,
the district court found sufficient allegations of additional
conduct to support an allegation of scienter. 300 The Enron
litigation will have a long course to run before the law is settled
with respect to its application to Arthur Anderson and the other
parties involved. I believe, however, in light of Congress's
Thus, the district court concluded that
[ead Plaintiff has identified numerous violations by Arthur Andersen of
GAAS, GAAP, risk factors for fraud, accounting rules, and rules of
professional conduct for accounts that Arthur Andersen violated. Yet
Arthur Andersen certified that Enron's financial statements for 1997-2000
were in compliance with GAAP and its audits of the financial statements
complied with GAAS. Moreover it knew its reports would be relied upon by
present and potential investors in Enron securities. It also consented to
having the audited financial statements included in registration
statements, prospectuses, and annual shareholders' reports that were filed
by Enron during the Class Period. Lead Plaintiff has also alleged that
Arthur Andersen destroyed documents to conceal its fraudulent
accounting. All of these constitute primary violations under § 10(b).
Id. at 706.
299 "'[T]he mere publication of inaccurate accounting figures, or a failure to
follow GAAP, without more does not establish scienter. The party must know that it
is publishing materially false information or the party must be severely reckless in
publishing such information.'" Id. at 707. (quiting Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097,
1103 (5th Cir. 1994)). Failure to follow GAAP, of course, is also a necessary element
of a fraud claim, but does not go toward the element of intent or recklessness,
standing alone.
300 The specific factual allegations indicating the requisite level of scienter
included:
Arthur Andersen's comprehensive accounting, auditing, and consulting
services to Enron necessarily made it intimately privy to the smallest
details of Enron's alleged fraudulent activity. Lead Plaintiff has described
several similar prior fraudulent audits of other companies, establishing a
pattern of such conduct, and the SEC's and courts' repeated imposition of
penalties on Arthur Andersen and its employees, including the consent
decree and injunction from the Waste Management fraud which was in
effect at the time Lead Plaintiff alleges that Arthur Andersen violated §
10(b) in auditing Enron.
Id. at 706. The district court also found significant the details of a telephonic
conference between Arthur Anderson principals in which most of the information
relating to the fraudulent conduct of its client was discussed, but a decision was
made to continue the representation "because Enron's business was so lucrative."
Id. at 706-07. The plaintiffs also produced evidence of internal "e-mails and internal
memoranda between and among Arthur Andersen employees.., before the '99
financial statements were issued that reflect Arthur Andersen's knowledge and
intent to continue in the fraudulent scheme." Id. at 707.
298
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understanding of the scandal leading to this litigation and to the
enactment of SOA, that the allegations against Arthur Anderson
may well come to provide a nice laundry list of conduct to be
avoided in order to avoid claims of primary liability under the
securities laws. The SEC, however, is not waiting. It continues
to take an aggressive stance in bringing litigation. In a case
filed in April 2003,301 the SEC claimed that Chancellor
Corporation's outside auditors were liable as principals for
securities fraud. 30 2 With respect to the auditors, the SEC also
alleged that the auditor could not have been unaware that the
company was preparing to file financial statements that
contained material misrepresentations, triggering the auditor's
section 10A obligations. 30 3 In this case, the auditor's conduct in
failing to detect and report misconduct, in issuing a clean audit
report, and in reviewing subsequent disclosures by the issuer,
was sufficient to constitute both a basis for violation of section
10A, and section 10B, and Rule 10b-5. 30 4 The auditor's failure to
report violations constitutes a violation of section 10A, and this
failure to report constitutes a critical component of the auditor's
course of conduct which exposes the auditor to liability as a
30 5
principal for the fraud of the issuer.
2.

Outside Counsel

Like auditors, lawyers no longer face the prospect of liability
in private actions for aiding and abetting securities fraud under
Rule 10b-5. 306 On the other hand, courts have been willing to
30 7
extend primary liability to outside counsel under Rule 10b-5.
As a result, it has become "hornbook law" to avoid conduct
drawing direct attention to the work of the outside counsel to
301 SEC v. Chancellor Corp., No. 03-10762 MEL (D. Mass., filed April 24, 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/compl8104.htm
(last visited Sept. 30,
2003). The defendants include certain officers, an outside director, and the issuer's
outside auditor. See id. at para. 1-6.
302 See id. at para. 83-86. The SEC alleged that the auditors failed to
substantiate the propriety of the issuer's financial statement disclosures in a
number of respects in the face of obvious warning signs. See id. at para. 67-82.
303 See id. at para. 121-25.
304 See id. at para. 7, 67-82.
305 See id.
306 See supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
307 See, e.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 174-76 (2d Cir. 1998);
Carley Capital Group v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1333-34
(N.D. Ga. 1998).
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minimize the potential for primary liability under the securities
laws. "For lawyers and others involved in transactions, it has
become extremely important to remain 'behind the scenes,'
avoiding unnecessary contact with the parties on the other side
of transactions. This helps prevent one avenue that can open
one up to primary liability."30 8 As with auditors, the scandals of
the early twenty-first century may rewrite the common
understanding of the standards for imposing primary liability on
outside counsel under the securities laws, and especially what it
means to be "behind the scenes." In the Enron litigation, 3 9 the
district court refused to dismiss the primary liability claims
against Vinson & Elkins, Enron's outside counsel. 3 10 The court
rejected the claims by Vinson & Elkins that its role was merely
that of a behind the scenes secondary agent charged with a
primary duty of keeping client confidences under relevant rules
3 11
of professional responsibility.
Instead, the complaint alleges that the two were in league, with
others, participating in a plan, with each participant making
material misrepresentations or omissions or employing a
device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or engaging in an act,
practice or course of business that operated as a fraud, in order
to establish and perpetuate a Ponzi scheme that was making
312
them all very rich.
There were a number of facts alleged that made the
allegations credible to the court. Most of these will likely serve
as a litmus test for law firms serving public companies in the
future. Among the facts alleged were those that went to a
showing that Vinson & Elkins affected the very devices at the
heart of the scheme to defraud. 313 For purposes of motivation,
308 LARRY D. SODERQUIST, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS § 12:12, at
12-33 (3d ed. 2001).
3o9 In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative and ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549

(S.D. Tex. 2002).
310 See id. at 705.
311 See id. at 704-05.
312 Id. at 704.
313 The district court specified the following:
Vinson & Elkins was necessarily privy to its client's confidences and
intimately involved in and familiar with the creation and structure of its
numerous businesses, and thus, as a law firm highly sophisticated in
commercial matters, had to know of the alleged ongoing illicit and
fraudulent conduct. Among the complaint's specific allegations of acts in
furtherance of the scheme are that the firm's involvement in negotiation
and structuring of the illicit partnerships and off-the-books SPEs, whose
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the court was content to look to the large fees that Vinson &
Elkins earned for its alleged work. 314 Though the court
suggested that under other circumstances the absolute public
silence of Vinson & Elkins might have cut against liability, the
plaintiffs had alleged a number of instances of public
interventions by the law firm in connection with the matters it
handled for Enron. 315 The nature of the participation of outside
counsel necessary to support a claim for primary liability can be
contrasted with the sorts of activities that might shield outside
lawyers. While the district court found that the complaint could
survive a motion to dismiss its allegations of primary liability
against Vinson & Elkins, the same court held that the
allegations against another law firm, Kirkland & Ellis, did not
rise to a cognizable claim for primary liability. 316 According to
the court, plaintiffs failed to allege facts other than that
Kirkland & Ellis, unlike Vinson & Elkins, performed little more
than "routine" legal work, never made statements which could be
relied on by third parties, and otherwise did nothing that
directly tied its work to disclosure obligations under the
317
securities laws.

formation documentation it drafted, as well as that of the subsequent
transactions of these entities. It advised making Kopper manager of
Chewco so that Enron's involvement in and control of the SPE would not
have to be disclosed, drafted "true sales" opinions that Lead Plaintiff
asserts were essential to effect many of the allegedly fraudulent
transactions. Vinson & Elkins was materially involved in the New Power
IPO, and it structured and provided advice on the Mahonia trades, all
actions constituting primary violations of § 10(b).
Id.
See id. at 704-05.
Thus, for example, the court looked to
Vinson & Elkins made the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations to
potential investors, credit agencies, and banks, whose support was
essential to the Ponzi scheme, and Vinson & Elkins deliberately or with
severe recklessness directed those public statements toward them in order
to influence those investors to purchase more securities, credit agencies to
keep Enron's credit high, and banks to continue providing loans to keep
the Ponzi scheme afloat. Therefore Vinson & Elkins had a duty to be
accurate and truthful. Lead Plaintiff has alleged numerous inadequate
disclosures by Vinson & Elkins that breached that duty.
Id. at 705.
316 See id. at 705-06.
317 The court explained that
While the allegations against Kirkland & Ellis may indicate that it acted
with significant conflicts of interests and breached professional ethical
standards, unlike its claims against Vinson & Elkins, Lead Plaintiff has
314

3,5
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In this emerging context, the lawyer's obligations under
SOA section 307 add another layer of obligations whose breach
may consist of acts which, taken with those of corporate
fiduciaries, can constitute fraud within the meaning of section
10b-5. Outside counsel who participate in the creation and
marketing of fraudulent devices, and outside counsel who
discover evidence of potential fraud in the construction,
marketing, explanation, or disclosure of corporate actions and
fail to report such evidence to management, or fail to distance
themselves from those schemes after reporting, face a
heightened likelihood that their conduct could give rise to an
inference of scienter necessary to maintain an action against
them as primary violators. Likewise, the failure to create and
implement procedures that might lead to the detection of
"material violations" with respect, at least, to the outside
counsel's engagement might also provide evidence of a sufficient
level of recklessness to suggest scienter.
C. Direct Liability For Other CorporateIllegal Acts.
Most of the commentary to section 10A and the regulations
under SOA section 307 focuses on auditor and lawyer liability
under the securities acts. 3 18 I have suggested that the breadth of
liability could extend significantly farther. In particular, given
the scope of the monitoring obligations and the positive
obligations to detect and report even the possibility of contingent
liability, auditors and outside counsel ought to become especially
sensitive to the possibility that they might become liable, along
with their corporate client, for violations of laws other than the
securities laws. While it is true enough that the "material effect
not alleged that Kirkland & Ellis exceeded activities would be protected by
an attorney client relationship and the traditional rule that only a client
can sue for malpractice because it never made any material
misrepresentations or omissions to investors or the public generally that
might make it liable to nonclients under § 10(b). Any documents that it
drafted were for private transactions between Enron and the SPEs and the
partnerships and were not included in or drafted for any public disclosure
or shareholder solicitation. Any opinion letters that the firm wrote are not
alleged to have reached the plaintiffs nor been drafted for the benefit of the
plaintiffs. It was not Enron's counsel for either its securities filings or its
SEC filings. Thus the Court grants Kirkland & Ellis' motion to dismiss.
Id. at 706.
318 See, e.g., Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8150; Fed. Reg. 71,670, 71,689 n.57.
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on financial statement amounts '' 319 standard would tend to limit
the reach of liability, as recent discrimination litigation against
some of the largest public companies in the United States has
shown,3 20 discrimination cases with potentially significant effects
on financial statement amounts are not rare.
The basis of liability as principals, for laws other than the
securities laws, will necessarily draw by analogy, at least to
some extent, to the emerging law of primary liability under the
securities laws for auditors and outside counsel. The crux of
liability will likely depend, in general, on the willingness of
courts to construe some set of auditor and lawyer conduct as
constituting active participation in the corporation's illegal
conduct. To that extent, the example of Vinson & Elkins
participation in Enron's securities and financial schemes may
prove helpful to courts. Scienter may or may not be material for
illegal conduct other than for violation of the securities laws.
Where the underlying statutes are predicated on "knowing"
violation, the scienter rules of primary liability for auditors and
lawyers may be influential. This area of law is substantially
unexplored. I merely suggest here a set of possibilities that may,
with time, be exploited by plaintiffs' counsel in cases alleging
misconduct by public companies other than misconduct relating
to the securities laws.
1.

Auditors

I have already suggested that the section 10A safe-harbor
provisions can be interpreted as fairly limited in scope.3 21 The
report itself may not be used as a basis for liability. On the other
hand, the safe-harbor provisions of section 10A do not provide
protection against liability for the illegal activities themselves, at
least to the extent that the auditor had an independent duty to
act or not act. Early commentators got it right when they
observed that:
[P]laintiffs' attorneys may cite the auditor's new duty under
[section 10A] to detect and disclose illegal acts to support their
securities fraud allegations which now must be pled with
factual particularity. Plaintiffs may allege that an auditor's
failure to detect fraudulent or illegal acts demonstrates the

320

15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(a)(1) (2000).
See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.

321

See discussion supra Part II.A.

319
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requisite scienter or recklessness to sustain a primary section
10(b) or Rule 10b-5 fraud liability claim. In fact, recent
successful federal securities lawsuits against accountants
alleging direct primary fraud violations may fuel future
litigation under [section 10A1.322
The courts have emphasized that auditors face primary
liability under Rule 10b-5 where the auditor knows that its audit
opinions would reach investors. 32 3 On the other hand, "an
outside accounting firm might be blameless where it had no
reason to know that its client would use its audit report to sell
securities. '324 Knowledge or use of auditor opinions extends to
the reliance on auditor data on a company's 10-K periodic
reports. 325 Liability under section 10b extends to "a document
such as a press release, annual report, investment prospectus, or
other such document on which an investor would presumably
rely."32 6

These concepts are not necessarily new or newly applied to
auditors. However, they do suggest the contours of liability
derived from auditor obligations under section 10A based on
either the failure to report illegal activities that ought to have
been detected or on complicity in the fraud of the issuer.
Auditors would not be liable in private suits for failure to meet
their obligations under section 10A. 327 Instead, liability would
derive from the product of that failure, financial statement
amounts that materially misrepresent the financial condition of
the company or otherwise contribute to misleading disclosure by
Where the failure involves a material
the company.
3
28
the auditor's failure to comply either with
contingency,

322 Jeanne Calderon & Rachel Kowal, supra note 162, at 449-50 (1998) (citing
Robbins v. Koger Properties, Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1445-46 (11th Cir. 1997) and

Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 928 F.Supp. 557, 559-60 (W.D.
Pa. 1996)).
323 Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod., 77 F.3d 1215, 1227 (10th Cir. 1996).
324 McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102 F.3d 390, 397 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing
Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d 183, 189-90 (7th Cir. 1993)).
325 See id. (discussing dissemination of false information in 10-K report).
326 SEC v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1993); accord
Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 175-76 (3rd Cir. 2000) (regarding
accountant primary liability).
327 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(c).
328 See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, supra note 116, at 4-7
(describing disclosure guidelines for auditors dealing with loss and gain
contingencies).
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auditing standards or the requirements of the SEC 329 might
contribute to primary liability under Rule 10b-5.
2.

Outside Counsel
For lawyers, the monitoring and reporting requirements
under the regulations to SOA section 307, when amplified by
traditional ethical rules, suggest that the failure of lawyers to
detect and report illegal acts of corporate clients might well
subject lawyers to liability as principals. The extent of liability
might well depend on the adequacy of the mechanisms in place
for detection of illegal acts as well as on the lawyer's conduct
once credible evidence of the acts becomes known or should be
apparentto the lawyer.
At least since the 1980s, ethical rules have prohibited a
lawyer from assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer knows
is criminal or fraudulent. 330 The comments to that section of the
rules suggest that the consequences of a failure to observe the
rule appropriately include the lawyer running the risk of
becoming a party to the criminal or fraudulent course of
action. 331 The comments distinguish between "presenting an
analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and
recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be
329 See Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Exchange Act

Release No. 34-26831, 54 Fed. Reg.
22,427 (May 24, 1989) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 241, 271). A disclosure duty exists where management is aware
of an uncertainty that is reasonably likely to have a material effect on the
company's financial condition. Id. at 22,249. Where management cannot objectively
evaluate the reasonable likelihood of occurrence, management must evaluate the
uncertainty on the assumption that it will occur. Id. at 22,430. For auditors, this
may require both procedures that elicit representations from management and
counsel and procedures that in certain cases test those representations. All of that is
subject to discovery and may provide the basis for primary liability on the auditor's
failure to comply with their duty.
330

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002).

A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss
the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and
may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the
validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.
Id. For a discussion of the changes to Rule 1.2 in the course of the ABA's Ethics
2000 project, see Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct: Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 441, 447-48 (2002).
331 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002) cmt. 9-13.
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committed with impunity." 332 With respect to a client's course of
action already begun or continuing, the comment describes the
lawyer's responsibility as "especially delicate." 33 3 In this case the
lawyer must avoid drafting or delivering fraudulent documents,
suggesting methods for concealing the wrongdoing, and
continuing to assist the client in conduct the lawyer may have
thought was legal but thereafter discovers is not. 334 In the latter
case, the comment suggests withdrawal from the representation,
and in those cases in which "withdrawal alone might be
insufficient" and "[i]t may be necessary for the lawyer to give
notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm any opinion,
335
document, affirmation or the like."
Of course, the ethical rules are narrowly tailored to give
lawyers the benefit of the doubt in many cases. The triggering
standard is knowledge, not suspicion. Also, there appears to be
no obligation to implement procedures to guard against or detect
client misconduct. The ethical obligation posits as unethical the
lawyer actually in cahoots with the client in engaging
consciously and deliberately in acts of actual misconduct.
Ignorance is rewarded with protection against liability, but more
importantly, ignorance permits the lawyer to continue to
represent the client. Withdrawal is required only on discovery of
ongoing misconduct, and disaffirmation is suggested only to the
extent necessary to protect the lawyer from continued
implication in the client's affairs.
These basic ethical norms, however, take on new meaning
when read in light of the detection and reporting obligations of
the SOA section 307 regulations. The obligation to detect and
report has the potential to make it more likely that lawyers will
come across evidence of illegal client activity. Lawyers who see
the obvious and fail to make inquiries and who help the company
produce disclosure statements to investors indicating no reason
to worry about the potential for material effects on financial
statement amounts by reason of litigation potential are the
lawyers who may well breach breached their obligations to
detect. Furthermore, they way compounded the breach by aiding
the company in creating a false picture. These situations,
332

333
334

Id. at cmt. 9.
Id. at cmt. 10.
See id.

335 Id.
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similar to what Cheryl Wade suggested with respect to director
liability for corporate discrimination, might also have some
336
applicability to outside counsel.
Once the obligation to report has been triggered under SOA
section 307, the question for the lawyer becomes: How does my
report to the corporation change my relationship to the
corporation and to the acts that I have reported? The simplest
and best answer for lawyers is: no change. But the SOA section
307 regulations, like the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
appear to require the lawyer to resign in the event the
corporation does not satisfactorily address the lawyer's report.
Clearly, if the reporting lawyer does not obtain a satisfactory
response to her report, and fails to resign or do anything else
about it, there is a good chance that she will be deemed to have
joined in the illegal act she originally reported to the corporation.
"Regardless of the decision on the duty to disclose, the
organization does have a duty to discontinue any conduct that
violates the law. If the organization does not discontinue the
activities revealed as a result of the investigation, that inaction
itself becomes fraud. ''337 The extent of her primary liability will
depend on the nature of the illegal act and her exact course of
conduct after her report. The more she appears to have joined or
acquiesced in the illegal scheme, the greater the likelihood of
liability. As such, for example, continuing to perform services for
336 See Cheryl L. Wade, Corporate Governance Failures and the Managerial
Duty of Care, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 767 (2002). Professor Wade, in examining the
discrimination lawsuits against Texaco, suggests that:
Even if Texaco's board did not have a complete understanding of the
complaints made by Texaco's minority employees, their managers certainly
did. The court made no attempt to address the "reckless indifference" of
Texaco's officers. Nor did the court distinguish between the level of care
that should be exercised by inside, as opposed to outside, directors. Even if
Texaco's board had no reason to ask officers about racial discrimination,
the boards of companies with few or no minorities among senior managers
or executives may be recklessly indifferent to the possibility of litigation
and large settlements if they fail to ask their officers the right questions in
the aftermath of the large settlements paid by Texaco and Coca-Cola. In
other words, the boards of large public companies should inquire about
racial discrimination in order to avoid the negative publicity and huge
settlements that plagued Texaco and Coca-Cola.
Id. at 784-85; see also discussion supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text
(discussing discrimination actions against large public companies).
337 Gabriel L. Imperato, Internal Investigations, Government Investigations,
Whistleblower Concerns: Techniques to Protect Your Health Care Organization, 51
ALA. L. REV. 205, 226 (1999).
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the issuer in the face of evidence of discrimination may change
the character of the lawyer or accountant's relationship to the
discrimination to that of a discriminatory scheme. But even if
the lawyer obtains what she perceives to be a satisfactory
response, it is not clear that she, on that basis, will avoid
liability. Should both she and the corporation prove to be wrong
about the extent of liability, it is possible that she might face
338
liability as a principal.
Federal whistleblower protections included in the SarbanesOxley Act appear to provide little protection from liability for
either outside counsel or auditors. SOA is not clear about the
relationship between the section 307 requirements and the
protections afforded under the section 806 whistleblower
provisions. 33 9 For outside counsel, SOA whistleblower provisions,
if read narrowly, could appear to provide little protection for
lawyers. While section 806 extends protection to employees of a
company against retaliation by the employer under certain
specified circumstances, 340 it may not extend to suits by
unrelated parties for acts undertaken as an employee. The
encouragement of reporting under section 307 should not be read
as encouragement of reckless or negligent over-reporting which
results in damage to the company. Consequently, statutes that
protect employees reporting wrongdoing might not protect the
wrongdoing of the reporting employees.
A broader reading of the intent of the whistleblower
provisions might lead to a different result. If the purpose of the
protection is to encourage reporting, then employee liability
based on that reporting would seem to create disincentives to
robust reporting under section 307. Since the disclosure of
section 307 reporting may be a function of a company's
obligations under section 404, as overseen by the company's
outside auditors, it would be plausible to argue that any damage
alleged was not caused by the reporting employee but rather by
the reporting company and its auditors. As such, the employee
should escape liability to third parties, at least in circumstances
338 While clearly she might not have had the intent to commit or participate in
the illegal act under these circumstances, her assessment, if made recklessly
because of lapses in her information systems or due diligence, might be sufficient to
impose primary liability. See id. at 225-26.
339 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C.A. §1514A (West Supp. 2003).
340 See id. § 806(a)(1)-(2), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a)(1)-(2).
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in which the section 307 reporting might be covered by the
whistleblower protections of section 806.341
However, the SEC, in its final regulations implementing
section 307, may have taken the position that a lawyer's
obligations under section 307 are not covered by the protections
of section 806. The regulations provide that:
An attorney formerly employed or retained by an issuer who
has reported evidence of a material violation under this part
and reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged for
so doing may notify the issuer's board of directors or any
committee thereof that he or she believes that he or she has
been discharged for reporting evidence of a material violation
342
under this section.
The SEC explained that the "provision, an important
corollary to the up-the-ladder reporting requirement, is designed
to ensure that a chief legal officer ... is not permitted to block a
report to the issuer's board or other committee by discharging a
reporting attorney. '343 It is possible to interpret that this
provision to applies only to lawyers employed directly by an
issuer and that its effect is directed primarily at the obligation to
report. Thus, it may be that the notification right under section
205.3(b)(10) may be in addition to any protection offered to the
lawyer under section 806, to the extent those are otherwise
available.
D. A Hypothetical Application
I have suggested that section 10A and the regulations under
SOA section 307 can, under the right circumstances, be used to
extend primary liability to auditors and outside counsel for the
client corporation's violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the
securities laws and that they might also be useful to enhance
discovery. 344 I have also suggested an interpretation of sections
341 Of course, the circumstances under which this may occur may be quite
limited, given the potential narrowness of the application of the protection of the
whistleblower provision.
342 Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing
Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(10)
(2003).
343 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-47276, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6309 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205).
344 See supra Part III.A.
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10A and SOA section 307 which might be used to make a case for
asserting liability against a corporation's auditors and outside
counsel for violations by the client corporation of other laws such
as environmental and discrimination laws.3 45 In this section, I
provide a sketch of the sort of facts that might point to liability
on the basis I have suggested.
The key to liability is generally simple: alleging facts
sufficient to convince a judge or jury that outside counsel or the
auditors became partners in the unlawful conduct. The matter
of the quid pro quo is also a simple matter, the prospect of
continuing the business relationship and charging large fees to
the company. 346 The effect of section 10A and the SOA section
307 regulations in this context is also simple. By increasing the
obligations of outside counsel and the auditors to the company,
positive duties have been created on the part of both of these
actors to detect and report corporate misconduct. The failure to
detect and report, or the continued participation of outside
counsel or the auditors in the company's affairs in the face of
detectable and reportable events which have gone uncorrected,
suggests not mere approval but collusion, and this collusion
increases the likelihood of characterization of outside counsel or
auditor conduct as actionable.
There are a number of circumstances that might provide a
case for lawyer or auditor liability for a corporation's breaches of
laws other than the securities laws. For purposes of this section,
I limit myself to violations made by the client company of the
discrimination laws. Consider the following imaginary set of
facts:
Company is a corporation whose shares have been publicly
traded on a national stock exchange for a number of years. It
employs 5,000 people in plants scattered throughout the United

345 See supraPart III.B.
346 See William T. Allen & Arthur Siegel, Threats and Safeguards in the
Determinationof Auditor Independence, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 519, 520 (2002).
No fact more tellingly establishes that independence remains potentially
problematic, even though consulting is now made illegal, than the fact that
Arthur Anderson reportedly received approximately $26 million in audit
fees from Enron. Worldcoms[sic] audit fees were of the same magnitude.
Audit fees of this size are alone large enough to tempt audit partners from
the narrow path of rectitude. Thus, complex issues of auditor independence
do remain after passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
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States. Most of the employees are hourly workers employed in
low-skill manufacturing and assembly positions. Company's
board consists of 15 people, ten of whom are "independent"; the
rest are officers of Company. The Board is divided into a
number of committees. One of these, the Audit Committee, is
composed of six of the independent board members, two of whom
are the chief financial officers of their respective companies, and
both of whom are CPAs. Since Caremark,347 Company has
implemented systems of internal monitoring. These consist of
programs of formal reporting up the corporate chain of command
to the board, as well as formal and informal procedures for
"whistleblowing."
These programs have concentrated on
financial statement issues. Since the passage of SOA, Company
has augmented its programs of internal control in order to
comply with the requirements of SOA. In particular, the Audit
Committee has been given additional authority with respect to
financial statement monitoring, and a procedure for anonymous
disclosure to the Audit Committee has been instituted.
Counsel is a large law firm representing a number of public
companies.
Counsel has 100 partners and 200 associates
working in several practice groups, the largest of which are
litigation, corporate/securities, commercial, employment law,
and tax.
Counsel prides itself on a culture of partner
independence and exposure to clients.
Although multiple
partners and associates may perform work for a client, there are
only, at best, ad hoc procedures for communication between
them, especially if the lawyers are working out of different
practice groups. Counsel has represented Company for years,
from which it earns substantial fees. Although Partner X has
been the "billing partner" for years, concentrating principally on
securities laws issues, Partner Y and Partner Z have been
handling Company's labor and environmental issues for a
number of years. In addition, anywhere from four to fifteen
associates may be working on Company matters from time to
time.
Company's General Counsel is a former partner of
Counsel. General Counsel has hired a number of younger
lawyers away from Counsel. Relations between the office of
Company's General Counsel and Counsel are extremely close.
347 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). See supra notes 224-33 and accompanying
text. (discussing the Caremark case with respect to the development of the law of
the obligation to monitor).
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Counsel has prepared the employee handbook, counseled
Company extensively on employee hiring and termination policy,
counseled on specific cases involving worker termination, and
developed the terms of employment used by the company.
Counsel has litigated a number of lawsuits filed by former
employees, including suits alleging employment discrimination.
A few of these have drawn significant attention in the popular
press, and Partner Y was quoted extensively in newspapers and
on local television to the effect that Company has never done
anything wrong and had never discriminated against any racial
or ethnic group. After some of these suits were settled, Counsel
advised Company on a number of changes it could make to
minimize its exposure to such suits in the future. In connection
with its securities-laws obligations to Company, Counsel has
chosen to make no changes to its procedures. These procedures
consist of the usual client due diligence and circulation of
internal memoranda to firm partners seeking information
material to Company for purposes of disclosure and responses to
the annual auditor's request for information. While the system
has worked well enough in the past, there have been occasions
when busy partners have forgotten to respond and securities
filings have had to be amended. With respect to litigation and
other claims, Counsel has always taken a very conservative
approach with respect to disclosure, especially to Auditor.
Company's financial statements have been audited by
Auditor, a large firm providing accounting and related services
worldwide. Auditor has provided auditing, tax accounting, and
general consulting services to Company since it went public. It
has earned substantial fees for these services in the past. Since
the passage of SOA, however, Auditor has limited its work to
auditing and tax accounting services, for which it continues to
receive fees that are material to the profitability of the firm.
These services include year-end audit responsibilities and
limited review of other financial reports required to be filed
under the securities laws. Auditor and Counsel have provided
similar services for a number of companies and many of the
partners and associates of Counsel and Auditor are well known
to and trust one other. In addition, many former partners and
employees of Auditor now are employed in accounting and
finance positions in Company. As a result, relations between
Auditor and Company are deep and strong.
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Company has demanded increased flexibility in its freedom
to hire workers.
A number of employees, from senior
management down to plant managers, have quietly sought to be
able to hire only those people with whom they felt a
compatibility. Counsel has been more than happy to comply
with the requests for help in this context. Company's employee
workforce is 60% white and 20% Asian. Of the remaining 1,000
employees, about 700 are Hispanic, mostly female, and 300 are
African-American, mostly male, employees, all in the lowest
paying jobs. Company's management is overwhelmingly white.
Company's finance department has hired a number of Asian
employees; however, most of them are quite junior. They have
joked to their counterparts working for Auditors that they
describe themselves as the "coolie labor" at the Company because
they suspect they will have to leave to get promoted. When a low
level employee of Auditor asked why they never said anything,
she was told that at Company it never paid to be too vocal
because people who stood out that way tended to have very short
tenures at Company. The gist of this conversation was passed
on to the partner in charge.
The partner dismissed the
conversation, characterizing it as nothing more than whining by
young people.
For a number of years, the number of unlawful termination
lawsuits alleging racial and ethnic discrimination, have been
rising. More of these cases have been settled and the amounts
paid in settlement have been growing. When the increase was
brought to the attention of Counsel's Partner Y, she explained it
away by suggesting that hungry plaintiffs' counsel with poor law
school educations brought on the increase. Indeed, the only
response of Counsel, along with senior management of Company,
was to rework the employee manual and other terms of
employment so that while the rate of hiring minority employees
increased, so did the rate of termination. In addition, and with
Counsel's concurrence, Company retained a public relations firm
that produced a video for distribution to the public, which stated
that Company offered an open and diverse workplace where
people from every background could feel they could rise as far as
their talents could take them. Partner X appeared briefly in the
video. In addition, the Company continues to report to its
investors that employee relations are excellent and that the

20031

THE DUTY TO MONITOR

1003

company's new and expanded monitoring systems will ensure no
disclosure or financial statement problems.
It was not uncommon for ethnic jokes to be circulated widely
via e-mail within Company's management. Many of these were
forwarded to associates at Auditor and Counsel. These were
brought to the attention of the senior managers at Counsel and
Auditor. After Partner X talked with his counterpart at Auditor,
Auditor's and Counsel's complaining employees were told that
they were being too hypersensitive and ought to keep their
opinions to themselves. They were told that, if they didn't like
the e-mails, they should tell the sender to stop sending them
those sorts of jokes. Additionally, several of Counsel's associates
have noted the absence of a diverse workforce and have
mentioned this to Partners X and Y. Moreover, both Counsel
and Auditor's employees reported on the lack of diversity in their
own contacts with Company during the course of their legal and
audit work for Company.
Neither Counsel nor Auditor have fulfilled their detect and
report obligations under section 10A or the SOA section 307
regulations. Counsel, however, has worked extensively with
management on its MD&A disclosures.
Management's
discussion and assessment of the effectiveness of Company's
internal control structures and its procedures for financial
reporting under SOA section 404(a) 348 were based on informal
conversations between Counsel, the Audit Committee, and
management staff.349 In the course of the preparation of that
disclosure, Counsel learned that the Audit Committee received
an increasing number of anonymous complaints about lack of
diversity and incidents characterized as originating in racial or
ethnic animus.
These were referred to management.
Management explained that these were a result of agitation by
outsiders. The Audit Committee members have joked about
these complaints and suggested that the disgruntled employees
go back where they came from or made light of the complaints in
some other way. Indeed, both Auditor and Counsel learned
during the course of their review that the Audit Committee was
especially offended to learn about an off network internet site
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262 (West Supp. 2003).
On this basis the Company's principal executive and financial officers signed
the certification in the form required by Sarbanes Oxley § 302(a), 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 7241 and the regulations thereunder.
348

349
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called "The Discriminatory Company: Sharing Examples of
Discrimination at Company," which contained a large number of
complaints about incidents of race and ethnic discrimination at
the Company. Both Counsel and Auditor personnel viewed the
site. The auditors reviewing management's assessments of its
internal controls were also made aware of the complaints and
the responses of Company management and the board. But the
auditors neither discussed this with Counsel nor looked further
350
into the matter.
The hypothetical related above is full of missteps. It is
meant to illustrate the ease with which clumsiness, the refusal
to institute systems of information gathering and review, and an
ingrained blindness to data from the lower level employees of
both the client company and the monitors themselves, can with
little effort produce a set of facts which might well give rise to
inferences of both primary liability for securities fraud and joint
liability for discrimination. A few factors should be considered
with regards to outside counsel:
1.

Is there an internal monitoring system in place at the firm?
The implementation of procedures for gathering information
acquired from all of the lawyers performing work for the client
company may be an important factor for assessing Counsel
compliance with its obligations. In the hypothetical, Company
implemented monitoring systems after Caremark and updated
the systems after SOA. Company has acted conservatively and
adopted a course of conduct that should increase the likelihood
that potential violations will be caught early. Counsel, on the
other hand, has taken a more aggressive position. It has chosen
to make no changes to its internal procedures in the face of the
adoption of the SOA section 307 regulations. This choice may
impede Counsel's ability to reasonably detect evidence of
wrongdoing and, in addition, may make it more difficult to prove
that Counsel was not negligent (or worse) in its compliance with
its monitoring obligations.

350 Because the audit team was split into groups, the senior members of the
Auditor never learned about the pattern of suit, settlement, and complaints relating
to employee terminations, even though junior members of the audit team had run
across these and their counterparts in Company's finance department raised some
very discrete concern.
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Is there a culture of communication within the firm?

That is, do the labor lawyers speak with the securities or
Having a monitoring system in place,
business lawyers?
whether formal or informal does not guarantee compliance, or an
easy means to minimize exposure to liability. Current federal
prosecutorial principles applicable to corporations should serve
as a caution in this respect:
[T]he existence of a compliance program is not sufficient, in and
of itself, to justify not charging a corporation for criminal
conduct undertaken by its officers, directors, employees, or
agents. Indeed, the commission of such crimes in the face of a
corporate
compliance program may suggest that the 351
management is not adequately enforcing its program.
In this hypothetical, lawyers in Counsel do not communicate
efficiently with each other. This will increase the chances that
something important may be missed. Caremark makes it clear
that communication is crucial to detection and reporting. Here,
Counsel operates in a way that makes it more difficult to gather,
analyze and report evidence of wrongdoing to the appropriate
officer of Company.
Is there a procedure for anonymous reporting?
This is especially important for associates who fear
discipline where one of the outside counsel's partners may be
involved with management in unlawful activity of which the
other partners are unaware. 352 Counsel has no procedure for
3.

351 Memorandum for the Deputy Attorney General, supra note 9, at Part VII.A
(entitled "Charging a Corporation: Corporate Compliance Programs").
352 Fear of discipline, of course, is not limited to associates. See, e.g., Bohatch v.
Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543, 547 (Tex. 1998) (holding no liability to a
partnership where it expelled a junior partner from a firm after reporting a more
senior partner for over-billing). The Bohatch court recognized the conundrum
created by its decision:
We emphasize that our refusal to create an exception to the at-will nature
of partnerships in no way obviates the ethical duties of lawyers. Such
duties sometimes necessitate difficult decisions, as when a lawyer suspects
overbilling by a colleague. The fact that the ethical duty to report may
create an irreparable schism between partners neither excuses the failure
to report nor transforms expulsion as a means of resolving that schism into
a tort.
Id. But see Wieder v. Skala, 80 N.Y.2d 628, 635-38, 609 N.E.2d 105, 108-09 (N.Y.
1992) (stating that an associate terminated for reporting misconduct of another
associate had a valid contract claim based on implied obligation to comply with
rules of legal profession).
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anonymous reporting. Were one of the partners to engage in
wrongful activity in collusion with Company, Counsel itself may
face liability. This is a problem the importance of which Arthur
Anderson discovered only after the Enron collapse when it failed
to successfully blame one of its partners for any of the
wrongdoing ascribed to the firm. 353 Lawyers will now face the
same sort of problem in similar circumstances.
In this
hypothetical, for example, it might have been useful to provide a
means of informing the other partners in Counsel about the
appearance of Partner X in the Company video.
4.

Does the firm represent the client company in labor matters,
for example does the firm prepare or advise on the
preparation of the employee handbook, counsel on employee
hiring and termination policy, counsel on specific cases,
develop terms of employment used by the client company,
help negotiate collective bargaining or other employment
agreements?
In the Enron context, Vinson & Elkins found itself unable to
extricate itself from the lawsuits against its client because it had
contributed to a history that lent itself to an interpretation of
collusion with the company in its wrongdoing. 354
In the
hypothetical, Counsel may be crossing the line as well. Counsel
has advised Company of how to improve hiring and termination
procedures in order to comply with recent developments in
discrimination lawsuits. Counsel made representations to the
press in connection with some of the lawsuits but with perhaps
broader implications.
Especially damaging, potentially, was
Counsel's participation in the creation of the video. Counsel in
the future may have to have firmly in mind the distinction made
353 "Some of these people will even trot out the hoary (and discredited) old saw
that they were 'just following orders.'" Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron, Titanic and the
Perfect Storm, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1373, 1393 (2003) (citing Tom Fowler, ExAndersen Auditor Defended;Aide: Boss Was Told to Shred Files, HOUS. CHRON.,
Mar. 7, 2002, at 1 ("An assistant to the Arthur Andersen lead partner who handled
the Enron account said she believes her boss was just following orders when he told
workers to destroy Enron-related documents last fall.")). A year after enactment of
SOA, the emerging common knowledge suggests that provisions for the anonymous
reporting of suspected illegal conduct is now "a requirement for public companies."
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Changing
(Nov. 19, 2003), available at http://www.cfenet.com/411/FederalSentencing
GuidelinesChanging.asp? Source=FIN_2003_1119 (Last visited Nov. 19, 2003).
354 See supra notes 315-17 and accompanying text.
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by the district courts between the conduct of Kirkland & Ellis, on
356
the one hand,355 and Vinson & Elkins, on the other hand.
5.

To what extent are firm lawyers aware of their client
surroundings?

Does the firm make a point of noticing the obvious things,
for example, that the only females employed at its corporate
headquarters are secretaries and file clerks, and the only African
Americans are technicians and janitors? Counsel is aware of
past discrimination suits. Counsel allows compatibility hiring.
Several associates of Counsel and Auditor have noticed a lack of
diversity in Company's work force after working with contacts in
Company; some have received ethnically pointed e-mails and
have gotten other hints of potential trouble at the Company.
The information of the web site itself, let alone its very existence,
provides a large amount of evidence which, at a minimum, might
be worth exploring. 357 In adopting the final regulations to SOA
section 307, the SEC sought to assure the practicing bar that it
would not be required to report , or expected to report, "'gossip,
hearsay, [or] innuendo.' Nor is the rule's reporting obligation
triggered by 'a combination of circumstances from which the
attorney, in retrospect, should have drawn an inference,' as one

355 See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
356

See supra notes 315-17 and accompanying text.

357

Those who think such sites are a rarity would do well to surf the internet. A

number of such sites have been the object of some discussion.

Many of the "complaint" Web sites contain forums for disgruntled current
and ex-employees. The walmartsucks.com, chasebanksucks.com and
bestbye.com sites are three of the more popular among such employees.
Most employee complaints seem to revolve around poor treatment of lowerranking employees by management. While rooted in some element of truth,
many complaints are one-sided, exaggerated and sometimes outright false.
Nevertheless, when an anti-company Web site is set up by existing
employees, employers must be aware that taking action against the site
could violate labor laws. If a site discusses company policies and invites
other employees to comment, then it can be considered "concerted activity"
and is protected by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). In short,
where the company does not sponsor the Web site or host it on company
servers, there may be little the company can do to shut down employee
forums. As discussed below, however, companies can pursue employees
and non-employees who the company believes are revealing confidential
information and spreading false rumors.
Ronald F. Lopez, CorporateStrategies for Addressing Internet "Complaint"Sites, 14
INT'L L. PRACTICUM 101, 104 (2001).
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commentator feared." 358 Information that may not be sufficient
to trigger reporting, standing alone, however, may be sufficient
to put Counsel on notice investiagte carefully. Both lawyers and
accountants should be aware of the SEC's view, with respect to
evidence of material violation: "The evidence of a material
violation that an attorney first becomes aware of may be the tip
of an iceberg and, may, on its face, appear unlikely to result in
359
substantial injury to the issuer."

6.

To what extent do the lawyers ask questions?
There is, by now, in most large firms representing public
companies quite well oiled machinery for the acquisition of
360
business and other purposes built around the "legal audit."

Surely, in that context, it is difficult to remain oblivious or be
shy in conducting such audits with respect to key issues.
Partners seeking material for disclosure have access to internal
358

Implementation

of Standards

of Professional

Conduct for Attorneys,

Exchange Act Release No. 34-47276, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6302 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
359 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-46868, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670, 71,682 (proposed Dec. 2,
2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205) (commenting on proposed section 205.3(b),
"[w]hen an attorney 'becomes aware' of information that would lead an attorney
reasonably to believe in the existence of a material violation would turn, at least in
part, on the attorney's training, experience, position, and seniority. Attorneys are
not necessarily expected to identify issues they are not equipped to see").
360 For a classic study, see, for example, Louis M. Brown, Legal Audit, 38 S.
CAL. L. REV. 431, 436-45 (1965) (commenting on the structuring legal audits for
preventative lawyering). In the health care area today, one commentator noted that
"[flor example, one recently published guide designed to give corporate counsel an
overview to legal audits and investigations contained over 25 chapters and 800
pages on a variety of regulatory regimes, from antitrust to urine testing, and still
did not discuss laws specific to health care organizations." James G. Sheehan, Book
Review, 24 J. LEG. MED. 135, 135-36 (2003) (reviewing LINDA A. BAUMAN, HEALTH
CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE: PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES (2002)). Some commentators

have begun to suggest the institutionalization of legal audits within the structure of
public company boards.
A more formal mechanism for empowering directors to obtain legal advice
is the establishment of a legal audit committee. A committee whose
mission is to ensure legal compliance could focus on the quality of the
corporation's legal resources and could demand that the corporation's
lawyers, both in-house and outside counsel, thoroughly inform directors
and officers as they make corporate policy. Such a committee could provide
an additional mechanism for regular information flow between the board
and the lawyers.
Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future
Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097, 1136 (2003).
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memoranda, even if it is out of date or lacking appropriate
information. At some point, Counsel and Auditor have to look
around and ask the obvious: Is discrimination taking place? In
this context, it should not be enough for lawyers to claim it is
61
none of their business.
7.

To what extent do lawyers test the conclusions of
management with respect to areas of high-risk litigation,
such as compliance with discrimination laws?
Due diligence requires more than off the cuff explanations
from management. Here, there were a number of facts wellknown to Counsel that suggested a greater involvement in issues
of discrimination. Both the answers given by management and
the Audit Committee were far too facile and in need of some
testing. Of course, the problem in the hypothetical goes deeper.
Counsel is dangerously close to becoming, if it is not already, an
active participant in the Company's employment strategies.
Acceptance of explanations from management and the Audit
Committee in the form described above adds what might be
strong circumstantial evidence of collusion.
8.

To what extent does outside counsel talk to auditors?
Traditional relationships between auditors and lawyers
have been formal at best and for good reason.362 Before SOA and
the addiction of federal and state prosecutors to the questionable
tactic of cooperation, including "voluntary" waiver of privilege
and work product protection, communication could well imperil
attorney-client privilege as well as the willingness of corporate
clients to speak candidly to lawyers. Management's heightened
disclosure obligations, however, as well as outside counsel's
independent obligations to the company, effectively expose it to
disclosure information which in years past might well have been
considered work product or privileged. It stands to reason that
significant litigation over the course of the next several years
will substantially rewrite law and expectations in this area. 363
See, e.g., Wade, supranote 336, at 784-85.
This formality, of course, was memorialized in the rules relating to lawyer
responses to audit letter requests. See A.B.A., AUDITOR'S LETTER HANDBOOK 13-14
361

362

(1990).

363 Indeed, the aggressive attack on privilege by prosecutors, in combination
with extensions of federal regulatory powers, makes issues of privilege once a
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In this case, there was substantial informal discussion between
Counsel and Auditor at virtually every level of their respective
organizations, but there was little formal communication. The
informal communication tended to be undervalued, and the
formal communication was overblown in importance. Yet, in the
hypothetical, it is possible that evidence of illegal acts or
material violations such as discrimination could have been more
usefully developed with greater communication between Auditor
and Counsel.
9.

Does Counsel have procedures or standards in place for
determining under what circumstances SOA section 307
reporting must be made?
Do Counsel's personnel recognize evidence of "material
violations" should they come across it? Counsel has no such
procedures. Everyone is flying blind. The result is an increased
likelihood that Counsel will neither have control of its own
disclosure obligation process, nor be able to determine when
disclosure might be required. When added to Counsel's failure to
institute procedures for detecting evidence of wrongdoing,
Counsel appears to have deliberately (or at least recklessly)
acted to avoid learning anything that it might have to report. In
this hypothetical, though, Counsel could not help but learn about
evidence of material violations. The problem here is a lack of
any guidance for "processing" information received in order to
make reasonable assessments its character of the information,
an assessment which, in turn, indicated, if any. Moreover, in
this case, given the history of discrimination lawsuits, 364 outside
governmental investigation is commenced. Lawyers and auditors ought to
reconsider the boundaries of their communication in light of the emerging realities,
not the theoretics, of disclosure, privilege, and waiver. See, e.g., Michael A. Simons,
Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and Good Corporate Citizenship, 76 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 979, 996-98 (2002).

Now, prosecutors take a far more aggressive approach. If a corporation
hopes to avoid indictment, it may have to disclose the factual findings of
the internal investigation, to disclose all of the information gathered
during the internal investigation, to waive the attorney-client privilege
and work-product protection, to terminate the offending employees, to
replace management, and even to actively assist the government in covert
investigations of employees, competitors, vendors, and clients. To
prosecutors, this "super-cooperation" is simply "good corporate citizenship."
To corporations, it can be a minefield.
Id. at 99-97 (citations omitted).
364 See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
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counsel might be recklessly indifferent under SOA section 307
for failing to test for compliance.
10. With respect to securities law disclosure, is the firm
reasonably confident that the material statements contained
in the disclosure documents, the preparation and review of
which are the responsibility of the firm, are truthful?
In particular, lawyers will have to pay attention to
management's SOA section 404 disclosures. This section raises
two issues. The first relates to the reliability of management's
disclosure which was partially discussed at No. 8 above. The
second relates to issues of discovery.
To a certain extent,
information used to prepare disclosure documents will be subject
to discovery. Moreover, certain information will have to be
produced to support management's position with respect to
intent and knowledge. These documents, however, could be very
damaging in a discrimination lawsuit. In this hypothetical,
disclosure from the Company's monitoring system, the
intervention of Counsel in the preparation of the video and
Company's labor matters, the web site, and other information
create a strong suggestion that statements made to investors
might not be truthful in a material way. Specifically, the
Company has not disclosed the likelihood of exposure to
potentially significant liability for violating the discrimination
laws.
Counsel and Auditor face, to differing degrees, the
prospect of liability as principals, as well.
A few factors should be considered with regards to auditors:
1.

Several of the points described above are equally applicable
365
in the auditing context.

In particular, auditors can no longer rely on "financial
statements only by tunnel vision" as a limiting characterization
of their obligations. In the hypothetical, Auditor personnel
365 Communication within the audit team has been emphasized by the
profession in the context of financial statement fraud. See SAS 99, supra note 150,
at para.14-18. "Communication among the audit team about the risks of material
misstatement due to fraud also should continue throughout the audit-for example,
in evaluating the risks of material misstatement due to fraud at or near the
completion of the field work." Id. at para. 18. This framework for audit work,
extended to include illegal acts specified in SAS 54, ought to characterize the work
of auditors in the field who seek to minimize liability. See supra notes 157-58 and
accompanying text.
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appear all too ready to discount information about Company's
potential exposure to liability for discrimination. Auditors here
cannot hide behind SAS No. 54366 merely because the issue of
discrimination is not directly tied to financial statement
amounts. Auditors are well aware of the large loss contingencies
and actual expenses incurred by large clients in connection with
the defense and settlement of discrimination lawsuits.
Discrimination suits form an everyday part of corporate
compliance. Among the greatest lapses in this hypothetical was
the Audit partner's willingness to quickly dismiss information
gathered by lower level Auditor employees. 367 For example, the
evidence suggesting retaliatory discharges, a common enough
practice in certain circumstances, might well have required
greater inquiry. Indeed, one of the great failings of Auditor and
Counsel in the hypothetical is the ease with which the
suggestions and opinions of junior members of the team are
dismissed. At the same time, auditors may now be required to
be more proactive in discussions with the audit committee,
especially with respect to information which might have been
received by the audit committee that bears on possible illegal
36 8
acts with material effects on the financial statements.

366 See supra notes 150-61 and accompanying text.
367 In this connection, SAS 99, supra note 150, provides some guidance for the

auditor. In particular, the exhibit to SAS 99 would suggest that the sort of conduct
exhibited in the hypothetical by Company employees should have alerted auditors

to possible fraud or other illegal activity. See id.; see also id. at 64-66 (describing
elements of a positive work environment).
368 In this regard, consider the proposed change to AU § 316 recently proposed
by the AICPA:
Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires each audit
committee to establish procedures for (a) the receipt, retention, and
treatment of complaints received by the issuer regarding accounting,

internal accounting controls, or auditing matters; and (b) the confidential,
anonymous submission by employees of the issuer of concerns regarding
questionable accounting or auditing matters. For entities subject to these
requirements, the auditor should inquire as to the procedures placed in
operation, and complaints

received or concerns

expressed under the

procedures established by the audit committee as a result of these
requirements.
AICPA Auditing Standards Board, Exposure Draft: Proposed Statement on
Auditing Standards, Sarbanes-Oxley Omnibus Statement on Auditing Standards 22
(April 1, 2003), http://www.aicpa.org/download/auditstd/ed2OO304Olsas-s-o.pdf
(last visited Sept. 30, 2003).
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Of primary importance to auditors, however, is the need to

accept that the borders of their obligations to the client
company have been extended, whether they like it or not.
Hiding one's head in the sand of the narrowly circumscribed
"financial statements" will now offer little protection. Awareness
of the obvious and following through on clues that appear during
the course of a review will require a broader scope of
investigation. To some extent, the accounting profession is not
oblivious to these realities. This is underlined by SAS No. 99's
emphasis on the exercise of "professional skepticism when
considering the possibility that a material misstatement due to
fraud could be present." 369 In this case, the auditors clearly
failed to meet the SAS No. 99 standard. The excuse, of course, is
that such skepticism was not required since the problem in the
hypothetical involved a "legal" issue rather than one directly
related to financial statement fraud. However, even under a
loose reading of the standards of SAS

54,370

it might appear

reckless at best for Auditor to fail to bring the matter more
forcefully to the attention of the Board. It would not be too great
a stretch, under the facts described above, to paint a merely
auditor as a willing participant in a deliberate scheme to
discriminate. In the hypothetical, it seems fairly clear that there
were sufficient facts of which both Auditor and Counsel not only
should have been made aware active monitoring systems could
reasonably have been expected to pick up enough information to
warrant further inquiry but of which they were made aware.
These facts, at a minimum, should have triggered further
inquiry.

369 See SAS 99, supra note 150, at para. 2. Indeed, lawyers might well learn
from auditors in this regard:
The auditor should conduct the engagement with a mindset that
recognizes the possibility that a material misstatement due to fraud could
be present, regardless of any past experience with the entity and
regardless of the auditor's belief about management's honesty and
integrity. Furthermore, professional skepticism requires an ongoing
questioning of whether the information and evidence obtained suggests
that a material misstatement due to fraud has occurred.
Id. at para. 13.
370 See supranotes 150-61 and accompanying text.
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Are reporting obligations triggered under section 10a (for
Auditor) and the SOA section 307 regulations (for Counsel)?

From my perspective, the information was, by the time of
the preparation of the SOA section 404 disclosures, sufficiently
well developed to have warranted reporting. An objection could
be made, of course, that a reporting of sorts was made. Counsel
certainly sought information from management and the Audit
Committee. Given the facile nature of the response, however,
informal inquiry would not have been sufficient in this case. The
failure to make formal reports to management or to the Board,
as necessary in this case, would provide some additional
circumstantial evidence of the complicity of both Auditor and
Counsel in the Company's discriminatory activities. Recall also
that the quid pro quo for complicity in this case would be
substantial given the fees received for services rendered.
4.

To what extent is there real independence among Auditor,
Counsel, and Company?

The issue of auditor independence has become increasingly
important. Section 10A as well as other governmental and
industry initiatives have focused on this issue in order to
promote confidence in financial reporting and thus to strengthen
the integrity of financial markets. Good arguments have been
made that such initiatives have had perverse effects on
independence. 371 Indeed, where there are close relationships
between employees of Company and Auditor, those relationships
might create "an additional incentive for auditors to care more
about the care-and-feeding of their clients than about the
integrity of the audit services being provided." 372 The SOA
Auditor conflict of interest rules seek to ameliorate this problem,
but they do not solve it.3 The same arguments, to some extent,
371 See Jonathon Macy & Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the Role of
Commodification, Independence, and Governance in the Accounting Industry, 48
VILL. L. REV. 1167, 1175-76 (2003).
372 Id. at 1178 (citing In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F.
Supp. 2d 549, 647 (S.D. Tex. 2002)) (discussing independence of in-house audits and
noting that more than three hundred accounting and finance positions at Enron
were filled with former Arthur Anderson employees).
373In fact, SOA section 206 creates his problem, making it
unlawful for a registered public accounting firm to perform for an issuer
any audit service required by this title, if a chief executive officer,
controller, chief financial officer, chief accounting officer or any person
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might also be made with respect to lawyer independence.
Where, for example, the General Counsel of Company is a former
partner of Counsel, and the legal department of the client
Company is made up of former employees of Counsel, in today's
environment, it might be difficult to convince regulators or the
markets that there is a sufficient degree of independence
between outside lawyers and the client company. Though these
past connections alone might not be questionable, they could
provide another bit of the circumstantial evidence used to paint
a picture of collusion.
5.

In the event of an unsatisfactory response to formal
reporting of evidence of material violations or illegal
activities, is resignation the only viable option?
Perhaps the better view was nicely summarized a number of
years ago:
I would suggest that in securities matters (other than those
where advocacy is clearly proper) the attorney will have to
function in a manner more akin to that of auditor than to that
of the attorney. This means several things. It means that he
will have to exercise a measure of independence that is perhaps
uncomfortable if he is also the close counselor of management
in other matters, often including business decisions. It means
he will have to be acutely cognizant of his responsibility to the
public who engage in securities transactions that would never
have come about were it not for his professional presence. It
means that he will have to adopt the healthy skepticism toward
the representation of management which a good auditor must
adopt. It means that he will have to do the same thing the
auditor does when confronted with an intransigent clientresign .374
serving in an equivalent position for the issuer, was employed by that
registered independent public accounting firm and participated in any
capacity in the audit of that issuer during the 1-year period preceding the

date of the initiation of the audit.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 206, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(1) (West Supp. 2003).There is,
however, no corresponding limitation for movement at lower levels between auditors
and client companies. Had Arthur Anderson adhered to SOA section 206 rules, it is

not clear that the outcome in In re Enron would have been different. See In re
Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 647.

374 A.A. Sommer, Jr., The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer,
Address to the Banking, Corporation & Business Law Section of the N.Y. State Bar
Ass'n (Jan. 24, 1974), in LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA GABALDON, SECURITIES

REGULATION 617-19 (4th ed. 1999).
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Silence has been the great temptation of auditors since the
passage of section 10A, sometimes to their regret. 75 Silence will
likely be more costly to auditors under section 10A and lawyers
under the detect-and-report regime of SOA 307 regulations in
the future, at least if imaginative plaintiffs' counsel and
sympathetic courts have anything to do with it.
The hypothetical related above contains illustrations of
conduct best avoided under the heightened post-SOA monitoring
regimes. As plaintiffs counsel contemplates a class action
discrimination lawsuit against Company, circumstances like
these might well prompt such counsel to look at the exposure of
auditors and outside counsel as well. The extent of disclosure by
Company in its securities law filings and in other public
information, coupled with the apparent collusion of Company's
auditors and lawyers, may be sufficient to support liability of the
outside counsel and auditors. Moreover, for securities holders
facing a loss of value as a consequence of the Company's liability
for widespread discrimination, the auditors and lawyers, under
these circumstances, might also share primarily liability for
securities fraud.
CONCLUSION WITH A LOOK TOWARD THE FUTURE
Lawyers and accountants have tried to recast both the SOA
section 307 regulations and the detect-and-report obligations
under section 10A as species of re-articulations
of
provisions.3 7 6
existing
already
within
understandings
Compliance with some sort of very narrowly defined set of
obligations under this view will ensure protection both from
liability under the respective gatekeeper provision and from
liability as principal wrongdoers. Thus reduced in scope and
thrust, auditors and lawyers would appear to have nothing more
than the obligation to report to management those fairly
375 See, e.g., Darin Bartholomew, Is Silence Golden When it Comes to Auditing?,
36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 57, 93-98 (2002)."Even after section 1OA(b) was enacted
and prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley amendments to section 10A, independent auditors
have sometimes hesitated to engage in whistleblowing activity." Id. at 93.
376 See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Lawyer Professional
Responsibility, and a Heightened Role For Business Lawyers, NEV. LAW., March
2003, at 8. Accountants have sought to defend against action by the SEC on similar
grounds. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Solucorp Indus. Ltd. 197 F. Supp. 2d 4, 10 (S.D.N.Y.
2002); In re Sunterra Corp. Sec. Litig., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1321 (M.D. Fla. 2002);
In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
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substantial items of evidence of wrongdoing that they might
encounter by chance. Serendipity can thus reward sophisticated
guile on the part of management, or at least provide lawyers and
auditors with the defense of management guile whenever
liability is asserted.
I have tried to demonstrate, however, that neither section
10A nor SOA section 307 were written so narrowly.
The
intention of Congress to create positive detection and reporting
obligations, substantial in scope and not limited by the sort of
game playing that outside professionals and their clients have
become accustomed to playing, 377 is apparent from the context in
3 78
which both statutes were enacted. The fact that both the SEC
and private litigants have been slow to acknowledge or take
advantage of these changes does not alter either the character or
the scope of the new obligations.
Among the unexplored but potentially far reaching effects of
section 10A and the SOA section 307 regulations are the ways in
which private litigants, especially private litigants asserting
claims for corporate violation of law other than the securities
laws, may be able to take advantage of the monitoring provisions
now written into the federal securities laws. I have tried to show
how in the context of recent discrimination actions against large
public companies like Coca-Cola and Texaco the provisions of
section 10A may serve as a source of discovery for plaintiffs.
Equally important, the conduct of auditors and outside counsel
might also provide the basis for the assertion of claims against
either or both.
The sort of narrow and prissy reading of section 10A and
SOA advanced by the accounting and legal professions may
provide each of them some comfort. Juries hearing cases,
however, in which auditors and lawyers seek exculpation by
resort to a highly technical defense of "I didn't have to report it"
or "I wasn't required to act on my suspicions" may be less willing
to give the provisions the sort of narrow interpretation which,
377 The relationship between the management of Enron and its outside counsel
provide a case in point. For a critical discussion, see Coffee, supra note 16, at 1403-

05; Koniak, supra note 115, at 201-10.
378 For an example of a case where the SEC chose to litigate under section 10A
see, Solucorp Industries, 197 F. Supp. 2d at 4. While there may be more coming, it is
clear that the SEC's prosecutorial reticence has given the auditing community some
sense of protection against the broader implications of the duties imposed on the
profession by Section 10A.
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while plausible, is not required. Only the future will tell
whether the statutes are ultimately enforced broadly or whether
they are meant merely as window dressing for a business-asusual approach to the duties of outside counsel and auditors.

